Tag: Economics

  • ACA Premium Tax Credits in States

    ACA Premium Tax Credits in States

    (Analysis by Claude AI)

    This scatter plot reveals a fascinating and counterintuitive relationship between political preferences and healthcare policy usage across American states. Let me guide you through what you’re seeing and help you understand why this pattern matters so much for American politics and policy.

    Understanding the Basic Framework

    Think of this chart as a political-policy map of America. The horizontal axis shows how much each state supported Trump in the 2020 election, spanning from about 30% in strongly Democratic states like Vermont and Massachusetts all the way to around 70% in strongly Republican states like Wyoming and Oklahoma. The vertical axis measures what percentage of each state’s population receives ACA Premium Tax Credits – these are federal subsidies that help people afford health insurance through the Affordable Care Act marketplaces.

    The Surprising Pattern That Emerges

    Here’s where the story gets interesting, and it’s not what most people would expect. Rather than seeing a simple relationship between political preference and policy usage, we discover something much more complex that tells us a great deal about how American federalism actually works.

    Starting with the most Democratic states on the far left, you’ll notice they cluster quite low on ACA marketplace usage – typically between 3-6% of their populations. States like Vermont, Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut all fall into this pattern. This might seem puzzling at first since these are the states that most strongly supported the ACA politically.

    Now, as we move toward the center of the political spectrum – into competitive states and those with moderate Republican leanings – something remarkable happens. ACA marketplace usage jumps dramatically upward. Florida stands out as the most striking example, with nearly 18% of its population receiving these tax credits despite being politically competitive. But Florida isn’t alone in this pattern. Georgia reaches about 11%, Texas around 10%, North Carolina climbs to 8-9%, and South Carolina hits about 9%.

    Finally, as we continue moving rightward into the most Republican states – those with 60-70% Trump support – ACA usage drops back down to very low levels again. Wyoming, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and similar states cluster at the bottom of the chart.

    Why This Inverted Pattern Exists

    This bell-curve relationship actually makes perfect sense once we understand the underlying policy landscape, and it teaches us important lessons about how federal programs interact with state-level political decisions.

    The strongly Democratic states on the left show low marketplace usage for several interconnected reasons. Many of these states expanded Medicaid under the ACA, providing coverage for lower-income residents who might otherwise use marketplace plans. Additionally, these states tend to have stronger economies with more employer-based insurance coverage, and they often implemented the ACA most fully, creating robust state-based exchanges that may have shifted people into different coverage categories.

    The peak usage in politically competitive and moderately Republican states reflects a perfect storm of policy needs. Many of these states chose not to expand Medicaid, creating a coverage gap that marketplace plans help fill. They often have large populations working in industries that don’t traditionally provide employer insurance – think Florida’s tourism and service economy, Texas’s diverse economy with many small businesses, or Georgia’s mix of rural and urban workers. These states implemented the ACA but often with less enthusiasm, meaning marketplace plans became crucial safety nets.

    The strongly Republican states on the right show low usage again, but for different reasons than the Democratic states. Many actively resisted ACA implementation, some didn’t expand Medicaid, and some may have created administrative barriers that reduced enrollment. Additionally, some of these states have smaller populations and different economic structures that reduce the need for individual market insurance.

    The Deeper Political Implications

    This pattern reveals one of the most important ironies in American politics: the states whose populations most benefit from ACA marketplace subsidies often include those that were politically skeptical of the program. Meanwhile, the states that most strongly supported the ACA have populations that rely on it less heavily, often because they implemented complementary policies that provided alternative coverage pathways.

    This teaches us that political rhetoric and policy reality don’t always align neatly. It also shows how federal programs interact with state policy choices in complex ways that can produce unexpected outcomes. Understanding these patterns helps us think more sophisticatedly about why certain policies succeed or struggle in different political environments.

  • White House: BLS Has Lengthy History of Inaccuracies, Incompetence

    (Research assisted by AI)

    This White House article presents a highly critical assessment of the Bureau of Labor Statistics under the previous administration. It accurately identifies notable BLS revisions, a significant benchmark adjustment, and procedural lapses in August 2024. However, its framing of these events as evidence of systemic incompetence does not fully account for the agency’s established revision protocols or its enduring reputation for nonpartisan data quality.

    Summary
    The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), under former Commissioner Erika McEntarfer, has repeatedly published overly optimistic employment figures that were later revised downward, eroding confidence in the agency’s data (The White House, 2025). For example, initial May and June 2025 job gains were overstated by a combined 258,000 positions, figures which were quietly adjusted after influencing Federal Reserve policy (The White House, 2025). Similarly, March 2024 payroll growth was pared back by 818,000 jobs—the second?largest benchmark revision on record—while revisions throughout 2024 further reduced reported gains by tens of thousands each month (The White House, 2025).

    Chronic technical failures and premature data leaks compounded the problem, as BLS repeatedly delayed or mishandled releases of critical statistics. In August 2024, a technical glitch postponed the public jobs report, yet several financial firms accessed the data early, contravening the agency’s own nondisclosure protocols (The White House, 2025). Congressional Republicans have held multiple hearings and sent oversight letters spotlighting these missteps and demanding accountability, highlighting the agency’s pattern of miscommunication, data security lapses, and diminished reliability (The White House, 2025).

