Supreme Court Redistricting Decision: Texas Gerrymandering Case (Abbott v. LULAC)

Assistance from Claude AI.

Overview

This is a Supreme Court order granting a stay application, issued December 4, 2025. Think of a stay as a “pause button” on a lower court’s decision. When the Supreme Court grants a stay, it temporarily blocks a lower court’s ruling from taking effect while the case works its way through the appeals process. In emergency situations like this, the Court can issue these orders quickly—sometimes over a weekend—without full briefing or oral arguments. This is part of what critics call the “shadow docket.”

The practical effect here is enormous: the Supreme Court has allowed Texas to use a redistricting map that a lower court found violated the Constitution.

The Parties

Applicants (seeking the stay):

Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, and other state officials
These are the defendants in the original lawsuit who lost at the District Court level

Respondents (opposing the stay):

League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and other civil rights organizations
These are the plaintiffs who successfully challenged the map below

The Factual Background: An Unusual Mid-Decade Redistricting

To understand this case, you need to know that redistricting normally happens once per decade after the census. But in 2025, something unusual occurred:

Spring 2025: The Trump Administration urged Texas to redraw its congressional map mid-decade to create more Republican seats. Texas officials initially resisted—they’d just redrawn districts after the 2020 census, and mid-decade redistricting is politically risky.

July 7, 2025: The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division sent Texas a letter claiming that four of its congressional districts were illegal “coalition districts.” Coalition districts are areas where two or more minority groups (like Black and Hispanic voters) together form a majority and can elect their preferred candidates. The DOJ letter—incorrectly, as everyone now agrees—claimed these districts violated the Voting Rights Act and demanded Texas “immediately” fix them.

What happened next: Within two days of receiving this letter, Governor Abbott added redistricting to the legislature’s agenda. By late August, Texas enacted a new map that:

Created five more Republican-leaning seats
Dismantled the coalition districts DOJ identified (plus several more)
Converted three districts into majority-Black or majority-Hispanic districts by the narrowest possible margins (50.2%, 50.3%, and 50.5%)

The Legal Framework: Racial vs. Partisan Gerrymandering

Here’s where the law gets interesting and complicated. There are two different types of gerrymandering claims, and they receive vastly different treatment from courts:

Partisan gerrymandering: Drawing districts to favor one political party. In Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), the Supreme Court held that federal courts cannot review these claims—they’re “political questions” beyond judicial reach. States can gerrymander for partisan advantage as much as they want, and voters’ only remedy is at the ballot box.

Racial gerrymandering: Drawing districts where race is the “predominant factor” in deciding where lines go. This violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments unless the state has a “compelling interest” (which is extremely hard to prove). Courts can and must review these claims.

The tension: Race and partisan preference are often correlated, especially in diverse states like Texas where Hispanic and Black voters tend to vote Democratic. So legislators can achieve partisan goals by drawing lines based on race, then claim they were only thinking about politics.

The District Court’s Findings

A three-judge District Court conducted a thorough trial:

9 days of hearings
23 witnesses
Thousands of exhibits
3,000+ page record
160-page opinion

The court found that race predominated in drawing the new districts. The evidence included:

Direct Evidence:

The DOJ Letter’s Racial Focus: The letter demanding Texas “fix” coalition districts effectively imposed 50% racial targets. The only way to “remedy” a district where no single racial group is 50% is to redraw it so one racial group reaches 50%.
Governor Abbott’s Statements: After months of resisting redistricting, Abbott added it to the legislative agenda within two days of the DOJ letter—framed specifically as responding to “constitutional concerns” about districts’ “racial composition.” In interviews, he repeatedly described the map in racial terms, saying Texas wanted to “remove those coalition districts” and create districts that “turned out to provide more seats for Hispanics.”
Legislators’ Statements: Bill sponsors repeatedly boasted about creating majority-Hispanic and majority-Black districts. One crowed about creating “four out of five new seats” with “Hispanic majority.” Another noted a district was “purposely altered to [be] a Black majority district.”

