In a landmark December 2025 ruling, Chief Judge James Boasberg found that the U.S. government violated constitutional due process rights by secretly removing 137 Venezuelan nationals in hours without notice or opportunity to challenge gang-member designations. Despite physical detention in El Salvador’s CECOT prison, the court ruled the U.S. maintained constructive custody through a paid detention arrangement and ordered facilitation of their return for proper hearings, establishing important precedent on executive power limits in immigration enforcement. Assistance from Claude AI.
This is a Memorandum Opinion issued by United States District Court Chief Judge James E. Boasberg on December 22, 2025. A memorandum opinion is a detailed written decision explaining a judge’s ruling on legal motions. This document addresses cross-motions for summary judgment, which means both sides asked the court to decide the case based on the undisputed facts without needing a full trial.
The case has transformed from what was initially a request for preliminary injunctive relief (temporary court orders) into a final judgment on the merits of the constitutional claims.
The Parties
Plaintiffs (the people bringing the lawsuit): Six Venezuelan men originally, later expanded to a class of 137 individuals. They’re represented by immigration attorneys and civil rights organizations. The named plaintiffs include J.G.G. and others like Frengel Reyes Mota and Andry Jose Hernandez Romero.
Defendants (those being sued): Donald J. Trump (as President) and various federal officials, primarily from the Department of Homeland Security. The federal government’s attorneys represent them.
Factual Background: What Happened
The events underlying this case are extraordinary and constitute what the court characterizes as a serious constitutional violation. Here’s the timeline:
In early March 2025, the Department of Homeland Security began secretly interviewing Venezuelan detainees about possible gang membership. Around March 14, President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798—a wartime statute rarely used in modern times—claiming that a Venezuelan gang called Tren de Aragua had committed an “invasion” of the United States.
Critically, the President kept this proclamation secret initially. In the early morning hours of March 15, immigration officials took Venezuelan detainees from their cells at El Valle Detention Facility in Texas, shackled them, and loaded them onto planes. These individuals received no advance notice explaining why they were being removed, no information about the legal basis for their deportation, and no opportunity to challenge their designation as gang members.
The timing reveals the government’s apparent strategy to avoid judicial oversight. A few detainees managed to contact their lawyers the day before, who correctly anticipated what was happening and filed this lawsuit at 1:12 a.m. on March 15. The court granted a temporary restraining order that morning to stop the removals. The Proclamation wasn’t made public until an hour before an emergency court hearing at 5:00 p.m. that day.
While the emergency hearing was actually in progress, the government flew 252 Venezuelan men out of the United States—including 137 who became the certified class in this case. However, instead of sending them to Venezuela, the planes went to El Salvador, where the men were imprisoned in CECOT (Terrorism Confinement Center), described as an “infamous mega-prison.”
The government’s actions directly defied the court’s order not to relinquish physical custody of the detainees, leading to a separate contempt proceeding. In July 2025, all the Venezuelan detainees were released from CECOT and sent to Venezuela as part of what appears to be a prisoner exchange where Venezuela also released ten Americans and eighty Venezuelan political prisoners.
Core Legal Issues
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Does the court have authority to hear this case?)
This question proved surprisingly complex because the plaintiffs filed their habeas corpus petition while imprisoned in El Salvador, a foreign country. Habeas corpus—Latin for “you have the body”—is the constitutional remedy allowing people to challenge unlawful detention. The statute requires petitioners to be in custody “under or by color of the authority of the United States.”
The government argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs were physically held by El Salvador, not the United States. The court disagreed, finding that the United States maintained “constructive custody” over the plaintiffs even while they were in CECOT. This is a crucial legal concept: constructive custody exists when one sovereign acts as an agent for another in detaining someone, even without direct physical control.
