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This is a Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction issued by a three-judge federal district court panel in the Western District of Texas. A preliminary injunction is an emergency court order that maintains the status quo while litigation proceeds. It’s not a final decision on the merits, but it indicates the court believes the plaintiffs are likely to ultimately win their case.
This 160-page opinion is extraordinary in both its length and scope. Preliminary injunction orders are typically much shorter because they’re issued under time pressure and don’t represent final determinations. The detail here reflects the complexity and high stakes of the case.
The Parties
Plaintiffs (those challenging the map):
– League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
– Texas NAACP
– Various individual voters and advocacy groups organized into six “Plaintiff Groups”
– Congressional plaintiff-intervenors (including Representative Alexander Green)
Defendants (those defending the map):
– Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas (in his official capacity)
– Other Texas state officials
Background and Context
What Happened?
In August 2025, the Texas Legislature enacted a new congressional redistricting map (the “2025 Map”) that would govern elections for Texas’s 38 U.S. House of Representatives seats. Redistricting—the process of redrawing electoral district boundaries—normally occurs every 10 years after each census. This was a “mid-decade redistricting,” meaning Texas chose to redraw its maps outside the normal decennial cycle.
The Sequence of Events
The court traces a revealing timeline:
Early 2025: The Trump Administration began urging Texas to redraw its congressional map to create five additional Republican seats. However, Texas lawmakers were reportedly reluctant to redistrict purely for partisan reasons, fearing it could backfire.
June 2025: When Governor Abbott announced a special legislative session, redistricting was not on the agenda.
July 7, 2025: The Department of Justice (DOJ), through Civil Rights Division head Harmeet Dhillon, sent a letter to Governor Abbott and Attorney General Paxton. This letter demanded that Texas dismantle four congressional districts (CDs 9, 18, 29, and 33) because they were “coalition districts”—districts where no single racial group constituted a 50% majority, but where the combined minority population exceeded 50%.
July 9, 2025: Just two days later, Governor Abbott added redistricting to the special session agenda, specifically citing DOJ’s “constitutional concerns.”
August 2025: The Legislature passed the new map. Governor Abbott signed it on August 29, 2025.
What Is a “Coalition District”?
This concept is central to understanding the case. A coalition district is one where two or more minority groups (such as Black and Hispanic voters) combine to form a majority, even though neither group alone constitutes 50% of the voting population. These districts can allow minority voters to elect their candidates of choice through combined voting strength.
The Legal Landscape: Petteway v. Galveston County
In August 2024, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an important decision in Petteway v. Galveston County that changed the legal rules around coalition districts. Before Petteway, under a 1988 case called Campos v. City of Baytown, plaintiffs could satisfy Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by showing that a coalition of minority groups could form a majority in a reasonably configured district.
Petteway overruled Campos, holding that to bring a vote dilution claim under Section 2, plaintiffs must show that a single racial group could constitute a numerical majority—not a coalition of multiple groups. This meant courts could no longer force states to create coalition districts under Section 2.
Crucially, however, Petteway did not say that coalition districts are illegal or that states must eliminate existing coalition districts. It simply said the Voting Rights Act doesn’t require their creation.
The Core Legal Issues
The Three Types of Racial Discrimination Claims in Redistricting
The court helpfully explains three different legal theories plaintiffs can use to challenge redistricting maps:
1. Racial Gerrymandering (the main claim here)
This alleges that the state “separated its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race” without sufficient justification. The plaintiff must prove that race was “the predominant factor” motivating the legislature’s districting decisions—that is, the legislature “subordinated race-neutral districting criteria to racial considerations.”
2. Intentional Vote Dilution
This alleges that the state enacted a voting scheme “as a purposeful device to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities.” This requires proving both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect.
3. Effects-Based Vote Dilution (Gingles Claims)
This allows plaintiffs to challenge maps based on their racially dilutive effects alone, without proving discriminatory intent. It requires satisfying three “Gingles preconditions” from the Supreme Court case Thornburg v. Gingles.
The Central Question
The plaintiffs argue that Texas engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering by using race as the predominant factor in redrawing district lines—specifically, by deliberately eliminating coalition districts and creating new single-race-majority districts at DOJ’s command.
