Tag: Economic development

  • Naftzger Park tax increment financing (TIF)

    Naftzger Park tax increment financing (TIF)

    Background on tax increment financing (TIF) as applied to Naftzger Park in downtown Wichita.

    The City of Wichita has proposed using tax increment financing (TIF) revenue to redevelop Naftzger Park in downtown Wichita. Various city officials have said something along these lines: There is a pot of money — 1.5 million dollars — available for use on Naftzger Park, and this money can’t be used for any other purpose. Also, it’s implied that if this money is not used on Naftzger Park, this money will not be available for any purpose, almost as though the money will be wasted.

    The source of the money is tax increment financing (TIF). This is a method of public finance whereby future property tax revenues are redirected from their normal flow to something else. The amount of taxes that are paid at the time of the formation of the TIF district is called the base, which is a function of the district’s original assessed value. The plan is that as new property is built or existing property renovated in the TIF district, there is more assessed value, and more taxes are levied and collected. The amount of taxes paid each year above the base is called the increment. It is these incremental taxes that are captured and rerouted. Because TIF is usually applied to blighted areas and the property is not highly valued, the base is usually low. In successful TIF projects, the increment can be very large. 1

    To where are the incremental taxes redirected? Generally, to the benefit of property owners in the TIF district. 2 While there are restrictions on how TIF dollars may be spent, I don’t think any developers within TIF districts have not been able to take full advantage of the TIF dollars that are available, although Naftgzer Park is a special case (see below).

    Advocates of TIF make it sound as though it is free money. They often say that if the proposed project does not receive TIF financing, it can’t be built. This is the “but for” justification: But for the benefit of TIF, nothing will happen. Without TIF there will be no development, and no future incremental taxes will be collected.

    There are several issues with this line of thinking. First, the but for rationale is subject to abuse. Developers who want to use TIF have a large monetary incentive to make it appear as though their projects are not financially viable without TIF. That’s the meaning of but for. To make their case for TIF, developers supply financial projections to cities, and the city usually accepts them at face value. These financial projections rely on many assumptions about the future, often 20 or more years in the future. For example, what will be the occupancy rate and average room rate for a proposed hotel in 15 years? Forecasting these values for next year is difficult enough. Yet, it is projections like these that form the basis of the necessity of TIF.

    City officials do not have the expertise to evaluate these financial projections. If citizens want to see these projections, the City of Wichita will not supply them, in most cases.

    Second: The pleas for TIF made by developers are sometimes plainly false. In Wichita, a developer wanted to build a grocery store using TIF and other incentives. He told the city he has “researched every possible way” to make the project work, and it would not work without TIF. 3 A representative of the developer told the city council, “There will not be a building on that corner if this [TIF] is not passed today. … That new building would not be built. I absolutely can tell you that because we have spent months … trying to figure out a way to finance a project in that area.”

    The city’s chief economic development official told the council, “We know, for example, from the developer’s perspective in terms of how much they will make in lease payments from the Save-A-Lot operator, how much that is, and how much debt that will support, and how much funds the developer can raise personally for this project. That has, in fact, left a gap, and these numbers that you’ve seen today reflect what that gap is.” 4

    While the city approved TIF, the county did not. So TIF was not available, and the developer abandoned the project. But: A different developer built the same grocery store and additional retail space at the same location without TIF. It is still in operation six years later.

    Third: If it is true that we can’t have new development without TIF, there may be obstacles in place that should be removed so that development can take place without TIF.

    Not free money

    TIF has a cost. A real cost. If we don’t recognize that, then we must reconsider the foundation of local tax policy.

    In Wichita, as in most cities, the largest consumers of property tax dollars are the city, county, and school district. All justify their tax collections by citing the services they provide: Law enforcement, fire protection, education, etc. It is for providing these services that we pay local taxes.

    Within a TIF district, however, the new property tax dollars — the increment — do not go to the city, county, and school district to pay for services. Instead, these dollars are used in ways that benefit the development: Property acquisition, site preparation, utilities, drainage, street improvements, streetscape amenities, public outdoor spaces, landscaping, and parking facilities, according to the city’s explanation.

    Yet, the new development will undoubtedly demand and consume the services local government provides — law enforcement, fire protection, and education. But its incremental property taxes do not pay for these, as they have been diverted elsewhere. (The base property taxes still go to pay for these services, but the base is usually low.) Instead, others must pay the cost of providing services to the TIF development, or accept reduced levels of service as existing service providers are saddled with new demand.

    Supporters of TIF argue that developers aren’t getting a free ride. The city isn’t giving them cash, they say. The owners of the TIF development will be paying their full share of higher property taxes in the future. That’s true. But, these new tax dollars are spent for their benefit, not to pay for the cost of government.

    We’re left with an uncomfortable situation. City officials tell us that we must pay property taxes so the city can provide services. (In fact, right now the Wichita city manager is recommending increasing property taxes to pay for more police officers.)

    At the same time, however, the city creates special classes of people who use services but don’t pay for them.

    Yes, the city and developers cite the but for argument, arguing that without the benefit of TIF, there won’t be new development and new demand for services. But we’ve seen that the but for rationale is dubious and subject to abuse.

    Of note: At a recent public meeting regarding Naftzger Park, someone asked if some of the $1.5 million could be used for more police officers. The answer from city officials was “no.” That answer is correct. But in the normal case, part of this $1.5 million would be available to pay for more police.

    Also: The redevelopment district in which incremental taxes will be redirected to Naftzger Park includes a number of properties that are already developed.

