What did Kansas congressional candidates Ron Estes, Katy Tyndell, and Drew Cranmer get right—and wrong—during the October 23, 2026, PBS Kansas Kansas Week candidate forum? This fact-check examines their statements about inflation, tariffs, health care, Medicaid, federal debt, public broadcasting, and immigration. Using federal economic data, congressional voting records, and independent research, we assess 20 major claims made during the Kansas 4th Congressional District discussion. Assistance from Claude AI.
Participants: Ron Estes (Republican incumbent), Katy Tyndell (Democratic challenger), and Drew Cranmer (Libertarian challenger). Moderated by Jared Cerullo.
Claim Being Fact-Checked
The factual assertions made by the three candidates and the moderator during the October 23, 2026, edition of Kansas Week, addressing affordability, inflation, tariffs, health care, public broadcasting, federal spending, and immigration.
The supplied cleaned transcript serves as the source for the candidates’ statements. The assessments below use independent economic data, federal government records, congressional voting records, and other published research available through October 24, 2026.
Summary
The discussion contained accurate statistics, misleading interpretations, unsupported causal claims, and several demonstrably incorrect statements. No participant was consistently accurate or inaccurate across every subject.
The most important findings include:
- Ron Estes: Correctly described cumulative inflation during the Biden presidency and the existence of the rural health fund, but misstated the history of U.S. refinery construction and omitted important context about Medicaid reductions, prescription drug prices, and immigration.
- Katy Tyndell: Accurately identified the estimated $137 billion reduction in rural Medicaid spending and Estes’s congressional votes on public broadcasting. However, her claim that 8 million people have already lost health insurance is not established as stated, and her starting figure for the federal debt when Estes entered Congress is incorrect.
- Drew Cranmer: Raised legitimate policy questions about federal spending and Federal Reserve oversight, but inaccurately characterized how federal deficits are financed and overlooked the Fed’s existing audits.
- Jared Cerullo: The moderator’s principal statistics concerning Kansas wages, housing affordability, and employer-sponsored health insurance were supported by published data.
Analysis
1. Affordability, Inflation, Energy and Tariffs
Claim 1 — Estes: Inflation increased more than 20% during Biden’s presidency.
Verdict: Accurate, with qualification.
Estes stated that during the Biden administration, inflation increased more than 20%, raising the cost of groceries, lumber, labor and fuel.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index increased from 261.582 in January 2021 to 317.671 in January 2025, a cumulative increase of approximately 21.4%.
That supports his central numerical assertion.
However, inflation is the rate at which prices change, not the cumulative price level itself. Estes also incorrectly generalized that the cost of everything had increased. Individual prices change differently, and some fall.
His argument also leaves out the fact that inflation peaked at 9.1% annually in June 2022 and had slowed substantially before Biden left office (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2025, 2026; End Notes 1–2).
Claim 2 — Estes: The United States has not built a refinery since 1978.
Verdict: False as stated.
Estes used this assertion to explain why diesel prices have increased.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration specifically identifies a refinery in Galveston, Texas, that began operating in February 2022.
The distinction is that the newest major refinery with significant downstream processing capacity is Marathon’s Garyville, Louisiana, refinery, which began operating in 1977.
Additional refining capacity has also been added to existing facilities.
Estes’s broader concern about refining capacity is legitimate. U.S. distillate supplies were unusually tight during 2026. However, the EIA identifies several contributing causes, including international refinery disruptions, increased U.S. exports, and Middle East conflict. The inability to build new refineries is not an adequate explanation by itself (EIA, 2026; End Note 3).
Claim 3 — Tyndell: Trump’s tariffs have raised prices and harmed farmers.
Verdict: Substantially supported.
Tyndell argued that tariffs and retaliation have made life more expensive and reduced agricultural market access.
Her central economic argument is supported by tariff research.
A September 2026 Federal Reserve Bank of New York study found that tariffs imposed in 2025 increased consumer prices, with approximately 26% of the tariff increase passed through to consumer prices in its estimates. That included higher prices for imported goods, increased costs of imported production inputs, and domestic producers’ responses to reduced competition.
Retaliatory tariffs can also disadvantage U.S. agricultural exporters.