Circumstantial Evidence:

Surgical Precision: Three districts were converted to exactly 50.2%, 50.3%, and 50.5% single-race majorities. The court found it “very unlikely” this happened by chance without using racial data.
The Mapmaker’s Credibility: The official who drew the map claimed he never looked at racial data (though it was available in his software). The District Court found him not credible, noting he’d been shown a draft of the DOJ letter by White House officials before it was sent.
Expert Statistical Analysis: An expert generated “tens of thousands” of maps that favored Republicans using traditional criteria but without racial goals. Not one looked like Texas’s enacted map.

The Court’s Conclusion: While partisan advantage was the “end goal,” race was the predominant means of achieving it. Texas used racial line-drawing to create a map that was more “sellable” than a naked partisan gerrymander.

The Arguments on Appeal

Texas’s Arguments (Majority Agrees)

Argument 1: The District Court failed to honor the presumption of legislative good faith

Texas argues that when evidence is ambiguous—when it could support either a racial or partisan explanation—courts must presume legislators acted properly and interpret the evidence in the legislature’s favor. The District Court, Texas contends, did the opposite: it construed ambiguous evidence against the legislature.

Is this argument sound? It’s clever but misleading. The District Court did acknowledge the presumption and even found some legislators’ statements too ambiguous to use against Texas. But the court concluded that the overwhelming weight of evidence—including unambiguous statements about creating racial majorities, surgical precision in hitting 50% targets, and statistical improbability—overcame the presumption. Presumptions can be rebutted; that’s their nature.

Argument 2: The absence of an alternative map should be “dispositive” or “near-dispositive”

In Alexander v. South Carolina (2024), the Supreme Court said that when challengers claim racial gerrymandering but the state says it was just partisan, challengers should produce an alternative map that achieves the same partisan goals without the racial features. If they don’t, courts should draw an adverse inference against them—perhaps even a “dispositive” (case-ending) one.

Texas argues the plaintiffs here produced no such map, so they should lose.

Is this argument sound? It’s partially valid but incomplete. Alexander said the adverse inference is “dispositive” in cases lacking direct evidence. But Alexander also said it might not be dispositive when there’s substantial direct evidence—which is exactly what the District Court found here. The court drew an adverse inference but didn’t treat it as fatal because of all the direct evidence of racial intent (the statements, the 50% precision, the statistical analysis). This seems consistent with Alexander‘s framework.

The majority creates a new term—”near-dispositive”—that appears nowhere in Alexander or any other Supreme Court decision. This suggests the majority may be making up a new standard.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments (Dissent Agrees)

Argument 1: The District Court applied the correct legal standards and made credibility-based factual findings

The clear-error standard of review requires appellate courts to defer to district courts’ factual findings, especially credibility determinations. A finding is reversible only if it’s “implausible” given the full record—not merely because the appellate court would have decided differently. Here, the District Court’s finding that race predominated was at minimum “plausible” and probably correct.

Is this argument sound? Yes, this reflects established appellate review standards. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that district courts see witnesses, assess credibility, and are better positioned to weigh evidence in complex factual disputes. The majority nowhere explains why the District Court’s extensive findings are “implausible”—it just disagrees, which isn’t the legal standard.

Argument 2: Texas used race to achieve partisan goals, which is still unconstitutional

The Supreme Court has explicitly held that using race as the predominant districting criterion “with the end goal of advancing partisan interests” is unconstitutional. Cooper v. Harris (2017). It doesn’t matter that the ultimate aim was partisan advantage—if race was the main means of getting there, it’s still a racial gerrymander.

Is this argument sound? Yes, this directly quotes Supreme Court precedent. The majority doesn’t dispute this principle; it just disagrees about whether the facts show race predominated.

Argument 3: The Purcell principle doesn’t apply eleven months before an election

Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006) says courts should be cautious about changing election rules on the eve of an election because of voter confusion. But that case involved an injunction five days before an election; the election here is eleven months away, with primaries in March.

Is this argument sound? Very strong. The District Court detailed why this isn’t a last-minute change: the 2021 map (which the injunction restored) is familiar to everyone and was expected to govern 2026 until Texas’s surprise mid-cycle redistricting last summer. The plaintiffs sued immediately, declined discovery to speed things up, and the court ruled just one month after briefing. If eleven months is “too close,” states can effectively immunize any map from review by enacting it within a year of an election.