    Accuracy of Major Claims

    1. May–June 2025 Revisions
      The article states that initial job gains for May and June 2025 were overstated by a combined 258,000 positions and later revised downward. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), May’s gain was revised from +144,000 to +19,000 (–125,000) and June’s from +147,000 to +14,000 (–133,000), for a total downward revision of 258,000 jobs (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2025a). Financial?market responses confirm this adjustment rattled investors and fed into Federal Reserve deliberations (Jones, 2025).

    2. March 2024 Benchmark Revision
      The article correctly notes that the preliminary benchmark revision for March 2024 reduced nonfarm payrolls by 818,000 – the second-largest on record. BLS’s own announcement confirms an estimated downward adjustment of –818,000 jobs for the 12-month period ending March 2024 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2024).

    3. Revisions Throughout 2024
      It is true that BLS routinely issues monthly revisions as more complete data arrive. For example, in July 2024 BLS revised May employment down by 54,000 and April by 57,000; in April 2024 it further pared back February’s figures, and in February 2024 it reduced December 2023 by 43,000 and January 2024 by 124,000 (White House, 2025). However, these adjustments reflect BLS’s standard methodology of incorporating late survey returns and recalculating seasonal factors – practices that have been in place for decades – rather than a new pattern of systematic “overstatement” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2025b; Bloomberg, 2025).

    4. Technical Failures and Data Leaks
      In August 2024 a technical error delayed the public release of the jobs revision report, prompting outrage among policymakers and market participants (Gurley & Siegel, 2024). During that delay, at least three Wall Street firms obtained the unreleased figures in advance – an incident confirmed by Bloomberg and probed by a Republican-led House committee (Smith et al., 2024; House Education and the Workforce Committee, 2024).

    5. Congressional Oversight
      The article’s claim that Congressional Republicans have held hearings and sent oversight letters is accurate. In September 2024, Rep. Virginia Foxx’s Committee on Education and the Workforce formally requested details on both the leak and the procedural failures that allowed selective early access (House Education and the Workforce Committee, 2024).

    Evaluation of Conclusions

    Normalcy vs. Incompetence
    While the White House article emphasizes a “lengthy history of inaccuracies,” the documented revisions are largely consistent with BLS’s transparent revision process, which exists precisely to refine initial estimates (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2025b). Benchmark revisions, by their nature, can be large occasionally (e.g., –818,000 in March 2024), but such events occur roughly once a year when comprehensive unemployment insurance tax data become available.

    Isolated Glitches vs. Systemic Failures
    The August 2024 glitch and the premature disclosure to select firms were serious lapses in protocol, yet they are relatively rare given BLS’s long track record of dependable releases. Since 1979, the agency has operated under strict “lock-up” procedures to ensure simultaneous public access—procedures it has amended in response to these incidents (Bloomberg, 2024).

    Reputation and Independence
    Despite these missteps, the BLS remains widely respected among economists for its methodological rigor and transparency (Miran, 2025; Reuters, 2025). Its willingness to issue large downward revisions and to publicly document its data-processing methodology underpins its credibility. The article’s portrayal of “incompetence” overstates the frequency and severity of errors in a data?rich environment where preliminary estimates are by design subject to revision.

    Overall Assessment
    The White House article accurately identifies notable BLS revisions, a significant benchmark adjustment, and procedural lapses in August 2024. However, its framing of these events as evidence of systemic incompetence does not fully account for the agency’s established revision protocols or its enduring reputation for nonpartisan data quality. A balanced view recognizes both the need to shore up procedural safeguards and the value of BLS’s transparent approach to correcting its own estimates.

    References

    The White House. (2025, August 1). BLS has lengthy history of inaccuracies, incompetence. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/08/bls-has-lengthy-history-of-inaccuracies-incompetence/

    Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2024, July 5). 2024 preliminary benchmark revision to establishment survey data to be released on August 21, 2024. https://www.bls.gov/ces/notices/2024/2024-preliminary-benchmark-revision.htm

    Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2025a, July 30). Employment situation summary—2025 M07 results. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf

    Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2025b). Frequently asked questions: Why does the establishment survey have revisions? https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ces\_cps\_trends.htm#Revisions-Between-Preliminary-and-Final-Data

    Bloomberg. (2024, August 30). BLS data slipups are becoming a pattern.

    Bloomberg. (2025, August 1). Biggest job revisions since 2020 expose pitfall of economic data.

    Gurley, L. K., & Siegel, R. (2024, August 28). Technical error caused jobs data delay that sparked outrage, BLS says. The Washington Post.

    House Education and the Workforce Committee. (2024, September 25). Letter to Acting Secretary Julie Su on BLS data release issues.

    Jones, A. (2025, August 1). U.S. payrolls revisions jolt markets, making Fed look behind the curve. Reuters.

    Miran, S. (2025). Comment on BLS independence and data quality. Axios.