However, Tyndell’s broader implication that tariffs explain rising grocery prices generally is too sweeping. Food prices also reflect labor costs, fuel, transportation, weather, and commodity markets (Amiti et al., 2026; End Note 4).
Claim 4 — Estes and Tyndell: The Iran conflict has substantially increased energy prices.
Verdict: Supported.
Both candidates correctly identified disruptions associated with the Iran conflict as important contributors to higher oil and diesel prices.
An October 5 EIA analysis described rising crude oil prices, constrained international refining supplies, unusually high U.S. refinery utilization, and tight distillate inventories.
The evidence therefore supports the energy-price impact, although the two candidates differ politically over responsibility for the war and its consequences (EIA, 2026; End Note 3).
Claim 5 — Cranmer: Congress spends money it doesn’t have, and the Federal Reserve prints the difference.
Verdict: Misleading.
This is an inaccurate description of federal financing.
When federal expenditures exceed revenues, the Treasury generally finances the deficit by issuing securities purchased by investors.
The Federal Reserve can create bank reserves and purchase Treasury securities in secondary markets as part of monetary policy. But it does not automatically create money equal to the federal deficit or purchase newly issued Treasury securities directly from the government.
Cranmer’s proposal to expand monetary-policy oversight is a legitimate political position. However, the Federal Reserve already undergoes independent financial audits and multiple forms of congressional and inspector-general review. Some monetary-policy decisions are exempt from ordinary GAO audits to preserve central-bank independence (Federal Reserve, n.d.; End Note 5).
Additional Finding — Estes’s Wage-Growth Argument
Estes asserted that wages had outpaced inflation for 10 consecutive months before the Iran conflict. The transcript does not identify the exact months or earnings measure, so the streak cannot be confirmed from the statement alone.
The latest BLS release shows real average hourly earnings fell 0.7% between September 2025 and September 2026. That does not disprove an earlier streak, but it limits the usefulness of that historical claim for assessing current affordability (BLS, 2026; End Note 2).
2. Health-Care Costs and Medicaid
Claim 6 — Moderator: Employer-sponsored family health insurance averages more than $28,000 annually.
Verdict: Accurate.
The KFF 2026 Employer Health Benefits Survey, released October 22, reports an average annual family premium of $28,303.
Workers contribute an average of $7,471, an increase of $621 from 2025. Employers pay the remainder.
The moderator’s statistics are accurate, although KFF’s family-coverage category does not necessarily refer to a family of exactly four people (KFF, 2026; End Note 6).
Claim 7 — Tyndell: Medicaid cuts and the expiration of ACA subsidies have already removed 8 million Americans from health insurance.
Verdict: Misleading; the precise claim is not established.
Tyndell said these changes had already kicked 8 million Americans off health insurance in recent months.
The distinction between actual enrollment losses and projected future losses is critical.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that Medicaid provisions in the Republican legislation would increase the number of uninsured Americans by 7.8 million in 2034. This is a projection, not an observed 2026 total.
However, actual coverage losses have occurred. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reported that ACA marketplace enrollment fell approximately 2.2 million between December 2025 and February 2026. Medicaid enrollment declined approximately 5 million between June 2025 and June 2026.
These figures do not establish that 8 million people became uninsured because of the legislation. Changes in enrollment can have multiple causes, and a person leaving one program may obtain coverage elsewhere.
Tyndell also described the enhanced ACA subsidies as cuts included in the 2025 law. Technically, the enhancements expired on December 31, 2025, because Congress did not extend them. The law itself did not terminate them.
Her underlying concern about lost coverage is supported, but the number and timing are inadequately distinguished (CBO, 2025; CBPP, 2026; KFF, 2025; End Notes 7–8).
Claim 8 — Estes: The Republican legislation provided $50 billion for rural health care, including approximately $222 million for Kansas.
Verdict: Accurate, but incomplete.
The law established the Rural Health Transformation Program, appropriating $50 billion for fiscal years 2026 through 2030.
Kansas received a first-year federal award of approximately $221.9 million.
Estes was therefore correct about the funding.
However, the fund must be considered alongside the law’s Medicaid reductions. KFF estimated that federal Medicaid spending in rural areas would fall approximately $137 billion over 10 years.
That is substantially greater than the $50 billion transformation fund.