    Allowed uses: It’s just infrastructure

    In their justification of TIF, proponents may say that TIF dollars are spent only on allowable purposes. Usually a prominent portion of TIF dollars are spent on things that are related to infrastructure, as listed above. This allows TIF proponents to say the money isn’t really being spent for the benefit of a specific project. It’s spent on infrastructure, they say, which they contend is something that benefits everyone, not one project specifically. Therefore, everyone ought to pay.

    But this isn’t the case. Often non-TIF developers pay for significant infrastructure at their own expense. An example is the Waterfront development in northeast Wichita. There is a street that winds through the development, Waterfront Parkway. To anyone driving or walking in this area, they would think this is just another city street — although a very nicely designed and landscaped street. But the city did not pay for this street. Private developers paid $1,672,000 for this infrastructure, and then deeded it to the city. The same developers paid for street lights, traffic signals, sewers, water pipes, and turning lanes on major city streets. In order to build the Waterfront development, private developers paid for infrastructure, with a total cost of these projects at one time being $3,334,500. It has likely risen since then. 5

    In the case of Naftzger Park, it’s argued that the park benefits everyone. Therefore, it’s akin to infrastructure. In reality, the park is more like the front yard of a proposed hotel and a nearby building, being developed for their owner’s benefit. The developers of these are managing, along with the city, the plans for Naftzger Park. Incredibly, applications to be the park’s architect were sent not to the city, but to the private developers. 6

    Further: Park improvements were not an allowed use of TIF funds when the Center City South TIF was formed in 2007. So the city amended the TIF district plan to allow for TIF funds to be used to redevelop Naftzger Park. 7

    Redirect your taxes, not mine

    The Wichita Downtown Development Corporation (WDDC) is funded, primarily, by property taxes. A district known as the Self-Supported Municipal Improvement District (SSMID) levies a property tax in a district roughly defined as from Kellogg north to Central, and the Arkansas River east to Washington Street. In 2011 the mill levy was 5.950 and raised nearly $600,000 in revenue. 8 For 2016 the mill levy was 7.140. With an assessed value of $92,901,423, the SSMID tax ought to raise about $663,000. 9

    All the property tax money raised by the SSMID is used to fund WDDC.

    Now, WDDC — one of the leading advocates for the use of TIF in downtown Wichita — is quite happy to see incremental tax dollars redirected away from the city, county, and school district to benefit TIF developers. You might think that WDDC would also participate in this — purportedly — beneficial arrangement, consenting for its share of property tax to also be redirected for the benefit of developers.

    Guess again. The SSMID — nearly the only source of funding for WDDC — is exempted from having its tax revenue capture by TIF and redirected to another purpose.


    Notes

    1. Weeks, Bob. Wichita TIF projects: some background. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/wichita-tif-projects-background/.
    2. The Center City South TIF district is an unusual case in that only 70 percent of the incremental taxes are redirected.
    3. Weeks, Bob. In Wichita Planeview neighborhood: Yes, we have! Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/in-wichita-planeview-neighborhood-yes-we-have/.
    4. Weeks, Bob. For Wichita, Save-A-Lot teaches a lesson. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/for-wichita-save-a-lot-teaches-a-lesson/.
    5. Weeks, Bob. Wichita TIF projects: some background. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/wichita-tif-projects-background/.
    6. City of Wichita. Request for Qualification No. – FP740043. Available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B97azj3TSm9MQ1ZVcXVsNVQ2dkE/view?usp=sharing.
    7. Wichita city council agenda packet for May 16, 2016, agenda item IV-1.
    8. Wichita city ordinance 48-786. Available at http://wichitaks.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=820&meta_id=65004.
    9. Sedgwick County Clerk’s Office and author’s calculations.
  • Upcoming Naftzger Park legislative action

    Upcoming Naftzger Park legislative action

    The redesign of Naftzger Park in downtown Wichita is not a done deal, at least not legally.

    While the City of Wichita is engaging citizens and planning for the future of Naftzger Park, there is still another legislative step the city must take in order to fully proceed. In Kansas, use of tax increment financing requires at least two steps. The first step is that cities or counties establish the boundaries of the TIF district. After the TIF district is defined, cities then must approve one or more project plans that authorize the spending of TIF funds in specific ways. (The project plan is also called a redevelopment plan.) In Kansas, overlapping counties and school districts have an opportunity to veto the formation of the TIF district, but this rarely happens. Once the district is formed, cities and counties have no ability to object to TIF project plans. 1

    Center City South Redevelopment TIF District, July 2017. Click for larger.
    In the case of Naftzger Park, the TIF district (named Center City South) was formed some years ago, and there have been redevelopment plans adopted that cover portions of this rather large TIF district. Now a new redevelopment project area is proposed that includes Naftzger Park and some surrounding property. In the nearby map from the city, the Center City South TIF district is shown. The redevelopment project area under consideration is labeled “11.”

    In order to pass a redevelopment plan into statute, Kansas law requires a public hearing and passage of the redevelopment plan by a two-thirds majority of the governing body. For the Wichita city council, that means five votes are needed to adopt the project plan and start spending money. 2

    Documents from the city explain: “The next step in establishing the legal authority to use TIF is the adoption by the City Council of a redevelopment project plan, within the district, which provides more detailed information on the proposed project and how TIF would be used, and demonstrates how the projected increase in property tax revenue will amortize the costs financed with TIF.” 3

    Just for emphasis, from the same document: “Once adopted, the City will be authorized to use TIF to finance eligible project costs.”

    (The terminology may be confusing. Some documents use the term “project plan” and sometimes “redevelopment plan.” TIF districts are also sometimes referred to as “redevelopment districts.”)

    On July 11, 2017 the Wichita city council set August 15 as the date for the public hearing. Presumably a vote on adoption of the redevelopment plan will be at the same meeting, although votes like this have been delayed. And, there’s no guarantee there will be five votes in favor of adopting the plan.