  • Gross Domestic Product per Person  in States

    Gross Domestic Product per Person in States

    (Analysis by Claude)

    This scatter plot reveals a fascinating relationship between political preferences and economic prosperity across US states. Let me walk you through what we’re seeing here.

    The chart plots each state’s per capita GDP in 2022 (measured in inflation-adjusted 2017 dollars) against the percentage of votes Donald Trump received in that state during the 2020 presidential election. The size of each bubble corresponds to the state’s population, so larger states appear as bigger circles.

    The most striking pattern is the clear negative correlation: as Trump’s vote share increases (moving right on the chart), per capita GDP tends to decrease (moving down). This creates a downward-sloping cloud of states from the upper left to the lower right.

    Let’s examine some key clusters and outliers:

    High GDP, Low Trump Support: States like Massachusetts, New York, California, and Connecticut cluster in the upper left corner. These states have per capita GDPs above $75,000 and gave Trump less than 40% of their votes. Washington state also fits this pattern. These tend to be states with major metropolitan areas and knowledge-based economies.

    Low GDP, High Trump Support: States like Mississippi, West Virginia, and Arkansas appear in the lower right, with per capita GDPs below $50,000 and Trump vote shares above 60%. These are generally more rural states with economies historically based on agriculture, mining, or manufacturing.

    Notable Exceptions: Some states break the pattern in interesting ways. Alaska, for instance, has relatively high per capita GDP (around $70,000) despite strong Trump support (about 53%). This likely reflects Alaska’s oil wealth. North Dakota and Wyoming show similar patterns, also benefiting from natural resource extraction.

    Middle Ground: States like Texas, Florida, and Georgia occupy a middle position, with moderate Trump support (around 50-55%) and middle-range per capita GDPs ($60,000-65,000).

    This correlation likely reflects several underlying factors. Wealthier states tend to have more college-educated residents, more diverse economies, and larger urban populations – all demographics that leaned away from Trump in 2020. Meanwhile, states with lower per capita GDP often have more rural populations and traditional industries that have faced economic challenges from globalization and technological change – communities where Trump’s message resonated strongly.

    However, it’s crucial to remember that correlation doesn’t imply causation. The relationship between voting patterns and economic prosperity is complex and influenced by many factors including geography, history, education levels, industrial composition, and cultural values. The chart shows an association, but voting for or against Trump doesn’t directly cause high or low GDP, nor does GDP determine voting behavior in a simple way.

  • Gross Domestic Product in Counties

    Gross Domestic Product in Counties

    (Analysis by Claude)

    This scatter plot reveals a fascinating relationship between economic output and voting patterns at the county level in the United States. Let me walk you through what we’re seeing here.

    Understanding the Axes

    The vertical axis shows each county’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – essentially the total value of all goods and services produced in that county in 2022. Notice that this axis uses a logarithmic scale, which is crucial for interpretation. On a log scale, the distance between $10 million and $100 million is the same as the distance between $100 million and $1 billion. This allows us to see patterns across counties with vastly different economic outputs on the same chart.

    The horizontal axis shows what percentage of voters in each county voted for Trump in the 2020 election, ranging from 0% to 100%.

    The Main Pattern

    The downward-sloping trend line reveals the key finding: there’s a negative correlation between county GDP and Trump vote share. In simpler terms, counties with higher economic output tended to vote less for Trump, while counties with lower economic output tended to vote more for Trump.

    Reading the Data Distribution

    The density of dots tells us important things about American counties:
    – Most counties cluster in the lower-middle portion of the chart (GDP between $100 million and $10 billion, Trump vote share between 40-80%)
    – Very few counties have extremely high GDPs (above $100 billion) – these are likely major metropolitan areas
    – The vertical spread at any given vote percentage shows the diversity of economic conditions across politically similar counties

    Why This Matters

    This visualization captures a significant divide in American politics – the economic productivity gap between areas with different political preferences. The wealthiest, most economically productive counties (often containing major cities and their suburbs) leaned heavily against Trump, while less economically productive rural and small-town counties showed stronger Trump support.

    It’s worth noting that correlation doesn’t imply causation – this chart doesn’t tell us whether economic factors directly influenced voting patterns, or whether other factors (like education levels, urban vs. rural settings, or demographic differences) might explain both the economic and political patterns we see.

  • Trump’s Fed Rate Push Faces Economic Reality

    (Research assisted by AI)

    President Trump’s aggressive campaign for Federal Reserve interest rate cuts in 2025 represents an unprecedented assault on central bank independence, but economic experts warn that rate cuts would likely prove ineffective at spurring growth while risking dangerous stagflationary pressures. Trump demands cuts of 1-3 percentage points, claiming they would save “trillions” in government debt costs, yet economists across major institutions express measured skepticism about traditional monetary stimulus working in current conditions marked by persistent inflation, tariff-induced supply shocks, and full employment.

    This campaign comes as core inflation remains stubbornly at 2.9% – well above the Fed’s 2% target – while unemployment sits at just 4.1%, suggesting minimal economic slack to absorb demand stimulus. The unique stagflationary environment created by Trump’s own tariff policies has fundamentally altered the traditional monetary policy landscape, making rate cuts potentially counterproductive to the economic growth they’re meant to achieve.