Moreover, transformation grants are not interchangeable with ordinary Medicaid reimbursement. The money is directed toward specified health-system improvements and cannot simply replace every dollar in lost patient-care payments.
Estes accurately described a benefit of the law but omitted the much larger accompanying funding reduction (KFF, 2025–2026; Kansas Department of Health and Environment, 2026; End Note 9).
Claim 9 — Tyndell: Rural Medicaid spending will decline $137 billion over 10 years.
Verdict: Accurate as an estimate.
The $137 billion figure is supported directly by KFF’s analysis.
Tyndell was also correct that the $50 billion rural health fund covers five years, while the Medicaid reduction estimate covers ten years.
These are different time horizons, and the exact effects will depend on implementation and future policy changes. Nevertheless, KFF’s analysis supports her contention that the transformation fund does not fully compensate for projected Medicaid losses in rural areas (KFF, 2025; End Note 9).
Claim 10 — Estes: Extending enhanced ACA subsidies would put $350 billion into insurance companies’ pockets.
Verdict: Misleading framing of a real budget estimate.
The approximately $350 billion figure closely matches the Congressional Budget Office’s estimated ten-year federal budgetary cost of permanently extending enhanced ACA premium tax credits.
However, describing the entire amount as money put into insurers’ pockets suggests it is additional corporate profit.
That is not what the estimate measures.
Premium tax credits help eligible individuals purchase insurance. Payments generally flow to insurers on behalf of enrollees, but they finance coverage and medical claims rather than representing pure profit.
The CBO also estimated that extending the enhanced credits would increase insurance coverage by millions and lower benchmark premiums.
Estes used a legitimate budget number while omitting the program’s principal purpose and projected effects (Congressional Research Service, 2025; End Note 10).
Claim 11 — Estes: Republicans have reduced prescription drug prices by approximately 4%.
Verdict: Price decline verified; attribution not established.
The latest BLS data show that its prescription-drug price index declined 4.5% over the 12 months ending September 2026.
Thus, Estes’s approximate numerical claim is supported.
However, his suggestion that the decline resulted principally from Trump administration action is not established.
FactCheck.org examined similar claims in August 2026 and found that several factors contributed to declining prices, including competition from generics and biosimilars and drug-pricing policies enacted under the Biden administration.
The first Medicare-negotiated prices under the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act took effect in January 2026.
The decline is real. Assigning exclusive credit to Trump and congressional Republicans is not supported by the available evidence (BLS, 2026; FactCheck.org, 2026; End Note 11).
Claim 12 — Estes: More than 2 million people were enrolled in Medicaid in two states, and another approximately 2 million had incomes too high to qualify.
Verdict: Partly supported; specific figures not verified.
There is a genuine problem involving concurrent Medicaid enrollment.
CMS reported that approximately 1.2 million Americans per month appeared to be enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP in more than one state during 2024.
However, an apparent duplicate enrollment does not necessarily indicate intentional fraud. Some instances involve people moving between states or administrative delays in terminating coverage.
Estes’s figure of more than 2 million might reflect another counting period or methodology, but the cited CMS evidence does not establish that number as a monthly total.
I also could not independently substantiate his separate assertion that approximately 2 million people were receiving Medicaid despite incomes above eligibility limits.
The existence of improper or duplicate enrollment is documented. Estes’s specific characterization requires further evidence (CMS, 2025; End Note 12).
Additional Assessment — Political Influence and Health Care
Tyndell’s statement that lawmakers are bought and sold by pharmaceutical and insurance companies is a broad accusation, not a demonstrated finding about individual legislators.
Political contributions and lobbying are documented activities, but proving that a particular lawmaker exchanged official action for financial support requires specific evidence.
Her concern about financial influence is a political argument, not proof of corruption by Estes.
3. Public Broadcasting and the Federal Budget
Claim 13 — Tyndell: Estes voted for public-broadcasting funding in March 2025 and subsequently voted to rescind it.
Verdict: Voting history accurate; motive unproven.
Official House records show:
- On March 11, 2025, Estes voted for H.R. 1968, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act.
- On June 12, 2025, he voted for the initial House version of H.R. 4, the Rescissions Act.
- He also voted for the procedural measure allowing the House to adopt the Senate-amended rescissions bill in July.
The final legislation rescinded approximately $1.1 billion previously appropriated for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting for fiscal years 2026 and 2027.