    Since the redevelopment plan has not been adopted, you may be wondering how the city is going to use TIF funds to pay the architects. That’s a good question. It is the city’s declared intent to use TIF funding for work that is currently being done: “The park design is anticipated to be provided by Tax Increment Financing and is identified in the proposed 2018 CIP.” 4

    Another consideration: The city is proceeding at full speed — “an aggressive timetable” is the quote from the city manager — on the plan to redevelop Naftzger Park. 5 Public sentiment seems to be that it is a “done deal.” It’s going to happen, people are resigned to say.

    To his credit, the city manager is also quoted in the same Eagle article showing his understanding that the process is not complete: “If the process doesn’t allow us to do it, it doesn’t allow us to do it,”

    But other city officials act as though the design of Naftzger Park is inevitable, that the TIF money is there waiting to be spent, and those funds will be lost if not spent on the park.

    With attitudes like this, I wonder why we should bother holding a public hearing.

    Following is an excerpt from the July 11, 2017 city council agenda packet:

    The next step in establishing the legal authority to use TIF is the adoption by the City Council of a redevelopment project plan, within the district, which provides more detailed information on the proposed project and how TIF would be used, and demonstrates how the projected increase in property tax revenue will amortize the costs financed with TIF. …

    In accordance with state law, a TIF Project Plan has been prepared in consultation with the Wichita-Sedgwick County Metropolitan Area Planning Commission, which has made a finding that the project is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan for development of the area. In order to adopt a TIF Project Plan, the City Council must first set a public hearing no less than 30 and no more than 70 days from adoption of the resolution setting the hearing. The date of August 15, 2017, at the regular City Council meeting is proposed for the public hearing on the Naftzger Park Project Plan.

    If adopted by the City Council, the attached resolution setting the August 15, 2017 public hearing will be sent to the owners and occupants of all property located within the proposed Naftzger Park Project Area, by certified mail. The resolution will also be published in the Wichita Eagle and copies will be provided to the Board of County Commissioners and Board of Education and their appropriate staff.

    After closing the public hearing on August 15, 2017, the City Council may adopt the TIF Project Plan by ordinance, by two-thirds majority vote. Once adopted, the City will be authorized to use TIF to finance eligible project costs.


    Notes

    1. Weeks, Bob. Wichita TIF projects: some background. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/wichita-tif-projects-background/.
    2. 7 city council members times 2 divided by 3 equals 4.67, which must be rounded up to 5.
    3. Wichita city council agenda packet for July 11, 2017, item IV-1.
    4. Wichita city council agenda packet for July 18, 2017, item IV-3.
    5. Finger, Stan. Contentious crowd gathers to discuss Naftzger Park’s future, redesign. Wichita Eagle, July 27, 2017. Available here: http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article164112397.html.
  • Wichita MSA employment series

    Wichita MSA employment series

    Charts of employment in the Wichita metro area, along with Kansas and the United States.

    Since 1990 the country has experienced three recessions. For the first two, Wichita was able to catch up with the employment growth experienced by the entire nation.

    For the most recent recession, however, this hasn’t been the case. In fact, as time has progressed since 2010, the gap between Wichita and the nation has grown. Wichita is falling farther behind. You can also see evidence of this in the chart of one-year and five-year changes in employment. The peaks for the five-year series have become shorter and narrower, indicating weaker recoveries from recessions.

    Source of data is Bureau of Labor Statistics, an agency of the United States Department of Labor, 1 specifically the Current Employment Statistics program. 2 Charts created by the author. The charts of employment are indexed so that relative changes may be compared. Clicking charts may produce larger versions.

    Wichita MSA employment since 1990.
    Wichita MSA employment since 2010.
    Changes in Wichita MSA employment since 1990.
    Five-Year change in Wichita MSA employment.


    Notes

    1. “The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor is the principal Federal agency responsible for measuring labor market activity, working conditions, and price changes in the economy. Its mission is to collect, analyze, and disseminate essential economic information to support public and private decision-making. As an independent statistical agency, BLS serves its diverse user communities by providing products and services that are objective, timely, accurate, and relevant.” Bureau of Labor statistics. About BLS. https://www.bls.gov/bls/infohome.htm.
    2. https://www.bls.gov/sae/
  • Wichita WaterWalk contract not followed, again

    Wichita WaterWalk contract not followed, again

    Wichita city hall failed to uphold the terms of a development agreement from five years ago, not monitoring contracts that protect the public interest.

    Two weeks ago a Wichita Eagle article reported on a 2002 public-private partnership that called for the private-sector company to submit an annual report to the city. But the company did not submit the reports, and the city didn’t ask for them. The city did after the Eagle inquired. 1

    Much of the Eagle article described why current city officials were not aware of the 2002 agreement: “Due largely to turnover on the city staff and term limits on the City Council, top officials at City Hall were unaware of the contract provisions until The Eagle inquired about them. … No city official who played a major role in the 2002 contract is still actively involved in government.”

    The article quoted Mayor Jeff Longwell as “interested in WaterWalk fulfilling any contractual agreement they have in place (with the city), even if that contract was made 20 years prior to my time.”

    Now we know that the city did not enforce a similar agreement with the same WaterWalk developer made while Longwell was a council member. The city manager who oversaw the agreement is still manager.