Judge Boasberg applied the four-factor test from Abu Ali v. Ashcroft to determine constructive custody:
Factor 1: Detained at the behest of the United States? The evidence strongly supported this. The United States arranged with El Salvador to accept and house the detainees for up to one year in exchange for $4.7 million. The agreement’s structure indicated continued U.S. control rather than a complete handover—unlike other cases where the government explicitly relinquished all custody and control. El Salvador itself told the United Nations that “jurisdiction and legal responsibility for these persons lie exclusively with the competent foreign authorities” (meaning the United States). Even CECOT’s director reportedly told detainees that their continued detention came from “Donald Trump,” not El Salvadoran authorities.
Factor 2: El Salvador’s indifference to detention? The court found El Salvador had no independent interest in detaining Venezuelan nationals who had never been to El Salvador, committed no crimes there, and had no connection to the country. El Salvador received payment for housing them and ultimately got nothing from the prisoner exchange that released them. This suggested El Salvador was merely acting as a paid agent of the United States.
Factor 3: Detention intended to evade judicial review? The secretive removal clearly aimed to prevent prior judicial review. The government kept the Proclamation secret, gave detainees no information about their rights, and removed them literally during an emergency court hearing. However, the court found it unclear whether the subsequent CECOT detention was specifically intended to thwart review or was simply a byproduct of other motives (like deterrence through harsh conditions).
Factor 4: Would detainees be released upon U.S. request? Events proved they would be. When another CECOT detainee (Abrego Garcia) obtained a court order requiring his return, he was brought back to the United States in June 2025. The July prisoner swap—where all 252 Venezuelans were released in exchange for Americans held by Venezuela—demonstrated U.S. control over who stayed in and left CECOT.
The government relied on declarations from State Department officials suggesting El Salvador had sovereign control. However, the court found these declarations compatible with constructive custody because they never stated the United States had relinquished all control. The essence of an agent-principal relationship is shared control, not sole control by one party.
2. Mootness (Is there still an active controversy?)
The government argued that once the plaintiffs were released from CECOT to Venezuela, their claims became moot—meaning there was no longer an active dispute for courts to resolve. The court rejected this argument because the plaintiffs continue suffering “collateral consequences” from their designation as alien enemies and gang members.
These ongoing harms include: being barred from entering the United States, being barred from residing here, having property subject to seizure, having assets frozen (as members of a foreign terrorist organization), and being prevented from applying for asylum. If the court grants relief by finding their designations unlawful, these restrictions would be lifted. Therefore, a live controversy persists despite their release.
The government cited Gul v. Obama, where travel restrictions didn’t constitute sufficient collateral consequences to avoid mootness. But that case was distinguishable: the petitioners there hadn’t expressed a desire to travel to the U.S., and their No Fly List placement couldn’t be remedied even if their detention was found unlawful (because a separate statute required anyone previously detained at Guantanamo Bay to remain on the No Fly List regardless of the lawfulness of detention). Here, plaintiffs want to return and their restrictions flow directly from the challenged designation.
3. Class Certification (Can this proceed as a class action?)
The government argued that habeas corpus petitions are inherently individual and cannot be brought as class actions. This raised a novel procedural question: can Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (governing class actions) apply to habeas cases?
The Supreme Court has never definitively answered this question, but Judge Boasberg concluded that the All Writs Act gives courts authority to adopt class-action-like procedures when necessary to exercise their habeas jurisdiction. The All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651) allows federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.”
The court reasoned that class certification can be “necessary” in habeas cases where the government has unilateral power to moot individual claims by selectively releasing named plaintiffs. Without class certification, the government could strategically defeat judicial review by releasing anyone who files a lawsuit while maintaining the challenged policy for everyone else. This creates a “Whac-A-Mole” problem where courts never get to review potentially unconstitutional policies.
Most federal circuit courts have reached the same conclusion, at least for challenges to universally applicable policies (as opposed to individual criminal convictions, which do require individualized review). The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all approved class-action-like treatment in habeas cases under appropriate circumstances.
Applying Rule 23’s requirements:
Numerosity (enough class members to make individual joinder impractical): Easily satisfied with 137 class members, especially given the logistical difficulties of having each scattered Venezuelan individually join the lawsuit from abroad.