Tyndell therefore described a genuine change in the legislative treatment of that funding.
However, voting for a broad appropriations bill does not necessarily mean a legislator independently supports every program it funds. Her assertion that Estes was simply following presidential orders concerns his motivation, which cannot be established from roll-call votes alone (U.S. House of Representatives, 2025; CRS, 2026; End Note 13).
Claim 14 — Estes: Federal debt is approximately $40 trillion, and annual deficits are approximately $2 trillion.
Verdict: Substantially accurate.
Treasury data show approximately $40.4 trillion in total federal debt as of October 21, 2026.
The fiscal 2026 deficit was approximately $2 trillion.
Estes was correct about the magnitude of both figures.
However, the total cost of public broadcasting funding is extremely small relative to federal spending and debt. Eliminating approximately $1.1 billion over two fiscal years cannot materially resolve a $2 trillion annual deficit.
This does not settle whether federal broadcasting subsidies are justified. That remains a policy judgment (U.S. Treasury, 2026; End Note 14).
Claim 15 — Tyndell: Since Estes entered Congress nine years ago, federal debt increased from $25 trillion to $40 trillion.
Verdict: False starting figure.
Estes was sworn into Congress on April 25, 2017.
At that time, the national debt was approximately $19.85 trillion, not $25 trillion.
The debt reached approximately $25 trillion in 2020, roughly three years after Estes entered Congress.
Using the appropriate dates, debt increased from approximately $19.85 trillion in April 2017 to $40.4 trillion in October 2026.
That represents an increase of roughly $20.6 trillion during his congressional tenure.
Tyndell therefore understated the total increase by choosing an incorrect starting figure. Her broader observation that federal debt increased substantially during Estes’s tenure remains correct (U.S. Treasury, 2017–2026; End Note 14).
The increase occurred under multiple presidents and congressional majorities. Estes’s membership in Congress establishes his opportunity to influence fiscal policy, but the entire increase cannot properly be attributed to one representative.
4. Immigration, Enforcement and Deportation Costs
Claim 16 — Moderator: Kansas taxpayers will bear approximately $1.8 billion in deportation costs, or about $1,800 per taxpayer.
Verdict: Accurate description of a published estimate, not an observed cost.
The Economic Policy Institute published a calculator estimating approximately $268.9 billion in nationwide mass-deportation expenditures through the remainder of Trump’s second term.
Its analysis allocates those projected federal costs geographically according to residents’ shares of federal income taxes.
For Kansas, the estimate is approximately $1.8 billion, or about $1,800 per taxpayer.
The important qualification is that this does not mean Kansas itself has been assessed a special $1.8 billion tax or has already paid that amount.
It is an estimated allocation of nationwide federal spending.
The estimate is also different from the net fiscal impact of deportations, which would require accounting for resulting changes in tax collections, government benefits, employment, and economic activity (Economic Policy Institute, 2026; End Note 15).
Claim 17 — Estes: Open borders would cost approximately $150 billion annually.
Verdict: Misleading comparison.
The estimate appears consistent with a 2023 study by the Federation for American Immigration Reform, which calculated an annual net fiscal cost of approximately $150.7 billion associated with unauthorized immigration.
That study incorporates estimates of federal, state and local government spending and tax revenues. Its assumptions and methods are contested.
More importantly, the FAIR estimate does not represent the incremental cost of adopting a hypothetical open-border policy today.
It also cannot be compared directly with the EPI deportation estimate. One attempts to measure the annual net fiscal effects of an immigrant population; the other allocates a multi-year estimate of enforcement expenditures.
Other analyses reach materially different conclusions. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2024 that the recent immigration surge would reduce federal deficits by approximately $900 billion over 2024–2034, although that analysis does not represent a complete federal, state and local fiscal assessment of every unauthorized immigrant.
Estes treated a disputed estimate as though it were an established alternative cost of the Biden administration’s policies (FAIR, 2023; CBO, 2024; End Note 16).
Claim 18 — Estes: As many as 250,000 people per month crossed the border illegally under Biden.
Verdict: Approximately accurate for the peak month; misleading if generalized.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection recorded 249,785 Border Patrol encounters between ports of entry along the Southwest border in December 2023.