    WaterWalk additional rent calculation, excerpt. Click for larger.
    We don’t have to look as far back in history as 2002 to find an agreement the city did not enforce, one where the city was not protecting the interest of taxpayers. In 2012 the city entered into a same or similar agreement in the same WaterWalk development with the same developer, Jack P. Deboer. It also called for the city to potentially earn payments, called “additional annual rent.” It also called for reports to be made, although the exact language used is “provide that calculation.” 2

    I asked for the annual reports on July 10. Three days later I received a message indicating the documents would be ready on July 19. On that day they arrived. Like those provided to the Eagle, they were heavily redacted and showed that no additional rent was due the city.

    Upon further inquiry, it is clear that these reports were not filed with the city on an annual basis, but were created only after I asked for them. 3

    Calculations use incorrect formula

    The 2012 agreement specified that the WaterWalk developer would be able to annually deduct 20 percent of the construction costs as “development cost return.” But, in the calculations provided to me by the city, 17 percent is used instead. 4

    WaterWalk additional rent calculation, excerpt. Click for larger.

    The city excused this error as being in favor of the city, and no additional rent was due in any case.

    Redacted, not really

    As shown in the examples above, the documents provided to me were heavily redacted, with nearly all numbers obscured. The illustrations show the appearance of the pdf document when opened in Acrobat reader or another pdf reader.

    But a simple copy and paste into another application like Microsoft Word revealed the blacked-out numbers. The procedure used by the city didn’t really redact the numbers. It appears that someone used the Acrobat drawing tools to draw thick black lines over the numbers, which isn’t effective. Acrobat offers a set of redaction tools specifically designed for removing sensitive content from pdfs, and the city should have used this method. 5

    When I reported this finding to the city, Elder replied: “We would ask that you respect the privacy of this information as well as the City’s obligations under the Kansas Open Records Act at K.S.A. 45-221(b), included below, which strictly prohibits the release of the financial information of a taxpayer, and not disclose the financial information.” 6

    I don’t believe that the Kansas Open Records Act prohibits the disclosure of this information, and it is in the public interest that these numbers are available. At the moment, I am inclined to respect the city’s request.

    Again

    Here is another example of the city and its private-sector partners failing to observe a contract. The city did not monitor its agreements to protect the public interest, and this agreement is recent enough that remoteness in time is not an excuse.

    Were the 2002 and 2012 development agreements wise for the city? At the time of the 2012 deal, I wrote this: 7

    [There] is a provision that requires the apartment developer to pay “Additional Annual Rent.” Under this concept, each year the apartment developer will calculate “Adjusted Net Cash Flow” and remit 25 percent of that to the city.

    To the casual observer, this seems like a magnanimous gesture by the apartment developer. It makes it look like the city has been a tough negotiator, hammering out a good deal for the city, letting citizens profit along with the apartment developer.

    But the definition of cash flow includes a comprehensive list of expenses the may be deducted, including the cost of repaying any loans. There’s also an allowable expense called “Tenant Development Cost Return,” which is the apartment developer’s profit. The agreement defines this profit as 20 percent, and it’s deducted as part of the computation of “Adjusted Net Cash Flow.”

    If there is ever any money left over after the dedication of all these expenses and profit margin, I will be surprised. Shocked, even. Here’s one reason why. One of the allowable deductions that goes into the computation of “Adjusted Net Cash Flow” is, according to city documents: “Amounts paid into any capital, furniture, fixture, equipment or other reserve.” There’s no restriction as to how much can be funneled into these reserve accounts. We can be sure that if this project was ever in the position where it looked like it might have to remit “Additional Annual Rent” to the city, contributions to these reserve funds would rise. Then, no funds paid to the city.

    This is an example of the city appearing to be concerned for the welfare of taxpayers. In reality, this concept of “Additional Annual Rent” is worse than meaningless. It borders on deception.

    Beyond this, we now know that neither the city nor the WaterWalk developer followed the terms of the deal. The annual reports were not supplied by the company, and they were not requested by the city. As it turns out the annual reports purport to show that the city was owed no money under the profit sharing agreement.

    But that’s not the point. The issue is that the city did not enforce a simple aspect of the agreement, and the private-sector company felt it did not need to comply. Taxpayers were not protected, and we’re left wondering whether these agreements were really meant to be followed.


    Notes

    1. Lefler, Dion. WaterWalk profit-sharing: 15 years, zero dollars for Wichita. Wichita Eagle, July 8, 2017. Available at http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article160147944.html.
    2. “As Additional Annual Rent Tenant shall pay a sum equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the Adjusted Net Cash Flow commencing with the first day the Tenant Improvements open for business. The Tenant shall calculate Adjusted Net Cash Flow for each Current Year within forty-five (45) days after the end of the Current Year (or portion thereof) and provide that calculation, and pay to the Landlord the Additional Annual Rent, within sixty (60) days after the end of the Current Year. Additional Annual Rent shall continue until this Lease expires. Adjusted Net Cash Flow is Gross Revenues less Total Expenses, less the total amount of capital expenses for furniture, fixtures, and equipment for the Tenant Improvements in excess of the aggregate amount expended from any reserve during such year.” Amendments to WaterWalk Developer Agreements. August 21, 2012. Available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B97azj3TSm9Mdm1tWjlQbVAzemM/view?usp=sharing.
    3. Email from city development analyst Mark Elder, July 21, 2017. “The annual report for this project was requested in the same time frame as the reports provided for Gander Mountain however, the documents were provided to the City within the last week.”
    4. Wichita City Council agenda packet for August 21, 2012. Waterwalk Ground Lease, Section 16.08. “Tenant Development Cost Return, defined as, on an annual basis, twenty percent (20%) of the total Construction Costs for all Tenant Improvements paid by Tenant, Developer, or permitted assignees and sublessees. As further clarification, the amount determined to be twenty percent (20%) of the total Construction Costs for all Tenant Improvements may be included in the calculation of the Total Expenses each year during the Term of this Lease.”
    5. Adobe.com. Removing sensitive content from PDFs. Available at https://helpx.adobe.com/acrobat/using/removing-sensitive-content-pdfs.html.
    6. “Except to the extent disclosure is otherwise required by law or as appropriate during the course of an administrative proceeding or on appeal from agency action, a public agency or officer shall not disclose financial information of a taxpayer which may be required or requested by a county appraiser or the director of property valuation to assist in the determination of the value of the taxpayer’s property for ad valorem taxation purposes; or any financial information of a personal nature required or requested by a public agency or officer, including a name, job description or title revealing the salary or other compensation of officers, employees or applicants for employment with a firm, corporation or agency, except a public agency. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the publication of statistics, so classified as to prevent identification of particular reports or returns and the items thereof.”
    7. Weeks, Bob. Wichita WaterWalk apartment deal not good for citizens. https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/wichita-waterwalk-apartment-deal-not-good-for-citizens/.
  • In Wichita, new stadium to be considered