    Trump’s pressure campaign reaches unprecedented intensity

    Trump has launched the most aggressive presidential interference with Federal Reserve policy in modern history, combining personal attacks with institutional pressure tactics. His recent statements reveal the scope of his demands: “Fed should cut Rates by 3 Points. Very Low Inflation. One Trillion Dollars a year would be saved!!!” he posted on Truth Social in July 2025, while calling Fed Chair Jerome Powell “one of the dumbest, and most destructive, people in Government.”

    The president’s rationale centers on three main arguments: reducing the government’s $882 billion annual interest burden, achieving competitive parity with Europe’s more aggressive rate cuts, and addressing housing affordability through lower mortgage rates. Trump has specifically called for rates to drop to 1% from the current 4.25%-4.50% range – a reduction that would represent ten times a normal Fed adjustment. His Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has supported this push, stating that market signals show “two-year rates are now below fed funds rates” as justification for cuts.

    Beyond public pressure, Trump’s team is pursuing multiple institutional leverage points, including using Federal Reserve building renovation costs as potential grounds for Powell’s removal “for cause” and planning to announce Powell’s replacement early rather than waiting until his term expires in May 2026.

    Fed’s complex rate control mechanisms limit immediate impact

    The Federal Reserve’s influence over interest rates operates through a sophisticated framework that extends far beyond simple rate announcements. The Fed directly controls the federal funds rate, discount rate, and key administered rates like Interest on Reserve Balances (IORB), which serve as the foundation for short-term rate control. However, the transmission of these changes through the economy follows multiple channels with varying effectiveness and time horizons.

    Short-term rates respond immediately to Fed policy changes – Treasury bills, prime rate, and variable-rate consumer products like credit cards adjust within days or weeks. But longer-term rates remain market-determined, influenced more by expectations of future Fed policy, inflation outlook, and broader economic conditions than current Fed decisions. This distinction proves crucial for understanding why rate cuts might not deliver Trump’s promised benefits.

    The mechanism Trump hopes to exploit – lowering government borrowing costs – works through this complex transmission system. Approximately 20% of government debt (Treasury bills and variable-rate securities) would see immediate cost reductions from Fed cuts, while the majority of savings would accrue gradually as fixed-rate securities mature and are refinanced. With roughly $9.2 trillion in Treasuries maturing in 2025 (about one-third of outstanding marketable debt), sustained rate cuts could provide meaningful fiscal relief, but the benefits would unfold over years rather than immediately.

    Economic experts express measured skepticism about growth effects

    The overwhelming consensus among economists suggests that traditional rate cuts would prove significantly less effective at spurring growth in 2025’s unique economic environment. J.P. Morgan’s Michael Feroli expects the Fed to hold steady until June 2025 before modest cuts, noting that “elevated inflation expectations should reinforce the Fed’s extended pause.” Goldman Sachs downgraded 2025 growth projections from 2.5% to 1.7% specifically due to tariff impacts that monetary policy cannot address.

    The skepticism stems from impaired transmission mechanisms that limit rate cuts’ typical growth benefits. The housing channel – normally a primary pathway for monetary stimulus – faces structural constraints as the high share of existing fixed-rate mortgages reduces rate sensitivity. Despite recent Fed cuts, mortgage rates remain elevated at 6.8%, keeping housing affordability at worst levels since the mid-2000s bubble.

    Peterson Institute economist Adam Posen argues markets “still have too many Fed cuts priced in,” suggesting the Fed will try “very hard not to do anything till November” to maintain credibility. The International Monetary Fund cut U.S. 2025 growth forecasts by 0.9 percentage points and raised inflation projections by 1 percentage point, explicitly citing tariff-induced supply shocks that traditional monetary policy cannot counteract.

    Most critically, economists warn that tariffs create stagflationary dynamics – simultaneous inflation and growth headwinds – that make rate cuts potentially counterproductive. New research from the Minneapolis Fed challenges conventional wisdom by suggesting expansionary monetary policy might actually be optimal during tariff periods, but even this analysis acknowledges the complexity and risks involved.

    Government debt savings face yield curve complexities

    Trump’s claims that rate cuts would save “$1 trillion a year” in government borrowing costs oversimplify the complex relationship between Fed policy and Treasury debt service. While the mechanism for savings exists, the reality involves significant nuances that limit immediate benefits and create potential fiscal risks.

    The government’s debt structure determines how quickly savings materialize. Treasury bills and variable-rate securities (about 20% of total debt) would see immediate cost reductions, while the 68.1% in fixed-rate securities would only benefit as they mature and are refinanced. With the weighted average maturity of Treasury debt at approximately 76 months, full benefits would require sustained low rates over multiple years.

    Current interest costs of $882 billion annually (13% of federal spending) create genuine fiscal pressure, and with nearly $1 trillion in debt maturing in the next year, the government faces substantial refinancing at current elevated rates. However, the Federal Reserve’s own holdings of roughly $4 trillion in Treasuries complicate the calculation – when considering the consolidated government balance sheet, these holdings effectively act like floating-rate debt indexed to overnight rates.