Thus, Estes’s approximate peak-month figure is supported.
However, encounters are not necessarily unique individuals successfully entering and remaining in the United States. Many individuals were apprehended and subject to immigration processing, removal, or other dispositions.
Estes’s suggestion that all those people were simply sent throughout the country is unsupported.
Furthermore, crossings declined substantially during 2024, before Biden left office (CBP, 2024; End Note 17).
Claim 19 — Estes: No illegal immigrants have been released into the country for 16 months.
Verdict: Accurate only under a narrower definition.
The administration reported 16 consecutive months of zero Border Patrol releases at the border through August 2026. By September, the reported streak had reached 17 months.
That supports a narrower claim about Border Patrol release practices.
It does not establish that no unauthorized immigrants entered the United States, or that nobody was ever released through any other immigration process anywhere in the country.
Those are different measures.
The enforcement statistic is significant, but Estes stated it more broadly than the underlying agency metric warrants (DHS/CBP, 2026; End Note 17).
Claim 20 — Estes: Drug overdose deaths are declining, showing that current immigration policies are making communities safer.
Verdict: Decline verified; causal connection unproven.
The CDC confirms that drug overdose deaths declined substantially.
However, the decline began before Trump’s second administration.
CDC data show that the age-adjusted overdose death rate began falling after 2022, with the largest annual reduction occurring from 2023 to 2024.
Declines continued into 2025 and 2026.
It is possible that enforcement policies affect drug trafficking and availability. But these aggregate statistics do not establish that the current immigration crackdown caused the national decline in overdose deaths.
Estes used a real improvement to support a causal argument that the evidence does not establish (CDC, 2026; End Note 18).
Additional Immigration Findings
The moderator’s figure of 3,895 ICE arrests in Kansas is potentially traceable to ICE records processed by the Deportation Data Project, whose dataset extends through August 2026. I confirmed the dataset’s existence but did not independently reproduce that exact Kansas subtotal.
Tyndell’s assertions about constitutional violations and Cranmer’s account of enforcement actions occurring without local-law-enforcement notification would require case-specific corroboration before receiving definitive verdicts.
5. The Moderator’s Introductory Statistics
Three additional numerical statements were directly verifiable.
Kansas ranked 41st in average weekly wages in the first quarter of 2026.
Verdict: Accurate.
The BLS reported average weekly wages of $1,286 for Kansas, compared with $1,654 nationally. Kansas ranked 41st among the states and District of Columbia (BLS, 2026; End Note 19).
A Kansas household needs approximately $89,000 annually to afford a median-priced home.
Verdict: Accurate within the study’s assumptions.
Habitat for Humanity’s 2026 Kansas affordability report uses that income estimate, based on assumptions about mortgage interest, down payment and housing costs. It is not a universal income requirement for every Kansas home purchase (Habitat for Humanity, 2026; End Note 19).
Employer-sponsored family insurance costs more than $28,000 annually.
Verdict: Accurate.
As verified above, KFF reports a $28,303 average annual family premium for 2026.
Logical Fallacies and Misleading Framing
Several recurring problems appeared in the forum.
Selective baselines. Estes emphasized cumulative inflation under Biden without providing the current comparable measure. Tyndell described federal debt growth using an incorrect starting figure. Both examples show why selecting appropriate dates is essential.
False or unsupported causation. Estes associated falling overdose deaths with current immigration enforcement and falling prescription drug prices with Republican initiatives. Both trends are real, but neither causal conclusion is established by the statistics cited.
Confusing projections with observed outcomes. Tyndell’s health insurance statement blurred future CBO coverage-loss projections with enrollment changes already recorded.
Inappropriate comparisons. Estes compared the estimated cost of unauthorized immigration with an estimate of federal deportation spending, despite differences in time periods, populations, fiscal definitions and methodology.
Incomplete accounting. Estes highlighted $50 billion in new rural health funding without discussing the larger projected Medicaid reductions. A complete evaluation of the law requires examining both.
These are analytical problems with the arguments, not proof that any participant knowingly made false statements.
Overall Assessment
The forum provided voters with meaningful differences in policy positions, but several answers substituted selective statistics for a complete assessment of costs and benefits.