    In Wichita, new stadium to be considered

    The City of Wichita plans subsidized development of a sports facility as an economic driver.

    West Bank Redevelopment District. Click for larger.
    This week the Wichita City Council will consider a project plan for a redevelopment district near Downtown Wichita. It is largely financed by Tax Increment Financing and STAR bonds. Both divert future incremental tax revenue to pay for various things within the district.1 2

    City documents promise this: “The City plans to substantially rehabilitate or replace Lawrence-Dumont Stadium into a multi-sport athletic complex. The TIF project would allow the City to make investments in Lawrence-Dumont Stadium, construct additional parking in the redevelopment district, initiate improvements to the Delano multi-use path and make additional transportation improvements related to the stadium project area. In addition to the stadium work, the City plans to construct, utilizing STAR bond funds, a sports museum, improvements to the west bank of the Arkansas River and construct a pedestrian bridge connecting the stadium area with the Century II block. The TIF project is part of the overall plan to revitalize the stadium area and Delano Neighborhood within the district.”3

    We’ve heard things like this before. Each “opportunity” for the public to invest in downtown Wichita is accompanied by grand promises. But actual progress is difficult to achieve, as evidenced by the examples of Waterwalk, Kenmar,and Block One.4

    Trends of business activity in downtown Wichita. Click for larger.
    In fact, change in Downtown Wichita — if we’re measuring the count of business firms, jobs, and payroll — is in the wrong direction, despite large public and private investment. 5

    Perhaps more pertinent to a sports facility as an economic growth driver is the Intrust Bank Arena. Two years ago the Wichita Eagle noted the lack of growth in the area. 6 Since then, not much has changed. The area surrounding the arena is largely vacant. Except for Commerce Street, that is, and the businesses located there don’t want to pay their share of property taxes. 7

    I’m sure the city will remind us that the arena was a Sedgwick County project, not a City of Wichita project, as if that makes a difference. Also, the poor economic performance cited above is for Downtown Wichita as delineated by zip code 67202, while the proposed baseball stadium project lies just outside that area, as if that makes a difference.

    By the way, this STAR bonds district is an expansion of an existing district which contains the WaterWalk development. That development has languished, with acres of land having been available for development for many years. We’ve also found that the city was not holding the WaterWalk developer accountable to the terms of the deal that was agreed upon, to the detriment of Wichita taxpayers. 8

    Following, selected articles on the economics of public financing of sports stadiums.

    The Economics of Subsidizing Sports Stadiums

    Scott A. Wolla, “The Economics of Subsidizing Sports Stadiums,” Page One Economics, May 2017. This is a project of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Link.
    “Building sports stadiums has an impact on local economies. For that reason, many people support the use of government subsidies to help pay for stadiums. However, economists generally oppose such subsidies. They often stress that estimations of the economic impact of sports stadiums are exaggerated because they fail to recognize opportunity costs. Consumers who spend money on sporting events would likely spend the money on other forms of entertainment, which has a similar economic impact. Rather than subsidizing sports stadiums, governments could finance other projects such as infrastructure or education that have the potential to increase productivity and promote economic growth.”

    What economists think about public financing for sports stadiums

    Jeff Cockrell, Chicago Booth Review, February 01, 2017. Link.
    “But do the economic benefits generated by these facilities — via increased tourism, for example — justify the costs to the public? Chicago Booth’s Initiative on Global Markets put that question to its US Economic Experts Panel. Fifty-seven percent of the panel agreed that the costs to taxpayers are likely to outweigh benefits, while only 2 percent disagreed — though several panelists noted that some contributions of local sports teams are difficult to quantify.”

    Publicly Financed Sports Stadiums Are a Game That Taxpayers Lose

    Jeffrey Dorfman. Forbes, January 31, 2015. Link.
    “Once you look at things this way, you see that stadiums can only justify public financing if they will draw most attendees from a long distance on a regular basis. The Super Bowl does that, but the average city’s football, baseball, hockey, or basketball team does not. Since most events held at a stadium will rely heavily on the local fan base, they will never generate enough tax revenue to pay back taxpayers for the cost of the stadium.”

    Sports Facilities and Economic Development

    Andrew Zimbalist, Government Finance Review, August 2013. Link.
    “This article is meant to emphasize the complexity of the factors that must be evaluated in assessing the economic impact of sports facility construction. While prudent planning and negotiating can improve the chances of minimizing any negative impacts or even of promoting a modest positive impact, the basic experience suggests that a city should not expect that a new arena or stadium by itself will provide a boost to the local economy.