    The Congressional Budget Office warns of feedback effects where large deficits themselves push up interest rates, potentially offsetting Fed rate cut benefits. Their research shows that each 1 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio raises long-run interest rates by approximately 2 basis points, suggesting that fiscal expansion enabled by lower rates could undermine the very savings Trump seeks.

    Stagflation risks dominate expert warnings about rate cuts

    The current economic environment presents unusually high risks for Fed rate cuts that differ markedly from previous easing cycles. With core PCE inflation at 2.9% and rising, unemployment near full employment at 4.1%, and unique supply-side pressures from tariffs, rate cuts risk exacerbating existing vulnerabilities rather than providing economic support.

    Fed Chair Jerome Powell himself warned that sustained tariff increases “are likely to generate a rise in inflation, a slowdown in economic growth, and an increase in unemployment” – precisely the stagflationary conditions that make monetary policy particularly treacherous. The Fed’s April 2025 Financial Stability Report identifies “notable” vulnerabilities across asset valuations, with equity prices “high relative to fundamentals” and residential real estate at “near highest levels on record” relative to rents.

    Historical precedents underscore the risks. The early 2000s housing bubble resulted partly from the Fed’s aggressive rate cuts to 1% following the dot-com crash, creating conditions similar to today’s environment of post-crisis recovery, elevated asset prices, and political pressure for stimulus despite limited economic distress. Fed research later concluded that policy was “too little, too late” in responding to price instability.

    Current financial vulnerabilities amplify these historical lessons. Hedge fund leverage sits at the “highest level since 2013,” banks face $479 billion in underwater securities, and $23 trillion in “runnable” money-like liabilities create systemic funding risks. The Bank for International Settlements warns of a “global economic turning point” with elevated risks from asset price corrections and policy uncertainty.

    Fed independence under unprecedented assault

    Trump’s pressure campaign represents a fundamental challenge to Federal Reserve independence that economists warn could undermine monetary policy effectiveness regardless of specific rate decisions. The combination of personal attacks on Powell, institutional pressure tactics, and explicit threats of removal creates an environment where Fed credibility – crucial for managing inflation expectations – faces serious erosion.

    Recent FOMC minutes reveal Fed officials acknowledge they “might face difficult tradeoffs if elevated inflation proved to be more persistent while the outlook for employment weakened.” Seven of 19 officials now expect no rate cuts in 2025, up from earlier projections, suggesting internal recognition of the risks Trump’s preferred policies would create.

    The central bank’s effectiveness depends heavily on market confidence in its independence and commitment to price stability. Academic research consistently shows that politically compromised central banks struggle to anchor inflation expectations, creating exactly the kind of credibility problems that could transform Trump’s hoped-for economic stimulus into inflationary acceleration without corresponding growth benefits.

    Conclusion

    President Trump’s push for aggressive Federal Reserve rate cuts confronts economic realities that make such policies both ineffective and dangerous in current conditions. While the mechanisms exist for rate cuts to reduce government borrowing costs and potentially support some economic activity, the unique stagflationary environment created by tariff policies, persistent above-target inflation, and full employment conditions fundamentally alter the traditional monetary policy calculus.

    Expert consensus suggests that rate cuts would likely prove counterproductive, risking re-ignition of inflation while providing minimal growth stimulus through impaired transmission channels. The $882 billion question of government debt costs involves complex dynamics that limit immediate savings while potentially creating feedback effects that undermine fiscal stability.

    Most critically, the unprecedented assault on Fed independence threatens the institutional credibility that makes monetary policy effective in the first place. Historical precedents from both the Great Inflation and early 2000s housing bubble demonstrate how political pressure on central banks can transform well-intentioned policies into macroeconomic disasters. In 2025’s high-risk environment, the cure Trump demands may prove worse than the disease he seeks to treat.

  • The Employment and Wage Effects of Trump’s Steel Tariffs

    The Employment and Wage Effects of Trump’s Steel Tariffs: A Review of Research Findings

    Executive Summary

    Research on the Trump administration’s 2018-2020 steel tariffs reveals significant negative net employment effects despite modest gains in steel production jobs. While steel workers experienced some wage increases, the broader economic impact included substantial job losses in steel-using industries and higher costs for consumers.

    Background

    The Trump administration imposed tariffs of 25% on steel imports and 10% on aluminum imports in March 2018 under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, citing national security concerns. These tariffs remained in place through 2020 and have been the subject of extensive economic research.

    Employment Effects

    Steel Production Jobs

    The tariffs had a modest positive effect on employment within the steel production sector itself. Research by Cox and Russ found that tariffs on steel led to an increase of roughly 1,000 jobs in steel production (Econofact, 2020). The latest data on steel production jobs showed roughly 1,000 more jobs in November 2019 than in March 2018 when the tariffs were implemented.

    However, this gain was limited by structural factors in the industry. Even with demand strengthening, the effect on employment in steel production was likely to be muted by technological innovation, as new technologies have allowed steel companies to produce more with fewer workers (PBS NewsHour, 2020).