Commonality (common questions of law or fact): All class members were removed in the same manner, at the same time, under the same legal authority, with the same (lack of) process. The central question—whether the removal procedures violated due process—applies identically to everyone.
Typicality (named plaintiffs’ claims typical of class): The named plaintiffs suffered the exact same injury as all class members. Any detainee removed on those March 15-16 flights could serve as class representative.
Adequacy of representation: The named plaintiffs and their experienced counsel can adequately represent absent class members’ interests. The court addressed the government’s “next friend” argument (the doctrine allowing non-detainees to bring habeas petitions on behalf of detainees who cannot act for themselves) by noting that Rule 23’s protections serve the same function—ensuring that those litigating on behalf of absent parties will faithfully represent their interests.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), the government “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,” making classwide injunctive relief appropriate. The requested relief—an order facilitating the class’s ability to challenge their AEA designations—would benefit all class members uniformly.
4. The Merits: Due Process Violation
This is the heart of the case, and here the government essentially conceded. Even if the Alien Enemies Act was properly invoked (a separate question not decided in this motion), designated “alien enemies” must receive some process to contest their designation before removal. The Supreme Court said exactly this in A.A.R.P. v. Trump (2025), holding that “notice roughly 24 hours before removal, devoid of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster.”
The CECOT class received far less than 24 hours. They received:
- No advance notice of the basis for their removal
- No information that they had been designated as gang members
- No explanation of their right to challenge that designation
- No opportunity to file a habeas petition before removal
Other courts addressing similar AEA removals have required 14 to 21 days’ notice before deportation to allow time for meaningful judicial review. The government removed these individuals in hours, secretly, and even while a court hearing about their removal was in progress.
This constitutes a clear due process violation under the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. The Constitution’s protections apply to all “persons” in the United States, not just citizens. Even individuals subject to removal are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deported.
The Court’s Remedy
Judge Boasberg granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and certified the class, but the remedy requires careful calibration because the violation has already occurred—the plaintiffs have been removed.
The court concluded that the only meaningful remedy is requiring the government to facilitate the plaintiffs’ return to the United States so they can exercise the due process rights they should have received before removal. Otherwise, the government could effectively nullify constitutional protections simply by removing people so quickly that courts cannot intervene.
The Supreme Court already approved exactly this remedy in Abrego Garcia v. Noem (2025), unanimously holding that a district court “properly requires the Government to ‘facilitate’ Abrego Garcia’s release from custody in El Salvador and to ensure that his case is handled as it would have been had he not been improperly sent to El Salvador.”
However, the court recognized the need for deference to the Executive Branch on foreign affairs matters. Rather than dictating specific steps, Judge Boasberg gave the government two weeks to propose how it will facilitate the plaintiffs’ return. He suggested several possibilities:
- Issuing boarding letters permitting commercial air travel
- Paroling the individuals into the United States upon arrival at a port of entry (following existing ICE policy for returning lawfully removed individuals)
- Potentially offering a due process hearing without requiring return, if such hearing could satisfy constitutional requirements
The court noted that facilitating return should be easier here because the plaintiffs are not currently detained by any foreign government—they’re in Venezuela but not imprisoned. Additionally, the Venezuelan government has indicated it won’t oppose individuals returning to the United States.
Arguments and Their Strength
Plaintiffs’ Arguments (Strong)
Constructive custody argument: Exceptionally well-supported by evidence that emerged after the court’s initial ruling, including the financial arrangement with El Salvador, El Salvador’s own statements disclaiming responsibility, the prisoner exchange demonstrating U.S. control, and public statements by U.S. officials treating CECOT as an extension of American detention facilities.
Due process violation: Essentially uncontested. The government’s own admissions and the timeline of events prove the class received no meaningful notice or opportunity to challenge their designation. This is the strongest part of the plaintiffs’ case.
Collateral consequences: Persuasively demonstrated ongoing harm from the designation, including entry bars, asylum ineligibility, and asset restrictions that would be remedied by a favorable ruling.