The defendants counter that the redistricting was motivated purely by partisan politics—creating more Republican seats—not by race. This matters because partisan gerrymandering is legal under federal law (per Rucho v. Common Cause, 2019), while racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional.
Why the Distinction Matters
In states like Texas, where race and partisan affiliation are closely correlated (minority voters tend to vote Democratic), a racially gerrymandered map can look very similar to a partisan gerrymander. The court must therefore “disentangle race from politics by proving that the former drove a district’s lines.”
The DOJ Letter: The Core of the Court’s Analysis
The court devotes substantial attention to analyzing the DOJ letter, ultimately concluding it contains numerous “factual, legal, and typographical errors.” Even attorneys for the Texas Attorney General—a political ally of the Trump Administration—describe the letter as “legally unsound,” “baseless,” and “a mess.”
Legal Problems with the DOJ Letter
The court identifies several fundamental errors:
Error 1: DOJ claimed that coalition districts are per se unconstitutional under Petteway. This is wrong. Petteway held only that Section 2 doesn’t require states to create coalition districts. It nowhere holds that states are prohibited from creating them or must destroy existing ones.
Error 2: DOJ cited Bartlett v. Strickland, but that case actually undermines DOJ’s position. Bartlett emphasized that “States that wish to draw [minority opportunity] districts are free to do so” and warned that “if there were a showing that a State intentionally drew district lines in order to destroy otherwise effective [minority opportunity] districts, that would raise serious questions under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”
Error 3: DOJ included CD 29 in its list of “coalition districts” that needed to be “rectified,” but CD 29 was already a majority-Hispanic district (63.5% Hispanic by CVAP), not a coalition district at all.
Error 4: DOJ claimed CD 33 “resulted from a federal court order” requiring a coalition district. The court traces CD 33’s history and finds this factually incorrect—the earlier court explicitly stated it was “not a minority coalition district and was not drawn with the intention that it be a minority coalition district.”
What the DOJ Letter Conspicuously Lacked
The court emphasizes that the DOJ letter contained “any mention of partisanship” or political objectives. If DOJ had urged Texas to redraw maps to improve Republican performance, plaintiffs would face a much higher burden. Instead, DOJ’s letter commanded changes for one reason only: “the racial demographics of the voters who live there.”
The Evidence of Racial Gerrymandering
The court examines both direct evidence (explicit statements of intent) and circumstantial evidence (patterns that suggest racial motivation).
Direct Evidence
1. Governor Abbott’s Statements
In an August 11, 2025 interview, when directly asked whether he was redistricting at President Trump’s request to create Republican seats, Governor Abbott denied any such motivation. Instead, he said: “the reason why we are doing this is because of that court decision”—referring to Petteway. He explicitly stated he “wanted to remove those coalition districts and draw them in ways that in fact turned out to provide more seats for Hispanics.”
The Governor also made statements suggesting he viewed Hispanic voters as essentially Republican voters, saying many Hispanics “have decided they’re no longer with the Democrats” and “instead align with Republicans.” The court characterizes this as “using race as a proxy for political characteristics and stereotyping voters based on race”—which is constitutionally suspect.
2. Speaker Burrows’s Press Release
When the Texas House passed the 2025 Map, Speaker Dustin Burrows issued a press release stating the House had “delivered legislation to redistrict certain congressional districts to address concerns raised by the Department of Justice” (emphasis in original). He also praised the House for “deliver[ing] the legal, remedied maps Texas voters deserve”—suggesting he shared DOJ’s erroneous view that coalition districts were illegal.
3. Representative Oliverson’s NPR Interview
The Chair of the Texas House Republican Caucus, when asked directly whether the redistricting was occurring “specifically because of the President’s request,” said “No, we are not.” Instead, he said the redistricting was motivated by Petteway‘s rejection of coalition districts.
4. Representative Toth’s Interview
Another legislator similarly stated that redistricting “was required of us to do… in response to Petteway to get compliant”—again sharing DOJ’s legally erroneous view.
5. Chairman Hunter’s Floor Statements
Chairman Todd Hunter, who introduced the redistricting bill, made numerous statements on the House floor volunteering (without prompting) racial statistics about the districts. He emphasized that “four of the five” new Republican districts were “majority-minority Hispanic CVAP districts.” He repeatedly invoked Petteway as justification. He described the new racial numbers as “better” and “improving.”