    Instead, the city should think of the non-pecuniary benefits involved with a new facility, whether they entail bringing a professional team to town, keeping one from leaving, improving the conveniences and amenities at the facility, or providing an existing team with greater resources for competition. Sports are central to cultural life in the United States (and in much of the world). They represent one of the most cogent ways for residents to feel part of and enjoy belonging to a community. The rest of our lives are increasingly isolated by modern technological gadgetry. Sport teams help provide identity to a community, and it is this psychosocial benefit that should be weighed against the sizeable public investments that sports team owners demand.”

    Professional Sports as Catalysts for Metropolitan Economic Development

    Robert A. Baade, Journal of Urban Affairs, 1996. Link.
    “To attract or retain a team, cities are offering staggering financial support and rationalize their largesse on economic grounds. Do professional sports increase income and create jobs in amounts that justify the behavior of cities? The evidence detailed in this paper fails to support such a rationale. The primary beneficiaries of subsidies are the owners and players, not the taxpaying public.”


    Notes

    1. Weeks, Bob. STAR bonds in Kansas. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/kansas-government/star-bonds-kansas/.
    2. Weeks, Bob. Wichita TIF projects: some background. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/wichita-tif-projects-background/.
    3. Wichita City Council, agenda packet for July 18, 2017.
    4. Weeks, Bob. Downtown Wichita’s Block One, a beneficiary of tax increment financing. Before forming new tax increment financing districts, Wichita taxpayers ought to ask for progress on current districts. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/downtown-wichita-block-one-beneficiary-tax-increment-financing/.
    5. Weeks, Bob. Downtown Wichita business trends. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/downtown-wichita-business-trends/.
    6. “Ten years ago, Elizabeth Stevenson looked out at the neighborhood where a downtown arena would soon be built and told an Eagle reporter that one day it could be the ‘Paris of the Midwest.’ What she and many others envisioned was a pedestrian and bike-friendly neighborhood of quaint shops, chic eateries and an active arts district, supported by tens of thousands of visitors who would be coming downtown for sporting events and concerts. It hasn’t exactly turned out that way. Today, five years after the opening of the Intrust Bank Arena, most of the immediate neighborhood looks much like it did in 2004 when Stevenson was interviewed in The Eagle. With the exception of a small artists’ colony along Commerce Street, it’s still the same mix of light industrial businesses interspersed with numerous boarded-up buildings and vacant lots, dotted with ‘for sale’ and ‘for lease’ signs.” Lefler, Dion. 5 years after Intrust Bank Arena opens, little surrounding development has followed. Wichita Eagle. December 20, 2014. Available at http://www.kansas.com/news/local/article4743402.html.
    7. Riedl, Matt. Has Commerce Street become too cool for its own good? Wichita Eagle. April 8, 2017. http://www.kansas.com/entertainment/ent-columns-blogs/keeper-of-the-plans/article143529404.html.
    8. Weeks, Bob. Wichita WaterWalk contract not followed, again Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/wichita-waterwalk-agreement-not-followed/.
  • More Cargill incentives from Wichita detailed

    More, but likely not all, of the Cargill incentives will be before the Wichita City Council this week.

    A division of Cargill, Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation, is moving from an office on North Main Street in downtown Wichita to the site of the former Wichita Eagle building, also in downtown Wichita. Last year it was widely reported that Cargill was considering moving this division to another city. Reports of incentives offers to Cargill from other cities spurred the City of Wichita to offer its own incentives if Cargill would remain in Wichita. This week the city council will consider additional subsidies and incentives besides those already offered. 1

    As summarized in the agenda packet:

    “In exchange for Cargill’s commitment, the City has negotiated the following:

    • Issue Industrial Revenue Bonds (Letter of Intent approved April 18, 2017) 100% property tax abatement; 5+5 year basis
    • Sales tax exemption
    • Acquisition of a 15 year parking easement for public access to the garage in the evenings and on weekends (estimated cost of $6,500,000)
    • Expedited plan review (50% reduction in time)
    • Reduced permitting fees (50%) (estimated savings of $85,000)
    • Assign a project manager/ombudsman for a single point of contact for the company”

    Industrial Revenue Bonds

    In April the city council approved a letter of intent regarding Cargill’s participation in the Industrial Revenue Bond program. 2 The city won’t be lending Cargill money. Instead, IRBs are a (convoluted) method whereby local governments are able to forgive the payment of property taxes. For the case of Cargill, city documents from April state the tax forgiveness could be worth $1,359,531 per year. 3 This would be shared by these taxing jurisdictions in these annual amounts, again according to city documents:

    • City of Wichita: $378,450
    • Sedgwick County: $340,958
    • USD 259, the Wichita Public School District: $622,723
    • State of Kansas $17,400

    The property tax savings will probably be greater, if Cargill spends as much as it has agreed to spend and the appraiser values the building accordingly. Rough calculations indicate tax savings as much as $1,755,000 per year. 4

    Cargill has agreed to make an annual Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes (PILOT) of $413,900, according to city documents.

    In addition to the property tax exemption, the IRBs also carry a sales tax exemption for purchases related to construction. City documents give an estimated value of $2,026,291 for the sales tax Cargill will not have to pay. 5

    Parking easement

    At one time, it was thought that the city would build a parking garage and let Cargill use it an no cost, or at a greatly reduced cost. Instead, the city now proposes that Cargill build the garage and the city will acquire an easement. This has sounded almost benign, but now we realize that the city will pay Cargill an estimated $6.5 million. In return, the city will be able to use up to approximately 700 parking spaces outside of Cargill business hours.

    Is this a good deal for the city? The city has agreed to pay $9,286 for the use of each parking space. 6 For comparison, recently the city rehabilitated the parking garage at 215 S. Market at a cost of $17,609 per parking space. The city rents 180 of these to a nearby company at the rate of $35 per month, which is $420 per year. 7

    To repeat: The city has agreed to pay Cargill $9,286 for something it charges others $420 per year.