Evaluation of Evidence

Strong Evidence Supporting Racial Gerrymandering Finding:

The DOJ Letter: This is devastating to Texas’s position. The letter explicitly demanded racial changes to districts, and Texas complied within days after months of resistance. The temporal connection is stark.
The 50% Precision: Hitting exactly 50.2%, 50.3%, and 50.5% in three different districts is the statistical equivalent of lightning striking three times. Without racial data, this is nearly impossible.
Officials’ Own Words: When legislators and the Governor repeatedly describe their work in racial terms—”we created Hispanic majorities,” “purposely altered to be a Black majority district”—they’re providing direct evidence of intent.
Expert Analysis: Tens of thousands of simulated maps favoring Republicans, none looking like Texas’s map, strongly suggests racial data drove the actual map.

Weaknesses in Texas’s Defense:

The “I Never Looked at Racial Data” Claim: The mapmaker’s testimony that he never consulted racial data (despite having it readily available and knowing about DOJ’s racial demands) strains credulity. The District Court found him not credible, and credibility determinations receive maximum deference.
The Inconsistent Narrative: Texas simultaneously claims it was only thinking about partisanship while its officials publicly celebrated creating racial majority districts. These can’t both be true.
The Absence of an Alternative Explanation: If race didn’t drive the precise 50% targets, what did? Random chance is statistically implausible. Partisan data alone wouldn’t produce these exact racial outcomes.

Weaknesses Opposing Counsel Could Exploit:

The plaintiffs’ failure to produce an alternative map is their main vulnerability. While Alexander suggests this isn’t fatal when there’s direct evidence, the majority treats it as highly significant. The plaintiffs’ explanation—that they declined discovery to speed the case and thus didn’t have time to develop detailed alternative maps—is reasonable but may not satisfy the Court.

Legal Precedents

Key Cases Cited:

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (2024): Set the framework for disentangling race and politics in gerrymandering cases. Established the presumption of legislative good faith and said alternative maps create adverse inferences. Both sides claim Alexander supports them, which suggests the case didn’t clearly resolve all issues.
Cooper v. Harris (2017): Held that using race as the predominant criterion to achieve partisan goals is still unconstitutional. Also established the clear-error standard for reviewing districting factual findings.
Rucho v. Common Cause (2019): Closed federal courthouse doors to partisan gerrymandering claims. This creates the perverse incentive to use racial gerrymandering (reviewable) to achieve partisan goals (not reviewable).
Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006): Courts should avoid changing election rules close to elections. The case involved an injunction days before an election; applying it eleven months out significantly expands its reach.

Are These Precedents Valid?

All are binding Supreme Court precedent. The question is their application:

Alexander‘s alternative-map requirement makes sense when evidence is ambiguous, but the majority may be extending it beyond Alexander‘s actual holding
Cooper‘s clear-error standard is well-established appellate law that the majority appears to ignore
Rucho‘s political-question holding is controversial but settled law
Purcell‘s application eleven months before an election is a significant extension

Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

In the Majority’s Position:

Standards of Review: The majority never mentions “clear error” despite it being the controlling standard. This suggests they’re conducting de novo review (fresh analysis) rather than deferential review.
Inventing “Near-Dispositive”: This term appears nowhere in the case law. Creating new legal standards in an emergency order without briefing is procedurally questionable.
Ignoring Credibility Findings: The District Court found the mapmaker not credible based on observing him testify. Appellate courts generally cannot override such determinations.
The Purcell Stretch: Applying Purcell eleven months out gives states a roadmap to immunize unconstitutional maps: enact them less than a year before elections.

In the Dissent’s Position:

The Alternative Map: While the dissent has good explanations for why no map was produced, this remains the plaintiffs’ weakest point. Courts may reasonably expect challengers to show that partisan goals could be achieved without racial features.
Procedural Posture: This is preliminary injunction stage, not final judgment. Some might argue the factfinding here is less settled than after a full trial (though the nine-day hearing was quite comprehensive).

Prediction: Who Will Prevail?

At the Supreme Court on the merits: Based on this stay order, Texas will likely win 6-3 (or possibly 5-4 if Chief Justice Roberts defects, though he joined the majority here). The Court has already essentially decided the case by allowing the map to be used. Once elections occur under a map, courts are even more reluctant to overturn it retroactively.