The court notes that Hunter and his joint authors appeared to strategize that a map increasing majority-minority districts “would be more ‘sellable’ than a nakedly partisan map.”
Circumstantial Evidence
1. The Map Achieved DOJ’s and the Governor’s Explicit Racial Goals
The 2025 Map achieved three of the four racial objectives outlined in the DOJ letter:
– Eliminating CD 9’s status as a coalition district (Hispanic CVAP increased from 25.6% to 50.3%)
– Eliminating CD 18’s status as a coalition district (Black CVAP increased from 38.8% to 50.5%)
– Radically transforming CD 29’s demographics
2. Suspicious Just-Barely-50% CVAP Numbers
Three districts were transformed into single-race-majority districts by half a percentage point or less:
– CD 9: 50.3% Hispanic
– CD 18: 50.5% Black
– CD 30: 50.2% Black
The court finds it “extremely unlikely” that a mapmaker could achieve these precise racial thresholds purely by coincidence.
3. Differential Treatment of Districts by Race
The Legislature completely gutted majority-non-White districts while leaving majority-White Democratic districts largely unchanged. For example, only 2.9% of voters in the original CD 9 remained in the new CD 9, while 67.8% of voters in majority-White CD 37 remained in their district. Both districts had similar partisan characteristics.
4. Converting Republican Coalition Districts to Majority-White
If the motivation were purely partisan, one wouldn’t expect changes to Republican districts. Yet the Legislature converted CD 27 from a majority-non-White Republican district to a majority-White Republican district—decreasing Hispanic CVAP from 48.6% to 36.8% while raising White CVAP from 44.1% to 52.8%.
5. Dr. Moon Duchin’s Statistical Analysis
The court credits expert testimony from Dr. Moon Duchin, who used computational techniques to generate tens of thousands of hypothetical maps following the Legislature’s stated race-neutral criteria (partisanship, incumbency protection, compactness, etc.). None of these maps produced racial demographics resembling the enacted map.
In the Houston area, five districts fell outside the expected statistical range, with several showing “outlying” levels of minority population. This suggests that race-neutral criteria alone cannot explain the map’s configuration.
The Defense’s Arguments and Why They Failed
“This Was Partisan, Not Racial”
The defendants’ central argument was that the 2025 Map was motivated purely by partisanship—which is legal—not race.
The court rejects this for several reasons:
First, if the motivation were purely partisan, why mention Petteway at all? Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) already established that partisan gerrymandering was legal when Texas redistricted in 2021. Petteway was the only legal change since then—and it addressed racial classifications, not partisanship.
Second, requests to redistrict for purely partisan reasons failed to gain traction with legislators. What actually triggered the redistricting was DOJ’s racially-framed demand.
Third, Governor Abbott explicitly denied partisan motivations when asked and instead emphasized racial goals.
“The Mapmaker Drew It Race-Blind”
Adam Kincaid, the Republican National Committee’s mapmaker, testified he drew the map using only political data, with racial data turned off in his software.
The court doesn’t believe him. It finds it “extremely unlikely” that Kincaid could hit barely-50% CVAP thresholds in three districts by chance while simultaneously achieving DOJ’s explicit racial objectives.
More fundamentally, the court explains that even if Kincaid’s testimony were true, it wouldn’t matter. The mapdrawer is not a member of the legislature. What matters is why the legislature adopted the map. If the legislature adopted a putatively race-blind map because it achieved racial objectives, that’s still racial gerrymandering.
Credibility Problems with Key Defense Witnesses
The court identifies significant inconsistencies in testimony from Senator Phil King (Chair of the Senate Redistricting Committee), particularly regarding his communications with Kincaid. King testified he told Kincaid he didn’t want to talk about the map, while Kincaid testified King specifically asked about the number of seats Republicans could gain. King also testified he called Kincaid to ask whether he used racial data, but then told a fellow senator on the floor that he didn’t know whether the mapdrawer looked at race.
Legal Precedents and Their Application
The court engages extensively with Supreme Court redistricting precedents:
Cooper v. Harris (2017): A racial gerrymandering case where the Supreme Court disbelieved the mapmaker’s claims of race-blindness because the resulting district achieved an “on-the-nose attainment of a 50% BVAP.” The court applies the same reasoning here—but notes the facts are even more suspicious because Texas hit barely-50% thresholds in three districts.