    It is not known whether the city will charge fees to the public to use the garage. It is also unknown whether there is much demand for public parking at the Cargill location, but present market conditions would suggest there is not much additional demand.

    Expedited plan review, reduced fees, and ombudsman

    The city has agreed to cut permit fees and speed response time for approvals. 8

    This incentive — the need for it and its value to Cargill — is an explicit admission that City of Wichita regulations are burdensome. If not, why would the city devote time and expense to helping Cargill obtain relief from these regulations?

    Consider this aspect of public policy: Cargill is a large company with — presumably — fleets of bureaucrats and lawyers trained to deal with burdensome government regulation. These costs can be spread across a large company, meaning that Cargill can afford to overcome burdensome regulations.

    But what about the small companies that don’t have fleets of bureaucrats and lawyers? Small companies that can’t spread the costs of regulation across a large volume of business? What will the city do for these companies? This is especially important because the spirit of entrepreneurship the city wants to cultivate is most commonly found in small, young, companies — the type of company without fleets of bureaucrats and lawyers.

    The city says it would do for any company what it is doing for Cargill. Except: How are companies supposed to know to ask for regulatory relief, streamlining, and a discount on fees?

    If the city really wants to help all companies, it would — at its own initiative — cut fees and reduce response time across the board, for everyone. Until then Wichita offers special regulatory treatment for special circumstances, which widens the gulf between the haves and have-nots. 9

    Other subsidy programs

    The agenda packet for the city council meeting doesn’t mention this, but from the state of Kansas Cargill is likely to receive PEAK benefits. Under this program, the Kansas state withholding tax deducted from Cargill employees’ paychecks will be routed back to Cargill. 10 (Not all; only 95 percent.) Some very rough calculations show that PEAK benefits might be worth some $2 million annually to Cargill. 11

    Ironically, with the recent increases in Kansas income taxes, PEAK is even more valuable to Cargill.

    Is this needed?

    In the past, economic development subsidies of this type were justified by local governments as necessary to recruit new companies to the area. These subsidies, however, are used simply to retain a company that is already located in downtown Wichita.

    The city has asked Wichita State University’s Center for Economic Development and Business Research to produce benefit/cost ratios. They show that the costs the city, county, and state incur will generate benefits that exceed these costs. For the school district, costs exactly equal benefits — a remarkable coincidence.

    The reasoning and calculation behind these benefit/cost ratios is opaque. The general idea is that spending by a company spawns other spending that results in economic benefit and growth. That’s true. It’s important to know, however, that this benefit also occurs when companies move to Wichita or expand in Wichita, without the benefit of economic development subsidies.

    The question, then, becomes are these incentives necessary? Would Cargill have moved to another city if not for these incentives? It’s only if Cargill would have left Wichita that the benefit/cost ratios have any meaning.

    The City of Wichita says Cargill received lucrative offers from other cities. But these offers have not been seen, to my knowledge. We’re left to take the word of Cargill that it received offers from other cities, and that it would have moved from Wichita if not for Wichita’s incentives.

    Cargill, as we’ve seen, has a multi-million dollar motive. City of Wichita officials also have a large motive, as do officials and politicians at the state level. The politicians and bureaucrats want to — need to — be seen as doing something to improve the economy. It costs none of them one dime to pay these incentives. But the Cargill building will fulfill their ediface complex when they preside at groundbreaking and ribbon-cutting ceremonies.

    If Wichita leaders wanted to gain the trust of Wichitans, to have us believe and understand that these incentives are necessary to keep Cargill in Wichita, the city could reveal the other offers Cargill received. Cargill itself could reveal offers it received from other cities. These actions would help Wichitans understand whether these incentives are truly needed. But the world of economic development incentives is a murky swamp.

    Finally, Mayor Jeff Longwell, other council members, and city hall bureaucrats tell us that the city has moved beyond cash incentives. Cash will not be paid for jobs, they say.

    But forgiving a tax bill is just like paying cash. Discounting the cost of permits is just like paying cash. Paying $6.5 million to use a company’s parking garage during hours the company has no use for it: How is that different from simply paying the company a cash incentive?

    Perhaps the mayor and others have a different understanding of the economics of transactions than I.


    Notes

    1. City of Wichita. Agenda Packet for July 18, 2017. Approval of Development Agreement with Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation.
    2. Weeks, Bob. Industrial revenue bonds in Kansas. http://wichitaliberty.org/kansas-government/industrial-revenue-bonds-kansas/.
    3. City of Wichita. Council agenda packet for April 18, 2017.
    4. “The Office Building will consist of approximately 170,000 square feet space to be used primarily for Class A office space at an estimated construction cost of approximately $71,736,290, including, without limitation, land acquisition costs and the costs of construction of the Parking Garage.” Agenda packet for July 18, 2017. But the city has limited the value of the IRBs at $60 million. Calculation: $60,000,000 x 25% assessment rate for commercial property x approx. 117 mill rate / 1000 = $1,755,000 tax savings per year.
    5. Weeks, Bob. Cargill subsides start forming. Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/cargill-subsides-start-forming/.
    6. $6,500,000 / 700.
    7. Weeks, Bob. Why is this man smiling? Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/wichita-government/man-smiling/.
    8. “Section 4.03. Approvals. The City agrees to provide a 50% reduction in the fees charged by the City for permits and approvals, including plan review, utility and building permitting fees, for all matters related to the Project. The City also agrees to reduce the response time for approval of building plans from the standard 30 days to 15 days for all matters related to the Project.” Also: “The reduction in the permitting fees will be paid from the Economic Development fund.”
    9. Weeks, Bob. Regulation in Wichita, a ‘labyrinth of city processes.’ Available at https://wichitaliberty.org/regulation/regulation-wichita-labyrinth-city-processes/.
    10. Weeks, Bob. In Kansas, PEAK has a leak. http://wichitaliberty.org/kansas-government/kansas-peak-leak/.
    11. For the first year of the agreement, Cargill is expected to have 750 or more employees at an average salary of $66,814. That annual salary / 26 pay periods = $2,570 biweekly. For a family with two children (this is just a guess and could be way off), there are two withholding allowances, so $2,570 – ($86.54 x 2) = $2,397. Using the new withholding tables for married workers (another assumption), bi-weekly withholding is $48.17 + 5.7% x ($2,397 – $1,298) = $48.17 + $62.64 = $110.81. That means $2,881 annual withholding, so Cargill’s 95% share is $2,737. For 750 employees, this is an annual subsidy to Cargill of $2,052,750.
  • Wichita WaterWalk agreement not followed