Estes’s strongest factual points concerned cumulative Biden-era inflation, federal deficits, rural health transformation funding, and the sharp reduction in Border Patrol releases. His weakest involved refinery history, the fiscal comparison used to defend immigration enforcement, and causal attribution.
Tyndell’s strongest factual points concerned Medicaid funding reductions, health insurance affordability, and the record of congressional votes to rescind public-broadcasting funding. Her principal errors involved treating coverage-loss estimates and enrollment changes as an established total of people already uninsured, and using the wrong federal-debt baseline.
Cranmer’s proposals centered on reducing federal involvement and increasing transparency. Those are policy choices. His most significant factual mistake was reducing the complex relationship among Treasury borrowing, monetary policy and inflation to the proposition that the Fed simply prints whatever Congress overspends.
Overall verdict: Mixed accuracy, with important errors and omissions by multiple candidates.
The most consequential theme is that each candidate emphasized particular economic or fiscal effects while often overlooking others. A sound comparison requires consistent measures, accurate time periods, and accounting for both costs and benefits.
End Notes
-
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2025). Consumer Price Index—January 2025. U.S. Department of Labor.
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_02122025.htm -
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2026). Consumer Price Index—September 2026; Real earnings—September 2026.
Consumer Price Index;
Real Earnings. -
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026). When was the last refinery built in the United States?
EIA refinery FAQ.
See also Crude oil prices and refinery margins generally increased throughout the third quarter.
EIA Today in Energy. -
Amiti, M., Heise, S., & Weinstein, D. E. (2026). The anatomy of tariff pass-through into consumer prices. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 1201.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. -
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (n.d.). Does the Federal Reserve ever get audited?
Federal Reserve FAQ.
See also How does the Federal Reserve’s buying and selling of securities relate to the borrowing decisions of the federal government?
Federal Reserve explanation. -
KFF. (2026). 2026 Employer Health Benefits Survey.
KFF report. -
Congressional Budget Office. (2025). Information concerning Medicaid-related provisions in Title IV of H.R. 1.
Congressional Budget Office. -
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. (2026). Health coverage tracker: Millions of people are losing coverage following 2025 Republican policy changes.
CBPP coverage tracker.
See also KFF, Health provisions in the 2025 federal budget reconciliation law.
KFF analysis. -
KFF. (2025). How might federal Medicaid cuts in the enacted reconciliation package affect rural areas?
KFF rural Medicaid analysis.
Kansas Department of Health and Environment. (2026). Rural Health Transformation Program.
KDHE program information. -
Congressional Research Service. (2025). Enhanced Premium Tax Credit and 2026 Exchange Premiums: Frequently Asked Questions.
CRS report. -
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2026). Consumer Price Index, detailed expenditure categories—September 2026.
BLS CPI details.
FactCheck.org. (2026, August 31). Trump claims credit for drug price decline. Experts say it’s more complicated.
FactCheck.org analysis. -
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2025). Ensuring Medicaid eligibility integrity by addressing concurrent Medicaid and CHIP enrollment across states.
HHS guidance. -
U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Clerk. (2025).
Roll calls 70, 168, and 203.
Roll Call 70;
Roll Call 168;
Roll Call 203.
Congressional Research Service. (2026). Federal public broadcasting funding provisions.
CRS report. -
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2026). Debt to the penny.
Treasury Fiscal Data.
Historical figures also appear in Congressional Research Service, Federal Debt Levels on Presidential Inauguration Days.
CRS report. -
Morrissey, M. (2026, August 5). The cost of deportations calculator: Technical documentation. Economic Policy Institute.
EPI documentation.
See also
EPI deportation calculator. -
Federation for American Immigration Reform. (2023). The fiscal burden of illegal immigration on United States taxpayers.
FAIR study.
Congressional Budget Office. (2024). Effects of the immigration surge on the federal budget and the economy.
CBO report. -
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2024). CBP releases December 2023 monthly update.
CBP release.
White House. (2026). How President Trump ended the border invasion and restored American sovereignty.
White House release. -
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2026). Drug overdose deaths in the United States, 2023–2024. NCHS Data Brief No. 549.
CDC report. -
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2026). County employment and wages in Kansas—First quarter 2026.
BLS Kansas wage data.
Wichita Habitat for Humanity. (2026). Home is the Key 2026.
Habitat for Humanity report.