Class certification: Well-argued given the identical treatment of all class members, the impracticality of individual suits from Venezuela, and the risk of the government mooting individual claims while maintaining the challenged policy.
Government’s Arguments (Weak)
Lack of jurisdiction: The government’s jurisdictional arguments failed because they couldn’t overcome evidence of constructive custody. Their declarations were too vague, never stating the U.S. had relinquished all control. Their position that El Salvador had complete sovereign discretion was contradicted by the arrangement’s structure, El Salvador’s own statements, and the prisoner exchange.
Habeas class actions impermissible: This argument ignored extensive circuit court precedent approving class treatment for policy challenges (as opposed to individual conviction challenges). The government couldn’t explain why class procedures would be inappropriate for a uniform policy challenge affecting 137 identically situated individuals.
Mootness: The government’s mootness argument failed because it couldn’t show that a favorable ruling wouldn’t remedy the plaintiffs’ ongoing injuries. Unlike Gul, where relief couldn’t change the No Fly List status, here the ongoing restrictions flow directly from the challenged designation.
Remedy concerns: The government didn’t seriously contest the merits of the due process claim, focusing instead on jurisdictional barriers that the court ultimately rejected. This left them without a strong defense on the substance.
Weaknesses and Potential Counterarguments
Weaknesses in the Court’s Analysis:
The constructive custody finding, while well-reasoned, rests partly on circumstantial evidence and inferences from government officials’ public statements rather than sworn testimony explicitly confirming U.S. control. An appellate court might view the declarations from State Department officials as more dispositive than Judge Boasberg did.
The court’s treatment of the third Abu Ali factor (detention to evade judicial review) as neutral might be questioned. The evidence of intent to evade review in the initial removal was overwhelming, and one could argue that subsequent CECOT detention served the same purpose by creating jurisdictional confusion and limiting detainees’ access to counsel.
The remedy of facilitating return is unprecedented in scale (137 individuals rather than one or two) and could raise foreign policy complications the court may not have fully anticipated. The government might argue on appeal that requiring the State Department to negotiate the return of 137 people intrudes too far into executive foreign affairs authority.
Potential Government Counterarguments:
The government could argue that the court second-guessed State Department expertise on foreign relations, violating separation of powers principles. They might emphasize that their officials swore under oath that El Salvador had sovereign control, and courts should defer to such expertise in foreign affairs.
They could contend that even if the initial removal was hasty, the plaintiffs’ subsequent transfer to Venezuela—where they’re no longer detained—has mooted the case because any remedy now requires Venezuela’s cooperation, not just U.S. action. The government doesn’t control what Venezuela does with people on its territory.
On class certification, the government might argue to an appellate court that each class member’s individual circumstances in Venezuela differ too much for class treatment, especially regarding who wants to return versus who prefers to remain.
However, none of these counterarguments seem particularly strong given the factual record and Supreme Court precedent in A.A.R.P. and Abrego Garcia.
Likely Outcome and Next Steps
Will the plaintiffs prevail? They already have—this opinion grants summary judgment in their favor. The remaining question is implementation of the remedy.
What happens next for each party?
For the Government: Within two weeks (by approximately January 5, 2026), the government must submit a proposal explaining how it will facilitate the class members’ return to the United States or otherwise provide the due process hearing they were denied. The government has several options:
- Negotiate with Venezuela for the plaintiffs’ return, providing travel documents and parole into the U.S.
- Arrange for hearings to be conducted remotely or in Venezuela (though this might not satisfy due process requirements)
- Appeal Judge Boasberg’s decision to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
Given the government’s litigation posture throughout this case and its apparent commitment to the AEA removals as policy, an appeal seems likely. However, the Supreme Court’s unanimous decisions in A.A.R.P. and Abrego Garcia suggest they would face significant headwinds.