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections (2017): Establishes that racial predominance can exist “even when a reapportionment plan respects traditional principles” if “race was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised.”
Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of NAACP (2024): Emphasizes the “extraordinary caution” courts must exercise and the presumption of legislative good faith. The court finds this presumption overcome by the direct and circumstantial evidence.
Prejean v. Foster (5th Cir. 2000): Establishes that when an outside mapmaker professes to draw race-blind, courts should not automatically impute that intent to the legislature. Instead, courts must examine why the legislature adopted the map.
The Strict Scrutiny Defense
Once plaintiffs establish racial predominance, the burden shifts to the state to prove its use of race served a “compelling interest” and was “narrowly tailored” to that end.
The court finds Texas cannot satisfy this burden because:
1. There was no past discrimination to remedy: The 2021 Map was drawn race-blind according to the Legislature’s own testimony. Coalition districts that existed were coincidental byproducts of partisan criteria, not intentional racial accommodations.
2. DOJ’s legal theory was obviously wrong: While “States enjoy leeway to take race-based actions reasonably judged necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA,” courts “cannot approve a racial gerrymander whose raison d’être is a legal mistake.”
3. DOJ pressure doesn’t create a compelling interest: The Supreme Court has held that “the Justice Department’s objection to a state’s map is not itself a compelling interest adequate to insulate racial districting from constitutional review.”
The Purcell Doctrine: Timing Issues
What Is the Purcell Principle?
Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006) established that federal courts ordinarily should not enjoin state election laws close to an election, to avoid voter confusion and administrative disruption.
The defendants argued that with the primary election about four months away, Purcell bars relief.
Why the Court Rejects This Argument
Not Close Enough: The court distinguishes cases where the Supreme Court applied Purcell, noting that critical deadlines (absentee voting, candidate filing) are still weeks or months away.
The Legislature Created the Timing Problem: The Legislature enacted the map just weeks before filing periods opened—less than four months before the candidate filing deadline. If Purcell mechanically barred relief in this situation, legislatures could immunize unconstitutional maps by passing them close to elections.
The State Is Still Using the Old Map: Texas is currently conducting a special election in CD 18 under the 2021 Map, with a runoff scheduled for January 31, 2026. Harris County (the state’s largest) will retain 2021 Map precinct boundaries until that election concludes.
Maximum Diligence by All Parties: The plaintiffs filed their preliminary injunction motions before the Governor signed the bill. The court scheduled a hearing as quickly as possible. A nine-day evidentiary hearing occurred just one month after the motions were filed. The opinion was issued within 38 days of the hearing. “If that’s not maximum diligence, what is?”
The Purcell Factors Favor the Plaintiffs: Even applying heightened scrutiny, the plaintiffs succeed because (1) the merits are “clearcut” in their favor, (2) they will suffer irreparable harm (loss of constitutional rights), (3) they didn’t delay, and (4) changes are feasible since the state has experience running elections under the 2021 Map.
The Ruling
The court GRANTS the preliminary injunction and ORDERS Texas to use the 2021 Map for the 2026 congressional elections.
The court explains that reverting to the 2021 Map is appropriate because:
– It’s what the plaintiffs requested
– It was drawn by the Legislature (courts prefer legislative maps to judicial ones)
– Texas has already used it in three elections
– It minimizes disruption
The court declines to give the Legislature opportunity to draw a new map because:
– The Legislature is not in session and won’t be until 2027
– A special session couldn’t realistically complete new maps before the December 8 candidate filing deadline
– The 2021 Map is already viable
Evaluation: Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths of the Plaintiffs’ Case
1. Exceptionally Strong Direct Evidence: Unlike most racial gerrymandering cases, which rely primarily on circumstantial evidence, this case features explicit statements from the Governor, Speaker, and multiple legislators articulating racial goals. Governor Abbott’s direct denial of partisan motivation while embracing racial objectives is particularly damaging.
2. DOJ Letter as a “Smoking Gun”: The letter provides documentary evidence of what triggered the redistricting and demanded explicitly racial outcomes. The fact that the enacted map achieved DOJ’s racial demands while the Governor’s proclamation explicitly referenced DOJ’s “concerns” creates a clear chain of causation.