    Steel-Using Industries

    The employment losses in steel-consuming industries far exceeded gains in steel production. Cox and Russ estimated that increased costs facing U.S. firms due to the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum likely resulted in 75,000 fewer manufacturing jobs in firms where steel or aluminum are inputs into production (Econofact, 2020). This disparity reflects the fundamental economic reality that steel-consuming jobs outnumber steel-producing jobs by 80 to 1 (Tax Foundation, 2024).

    The automotive industry was particularly affected. All three Detroit automakers—General Motors, Ford, and Fiat Chrysler—closed plants in Michigan since January 2018. Both General Motors and Ford reported $1 billion each in increased steel costs in 2018 (NBC News, 2020).

    Net Employment Impact

    When accounting for both job gains and losses, the research suggests a negative net impact. Cox and Russ found that the broader trade war had caused a net loss of 175,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs by mid-2019 (Tax Foundation, 2024). Notably, the steel industry itself continued shedding jobs during the tariff period, employing 1,900 fewer workers than when Trump took office (NBC News, 2020).

    Wage Effects

    Steel Industry Wages

    Workers in the protected steel industry did experience wage benefits. In late 2018, U.S. Steel workers secured a cumulative 14% wage increase over a four-year period (NBC News, 2020). These increases were supported by initially higher steel prices resulting from reduced foreign competition.

    Broader Wage Impacts

    However, the wage effects were not uniformly positive across the economy. Higher steel costs created pressure on wages and employment in downstream industries. Manufacturing costs remained elevated for companies like Ford, which purchases 95% of its steel from domestic suppliers (NBC News, 2020).

    Economic Efficiency Analysis

    Research suggests the job creation achieved through steel tariffs came at enormous cost. Studies indicate that American consumers paid approximately $900,000 in higher prices attributable to the tariffs for every job created in the steel industry (Brookings Institution, 2023). Similarly, tariffs on washing machines cost about $817,000 per job created.

    The Brookings Institution concluded that when economists attempted to add up the net effect of Trump’s tariffs on jobs, any gains in import-competing sectors appeared to have been more than offset by losses in industries that use imported inputs and face retaliation on their foreign exports (Kimbrough & Sala-i-Martin, 2023).

    Academic Consensus

    A March 2018 survey of 43 economic experts by Chicago Booth revealed that 0% thought a U.S. tariff on steel and aluminum would improve Americans’ welfare (Tax Foundation, 2024). This reflects the broad academic consensus that while tariffs may benefit specific protected industries, they typically impose larger costs on the broader economy.

    Conclusion

    The research evidence on Trump’s steel tariffs demonstrates the classic trade-off inherent in protectionist policies: while they can provide benefits to workers in protected industries through higher wages and some job preservation, these gains typically come at the expense of much larger losses in downstream industries and higher costs for consumers. The net employment effect was negative, with job losses in steel-using industries far exceeding gains in steel production.


    References

    Brookings Institution. (2023, June 22). Did Trump’s tariffs benefit American workers and national security? Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/

    Cox, L., & Russ, K. (2020, March 10). Steel tariffs and U.S. jobs revisited. EconoFact. https://econofact.org/steel-tariffs-and-u-s-jobs-revisited

    Kimbrough, K., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (2023). How Trump’s tariffs really affected the U.S. job market. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/china-financial-markets/2021/01/how-trumps-tariffs-really-affected-the-us-job-market

    NBC News. (2020, October 9). Trump steel tariffs raised prices, shriveled up demand, led to job losses, some Michigan workers say. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/trump-steel-tariffs-raised-prices-shriveled-demand-led-job-losses-n1242695

    PBS NewsHour. (2020, February 7). Steel tariffs hurt manufacturers downstream, data shows. PBS NewsHour. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/steel-tariffs-hurt-manufacturers-downstream-data-shows

    Tax Foundation. (2024). Trump tariffs: The economic impact of the Trump trade war. Tax Foundation. https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/

  • Fact-Checking Claims in the “One Big Beautiful Bill” (July 2025)

    Fact-Checking Claims in the “One Big Beautiful Bill” (July 2025)

    Creation of this report was assisted by AI technologies.

    Introduction:
    In July 2025, President Donald Trump and Republican leaders advanced a sweeping legislative package nicknamed the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” encompassing tax changes, immigration measures, and budget provisions. Supporters tout it as a historic boon for American taxpayers and security, while opponents warn of severe consequences. Below we examine several major claims related to this bill, providing detailed analysis and verdicts. All numerical citations in parentheses refer to the endnotes listed at the end of this document.

    Tax and Economic Policy

    Claim: “The bill will eliminate taxes on Social Security benefits.”
    Analysis: President Trump claimed that under this bill, seniors would pay no tax on Social Security income. The truth is more nuanced. The plan increases the income threshold so that many more seniors would be exempt from taxes on their Social Security benefits, but it would not completely eliminate those taxes for everyone. Millions of higher-income retirees would still owe taxes on a portion of their benefits under the proposed changes (1). In other words, the bill reduces the tax burden on Social Security for many seniors, but it does not abolish it entirely.
    Verdict: Misleading – It significantly expands tax exemptions for Social Security benefits but does not fully eliminate taxes for all recipients.