Why this outcome is likely: The Court’s conservative majority appears to:

Favor narrow readings of racial gerrymandering claims
Place heavy weight on the alternative-map requirement
Apply Purcell broadly to limit judicial intervention in elections
Be skeptical of district court findings that invalidate state election laws

Why this outcome is problematic from the dissent’s perspective:

It requires appellate courts to disregard clearly erroneous review standards
It allows states to use racial gerrymandering to achieve partisan ends by simply claiming partisan motives
It makes racial gerrymandering claims nearly impossible to prove when states are sophisticated enough to cite partisan goals

Next Steps for the Parties

Texas:

Will use the 2025 map for the 2026 elections
Will file a jurisdictional statement appealing to the Supreme Court (though the stay order strongly suggests they’ll win)
Has essentially achieved its goal: the map will govern at least one election cycle

LULAC and other Plaintiffs:

Can continue litigating at the Supreme Court, but the stay makes victory unlikely
The stay remains in effect pending the Court’s decision on the merits
Even if they ultimately win (doubtful), it won’t affect 2026 elections
May need to wait until after 2026 and file a new challenge for future cycles

Practical Reality: The stay has largely decided the case. Elections will occur under the challenged map, creating facts on the ground that make reversal less likely.

Broader Implications

For Democratic Governance:

This decision, combined with Rucho, creates a troubling dynamic: states can’t be sued for partisan gerrymandering (even when extreme), but they can insulate racial gerrymandering by claiming partisan motives. As long as legislators are savvy enough to talk about partisanship publicly while using racial data privately, courts won’t intervene.

The dissent captures this concern: if challenges must be brought quickly (to avoid Purcell problems) but states can enact maps shortly before elections, there’s a very narrow window for judicial review. States can effectively immunize unconstitutional maps through strategic timing.

For Voting Rights:

The decision particularly affects minority voters in racially diverse areas. Coalition districts—where multiple minority groups work together—have been an important tool for minority representation. If states can dismantle these at will by claiming the alternatives are “racial gerrymandering,” minority representation may decrease despite growing diversity.

For the 2026 Midterms:

The decision arrives amid “an ongoing wave of mid-decade, overtly partisan redistricting” (as the Court’s order notes). Texas went first; California responded; North Carolina followed. This stay signals that courts won’t interfere with this trend, potentially affecting dozens of House seats in 2026.

For Federalism:

The dissent argues the District Court order actually restored the status quo (the 2021 map) and that the Supreme Court is disrupting the federal-state balance by overriding a district court’s factual findings. The majority counters that the District Court improperly inserted itself into an active campaign. This reflects ongoing tension about federal courts’ proper role in state election administration.

For the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy:

The dissent’s sharpest criticism is procedural: the Court reversed extensive district court fact-finding “over a holiday weekend” without applying the required deferential standard of review. This adds to concerns about the “shadow docket”—major decisions on emergency applications without full briefing or oral argument.

Justice Kagan’s closing captures this concern: “I cannot think of a reason why” the Court would arrogate district court fact-finding to itself—except ideology. When the Court appears to reach results based on preferred outcomes rather than proper standards of review, it raises questions about judicial legitimacy.

Conclusion

This order reveals deep divisions about voting rights, federalism, and judicial review. The majority sees a district court that overstepped by second-guessing legislative motives and interfering in an election. The dissent sees careful fact-finding being overridden by appellate judges who prefer a different result but lack authority to impose it under proper review standards.

The real-world effect is clear: Texas’s map, which a district court found was drawn predominantly along racial lines in violation of the Constitution, will govern the 2026 congressional elections. Whether that map is lawful or unlawful, millions of Texans will vote in districts the lower court found were created based on their race. And the precedent suggests other states can follow similar paths with limited judicial scrutiny.

The case illustrates how technical legal doctrines—standards of review, evidentiary burdens, timing principles—can determine whether constitutional violations are remedied or allowed to stand. It also shows how the Court’s conservative majority and liberal dissent have fundamentally different views about voting rights enforcement and appropriate judicial deference to state legislatures versus trial courts’ fact-finding.