3. Suspicious Statistical Patterns: Hitting barely-50% thresholds in three districts strains credulity. Dr. Duchin’s analysis showing that tens of thousands of race-neutral maps couldn’t reproduce these demographics provides powerful corroboration.
4. Logical Inconsistencies in Defense: If the motivation were purely partisan, why invoke Petteway (a race case) rather than Rucho (a partisanship case)? Why did partisan requests fail to motivate redistricting while racial requests succeeded? Why treat majority-White and majority-non-White Democratic districts differently?
Potential Weaknesses and Counterarguments
1. No Alexander Map: The plaintiffs didn’t submit an alternative map showing they could achieve the Legislature’s partisan objectives with better racial balance. The court excuses this because it’s only the preliminary injunction stage, but this will need to be addressed at trial.
2. Statements of Individual Legislators: The defendants can argue that statements by individual legislators (even sponsors) shouldn’t be imputed to the legislature as a whole. The court addresses this but acknowledges it’s a legitimate concern.
3. CD 33 Undercuts the Narrative: The Legislature didn’t eliminate CD 33’s coalition status, even though DOJ demanded it. This could suggest DOJ’s letter wasn’t determinative.
4. The Mapmaker’s Detailed Testimony: Kincaid provided specific, district-by-district explanations for his choices based on political criteria. While the court doesn’t believe him, this testimony could carry weight on appeal.
5. Purcell Concerns: Given the Supreme Court’s recent Purcell applications, there’s risk this injunction could be stayed pending appeal.
What Happens Next?
1. Appeal: The state will almost certainly appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, appeals from three-judge district court orders go directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the circuit court.
2. Potential Stay: The Supreme Court could stay the injunction pending its review, which would allow the 2025 Map to be used for the 2026 elections. Given the Supreme Court’s recent Purcell-based stays in Alabama (Milligan) and Louisiana (Robinson), this is a real possibility.
3. Trial on the Merits: If the preliminary injunction stands, the case will proceed to a full trial where the plaintiffs will need to meet their burden with complete evidence, including an Alexander map.
4. Potential Legislative Response: Even if the injunction is stayed, the Legislature could attempt to draw a new map that achieves partisan goals without the suspicious racial patterns.
Broader Implications
For Voting Rights Law
1. Limits of Petteway: This case clarifies that while Petteway removed the requirement to create coalition districts, it created no license to destroy them based on race. States cannot treat Petteway as authority to engage in racial gerrymandering.
2. Documentation of Intent: The case provides a cautionary tale about creating paper trails. The DOJ letter, the Governor’s proclamation, and legislators’ floor statements created a record that proved devastating.
3. Mapdrawer Independence: The ruling emphasizes that even race-blind map-drawing doesn’t save a plan if the legislature adopts it for racial reasons.
For Election Administration
The timing issues here are significant. States contemplating mid-decade redistricting near elections now face heightened judicial scrutiny, and courts may be less deferential to Purcell concerns when the state created the timing problem.
For Political Strategy
Both parties will study this case. For Republicans, it demonstrates the risks of explicit racial framing even when partisan goals align. For Democrats, it provides a roadmap for challenging mid-decade redistricting through racial gerrymandering claims.
Constitutional Implications
The case reinforces that the Constitution prohibits sorting voters by race even when the goal is partisan advantage. The court’s observation that legislators viewed racial framing as more “sellable” than naked partisanship suggests awareness that racial classifications face stricter judicial scrutiny—which is precisely why they should be avoided.
Conclusion
This is a remarkable case that may significantly impact voting rights jurisprudence. The court’s opinion is thorough, well-reasoned, and carefully tied to the evidentiary record. The direct evidence of racial motivation is unusually strong, and the statistical patterns are suspicious.
The central message is that the change in law from Petteway doesn’t authorize racial gerrymandering. States cannot deliberately dismantle coalition districts and create single-race-majority districts based on a misreading of Voting Rights Act requirements. While partisan gerrymandering remains legal, using race as the predominant factor—even to achieve partisan goals—triggers strict scrutiny that the state is unlikely to survive.
The next step is the Supreme Court, which will likely be asked to stay this injunction. Given the Court’s recent interventions in Alabama and Louisiana, the outcome is uncertain. But regardless of what happens on appeal, this opinion provides a detailed framework for analyzing racial gerrymandering claims when the state claims partisan motivation as a defense.