    Claim: “If the bill doesn’t pass, Americans will get a whopping 68% tax increase.”
    Analysis: This alarming figure is an extreme exaggeration. The 68% tax increase claim appears to misrepresent what would happen if certain tax cuts expire. Nonpartisan estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxation indicate that allowing the 2017 tax cuts to lapse would result in an average tax increase of about 10% (not 68%) for households, concentrated among higher earners (2). The 68% number vastly overstates the potential tax hike for the typical American and has no basis in official fiscal projections.
    Verdict: False – The actual tax increase without the bill would be nowhere near 68%, with official estimates around 10%, not 68%.

    Claim: “The average family of four will see an increase of $10,000 (or more) in take-home pay per year.”
    Analysis: Supporters, including the White House and some GOP lawmakers, have claimed that a typical family of four would gain between $10,000 and $13,000 in annual take-home pay thanks to the bill. This projection comes from the high end of the White House Council of Economic Advisers’ estimates. In reality, the Council’s own analysis gave a wide range of potential outcomes: initially about $7,800 up to $13,300 for a family with two children under the House version, later revised to roughly $7,600 to $10,900 under the Senate’s version of the bill (3). The proponents cherry-picked the very top of these optimistic ranges. It’s important to note that these estimates assume unusually strong economic growth (over 4% yearly) to reach those big pay increases, assumptions which budget experts have called “fantasy” because they far exceed the growth forecasts of independent economists (4). If economic growth is more modest (as most analysts expect, closer to 0.1%–1.3% annually), the increase in take-home pay for a typical family would likely be much smaller.
    Verdict: Misleading – A family’s take-home pay could rise under the bill, but claims of a $10k+ boost rely on the rosiest assumptions and are not guaranteed for the average household.

    Claim: “The bill unleashes clean, American-made energy and will reduce the cost of living for Americans.”
    Analysis: This claim was made by bill proponents to highlight an energy provision. The bill does include measures aimed at expanding domestic energy production. However, independent analyses suggest it may not actually lower household costs. In fact, some energy economists have indicated that certain provisions (such as rolling back clean energy incentives) could increase energy costs for consumers in the long run (5). The White House narrative frames the bill as relieving cost-of-living pressures, but available evidence does not clearly support that outcome. If anything, changes in energy policy might lead to higher prices for some fuels or utilities, contrary to the claim.
    Verdict: False – There is no clear evidence that the bill will reduce living costs; some analyses indicate it could raise energy expenses for consumers.

    Claim: “The bill will reduce the deficit by $1.4 trillion” (Republican claim) **/**** “It will actually raise the national debt by $4 trillion” (Democratic claim).**
    **Analysis:
    These dueling claims stem from different baselines and accounting tricks. Republicans argue that if you assume the 2017 tax cuts are extended anyway as “current policy,” then the new bill’s spending cuts outweigh its new spending, yielding over $1.4 trillion in deficit reduction. Democrats, on the other hand, count the extension of those tax cuts as a cost of the bill and highlight additional spending, saying it will add around $4 trillion to deficits. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office did an official score and found that, under normal assumptions, the Senate-passed bill would increase the national debt by at least about $3.3 trillion over the next decade (6). An analysis by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget similarly estimated roughly a $3.9 trillion debt increase through 2034 (6). In short, the bill is expected to expand deficits massively unless one accepts the Republican premise to exclude the cost of continuing existing tax cuts. Under standard budgeting, it doesn’t cut the deficit at all – it balloons it.
    Verdict: Misleading (both sides) – Using conventional calculations, the bill adds on the order of $3–4 trillion to the debt. GOP leaders’ claim of deficit reduction relies on a favorable baseline that ignores the cost of extending tax cuts, while the Democratic figure, around $4 trillion, is in line with independent estimates when counted on the books.

    Immigration and Border Security

    Claim: “Over 10 million ‘illegals’ have invaded our country under Joe Biden.”
    Analysis: Republican lawmakers have asserted that more than 10 million people entered the U.S. illegally during President Biden’s tenure. This figure is misleading. It likely refers to the number of border encounters recorded by authorities, which has been around 10 million since 2021. But encounters are not the same as individuals settling in the country. A single person can be counted multiple times in these statistics if they attempt to cross more than once. Moreover, millions of those encounters did not result in someone remaining in the U.S. — roughly 4 million were immediately expelled or removed, and many others were turned away at ports of entry (7). Homeland Security data indicates that about 3.8 million unique individuals were actually allowed into the U.S. (temporarily) to await immigration proceedings during that period (7). There were also an estimated 1.6 million “got-aways” (people who evaded Border Patrol) over the past few years (7). While that number is significant, it is far from 10 million new undocumented immigrants living in the country. The total undocumented population has not grown by anywhere near that amount.
    Verdict: False – There have been around 10 million border encounters, but the number of actual new undocumented immigrants in the country under Biden is only a fraction of that. The 10 million figure is an inflated misrepresentation.