    Wichita WaterWalk agreement not followed

    Does the City of Wichita enforce its public-private partnership agreements? In some cases the city doesn’t even ask for the information that is needed for enforcement.

    A Wichita Eagle article reports on a 2002 public-private partnership that called for the private-sector company to submit an annual report to the city. But the company did not submit the reports, and the city didn’t ask for them. The city did after the Eagle inquired. 1

    The deal involves the city leasing land to a private developer for a project now known as WaterWalk. Part of the deal called for the city to possibly receive annual payments in a form of profit-sharing. Annual reports to the city were to provide figures from which the city’s payment would be calculated.

    There is an important issue here apart from the wisdom of striking the initial deal in 2002. That is, neither the city nor the company followed the terms of the deal. The annual reports were not supplied by the company, and they were not requested by the city, according to Eagle reporting. As it turns out the annual reports purport to show that the city was owed no money under the profit sharing agreement.

    But that’s not the point. The issue is that the city did not enforce a simple aspect of the agreement, and the private-sector company felt it did not need to comply.

    Some of the Eagle article is devoted to explaining that the deal was struck some years ago, and: “No city official who played a major role in the 2002 contract is still actively involved in government.”

    I’m sure we will hear that excuse from current city council members and bureaucrats, that all this happened before our time. Anyone taking cover using that excuse deserves to be terminated immediately.

    We should not accept this or any excuse. This is because in 2012 the city entered into a same or similar agreement in the same WaterWalk development with the same developer, Jack P. Deboer. It also called for the city to potentially earn payments, called “additional annual rent.” It also called for reports to be made, although the exact language used is “provide that calculation.” 2

    I wonder: When city staff drafted the new agreement in 2012, and when the council deliberated the agreement, did anyone wonder how the 2002 agreement worked out? Did anyone wonder if the city earned any payments from that deal? The 2012 agreement was controversial, at least to some. I and others spoke to the council expressing our concerns. 3

    I also wonder: Has the developer filed the annual reports from the 2012 agreement? I’ve asked the city.

    Here is the article I filed in 2012: Wichita WaterWalk apartment deal not good for citizens.


    Notes

    1. Lefler, Dion. WaterWalk profit-sharing: 15 years, zero dollars for Wichita. Wichita Eagle, July 8, 2017. Available at http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article160147944.html.
    2. “As Additional Annual Rent Tenant shall pay a sum equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the Adjusted Net Cash Flow commencing with the first day the Tenant Improvements open for business. The Tenant shall calculate Adjusted Net Cash Flow for each Current Year within forty-five (45) days after the end of the Current Year (or portion thereof) and provide that calculation, and pay to the Landlord the Additional Annual Rent, within sixty (60) days after the end of the Current Year. Additional Annual Rent shall continue until this Lease expires. Adjusted Net Cash Flow is Gross Revenues less Total Expenses, less the total amount of capital expenses for furniture, fixtures, and equipment for the Tenant Improvements in excess of the aggregate amount expended from any reserve during such year.” Amendments to WaterWalk Developer Agreements. August 21, 2012. Available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B97azj3TSm9Mdm1tWjlQbVAzemM/view?usp=sharing.
    3. Wichita City Council. Minutes of August 21, 2012 meeting. Available at http://wichitaks.granicus.com/MinutesViewer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1843.
  • WichitaLiberty.TV: John Todd and Wichita issues

    WichitaLiberty.TV: John Todd and Wichita issues

    In this episode of WichitaLiberty.TV: John Todd joins Bob Weeks and Karl Peterjohn to discuss issues involving the City of Wichita, including the future of Naftzger Park and economic development. View below, or click here to view at YouTube. Episode 157, broadcast July 9, 2017.

    Shownotes

    • Wichita Pachyderm Club on Facebook
    • Article link: An information resource regarding the future of Naftzger Park in downtown Wichita
    • Article link: Downtown Wichita business trends: There has been much investment in Downtown Wichita, both public and private. What has been the trend in business activity during this time?
    • Article link: Downtown Wichita jobs, sort of: The claim of 26,000 workers in downtown Wichita is based on misuse of data so blatant it can be described only as malpractice.
    • Article link: Wichita economic dashboards

  • Naftzger Park in Downtown Wichita

    Naftzger Park in Downtown Wichita

    An information resource regarding the future of Naftzger Park in downtown Wichita.

    A possible plan for Naftzger Park
    The City of Wichita is proposing to spend $1,500,000 to transform Naftzger Park from its present form to something else. Here are information resources:

    Update: The city council will consider setting the date for a public hearing. See Naftzger Park public hearing to be considered.