For the Plaintiffs: They must wait for the government’s proposal and be prepared to respond if it’s inadequate. If they return to the United States, they would then pursue individual habeas petitions challenging:
- The validity of the AEA Proclamation itself
- Their individual designations as Tren de Aragua members
- The propriety of using the AEA rather than standard immigration removal procedures
These individual challenges would proceed in various district courts depending on where the plaintiffs are detained upon return. The class certification and due process ruling established only that they deserve a hearing—not what the outcome of those hearings should be.
For Class Members: The 137 class members now have a legal right to return to the United States to pursue their claims. However, the practical challenges are significant. Many may be difficult to locate in Venezuela, some may fear returning to U.S. detention (even temporarily), and others may have established themselves in Venezuela and prefer not to return. The attorneys will need to contact class members to determine who wishes to exercise this right.
Broader Implications
Political and Societal Impact
This decision has profound implications for executive power and immigration enforcement. The ruling establishes several important principles:
Limits on executive unilateralism in immigration enforcement: Even when exercising statutory authority like the Alien Enemies Act, the executive branch cannot completely bypass constitutional due process protections. The President cannot simply declare people to be enemies and remove them without any opportunity for judicial review. This restrains future presidents from using emergency powers to circumvent normal immigration procedures.
Accountability for rushed deportations: The opinion sends a clear message that the government cannot defeat judicial review through speed and secrecy. The tactics employed here—secret invocations of emergency powers, middle-of-the-night removals, flights departing during court hearings—will not succeed in evading constitutional scrutiny.
Viability of constructive custody doctrine: By finding constructive custody based on the U.S.-El Salvador arrangement, the court prevented the government from placing people beyond the reach of habeas corpus simply by paying another country to detain them. This prevents an end-run around constitutional protections through outsourcing detention.
Class actions in immigration detention: The decision strengthens the precedent for class-action-like treatment in immigration detention cases, making it easier for future challengers to obtain system-wide remedies for policy violations rather than just individual relief.
Constitutional Democracy Implications
At a fundamental level, this case tests whether courts can enforce constitutional limits on executive action during immigration enforcement. The government’s position—that it could remove hundreds of people in hours with no notice, no hearing, and no opportunity to file a lawsuit—would essentially create a due-process-free zone in immigration law.
Judge Boasberg’s opinion reinforces that the Constitution’s protections apply even in immigration enforcement, even during claimed emergencies, and even to non-citizens. The ruling vindicates the principle that executive power, however broad in the immigration context, remains subject to constitutional constraints and judicial review.
The opinion also highlights institutional tensions in our system. The Executive Branch has broad authority over foreign affairs and immigration, but courts have the duty to ensure constitutional rights are protected. Finding the right balance—deferring to executive expertise while preventing constitutional violations—is the central challenge, and Judge Boasberg attempts to navigate it by giving the government flexibility in how to implement the remedy while insisting that some remedy must be provided.
Separation of Powers Questions
The remedy ordered here—requiring the government to facilitate the return of 137 people from Venezuela—raises delicate separation of powers issues. Traditionally, courts defer substantially to the executive branch in matters of foreign affairs and diplomacy. By ordering the government to negotiate for these individuals’ return, the court arguably intrudes into the President’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations.
However, the Supreme Court’s approval of exactly this remedy in Abrego Garcia suggests the justices don’t view it as improper judicial overreach. The key distinction is that the court isn’t dictating foreign policy or requiring specific diplomatic outcomes—it’s simply requiring the executive to undo the effects of its own constitutional violation. The government created this situation by removing people without due process; courts have authority to fashion remedies for constitutional violations even when those remedies have foreign policy implications.
Precedential Value
This opinion will likely be cited extensively in future immigration litigation, particularly regarding:
- When constructive custody exists over detainees held abroad
- The permissibility of habeas class actions
- Due process requirements before removal under emergency authorities
- Appropriate remedies when the government removes people before they can seek judicial review
The detailed analysis of the Abu Ali factors and the evidence supporting constructive custody provides a roadmap for future cases involving U.S.-sponsored detention abroad. The opinion’s treatment of habeas class actions adds to a growing body of case law recognizing the necessity of aggregate procedures in immigration detention cases.