    Claim: “Illegal immigrants drove up housing prices and insurance premiums, lowered wages for American workers, and caused crime to surge.”
    Analysis: This sweeping claim blames undocumented immigrants for a host of economic and social ills. Empirical evidence does not support such broad effects. On wages and jobs, most economists find that immigration has little to no negative impact on average wages of U.S.-born workers. In fact, immigrant labor can complement native workers; studies show immigrants generally do not cause any significant drop in overall wages or employment for U.S. citizens (8). If anything, immigration tends to have a small positive effect on average wages and can lower prices for some goods and services. As for housing costs and insurance premiums, these are influenced by many factors (interest rates, supply constraints, state regulations, etc.). There isn’t solid data isolating undocumented immigrants as a major driver of rising home prices or insurance rates. The claim that undocumented people have “crippled” cities with crime is sharply contradicted by crime statistics. Numerous studies and crime data analyses have found that immigrants, including those here illegally, have lower crime rates than native-born Americans (9). High-immigration areas often actually experience lower or no greater crime rates compared to other areas (9). The recent surges in violent crime in some U.S. cities have not been credibly linked to immigration. In short, these assertions rely on anecdote and fear rather than facts.
    Verdict: False – There is no evidence that undocumented immigrants are broadly driving up housing or insurance costs or fueling crime spikes. Research shows immigrants have minimal impact on natives’ wages on average and tend to have lower crime rates than the native-born population.

    Claim: “We have 5,000 border agents trying to get rid of 600,000 criminal aliens — we need resources to deport them.”
    Analysis: This claim refers to the number of non-citizens in the U.S. with criminal convictions or charges who are awaiting deportation. There is truth to the magnitude: by mid-2024, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had over 660,000 undocumented immigrants on its docket with criminal histories (10). This number includes people with past criminal convictions or pending criminal charges who are in removal proceedings or subject to deportation orders. It highlights a genuine challenge — a large backlog of deportable offenders. The bill does seek to increase funding for immigration enforcement (including thousands of new border agents and ICE officers) to address this. The figure of “5,000 border agents” is a bit misleading in terminology, as those tasked with interior deportations are primarily ICE Enforcement officers, not Border Patrol agents. ICE’s workforce for removals is indeed only a few thousand officers, which is small relative to 600,000+ cases. Thus, the general point that resources are strained in trying to deport hundreds of thousands of criminal non-citizens is accurate. New funding in the bill would expand capacity for detention and removal of such individuals. However, it’s worth noting that those 600,000 “criminal aliens” are not roaming freely as a violent mob; most have served sentences or are monitored, and deportation can be a lengthy legal process. Increasing enforcement funding may help process more removals, but it is not a simple overnight fix.
    Verdict: True – Around 600,000 undocumented immigrants with criminal records are in the system for potential deportation, which far outstrips current enforcement resources. The bill correctly identifies this backlog, though the phrasing conflates Border Patrol with interior ICE officers.

    Immigration Policy Note: The bill also includes measures such as a 3.5% tax on money transfers (remittances) sent abroad by non-citizens and tens of billions allocated for border security (including finishing the border wall and hiring more agents). Supporters argue the remittance tax will discourage illegal immigration and fund border efforts, while critics counter that it will hurt immigrant families and foreign economies without definitively stopping illegal entry. These outcomes are speculative and not a straightforward matter of “truth” to be proven or debunked here. What’s clear is that the bill represents a major hard-line shift in immigration policy.

    Health Care and Social Policy

    Claim: “This bill doesn’t touch Social Security or Medicare at all – we are not cutting those.”
    Analysis: Unlike some earlier budget proposals, the One Big Beautiful Bill notably avoids direct changes to Social Security and Medicare benefits. The Republican authors repeatedly emphasized that the legislation leaves Social Security and Medicare intact, in response to political attacks. Indeed, there are no provisions in the bill that cut funding for Social Security retirement benefits or Medicare services. Some Democrats had accused the GOP of endangering these programs, but those claims refer to separate political debates or hypothetical future measures. In this bill, Social Security and Medicare are essentially unaffected. (The focus instead is on other programs like Medicaid, as discussed below.)
    Verdict: True – The bill does not contain any cuts to Social Security or Medicare. Any claims to the contrary are misinformation.

    Claim: “Your Medicaid is left alone. It’s left the same.”
    Analysis: President Trump and GOP leaders have insisted that Medicaid – the federal-state health insurance program for low-income and disabled Americans – would remain unchanged for recipients. This is incorrect. The bill introduces significant Medicaid reforms and spending reductions. Chief among them is the imposition of new work requirements for many adult Medicaid enrollees (those able-bodied and under 65 without young children) as a condition for keeping coverage. It also rolls back parts of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion over time and reduces federal funding contributions in various ways. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Medicaid and health insurance provisions in the House version of the bill would result in roughly 7 to 8 million people losing Medicaid or ACA coverage by 2034 (11). In the latest Senate version, the CBO estimated about 11.8 million more Americans would be uninsured in 10 years than under current law, due largely to the Medicaid eligibility restrictions (12). Far from leaving Medicaid “the same,” these policies would gradually shrink the program’s enrollment and expenditures. The changes are phased in over several years, but they represent a substantial impact on Medicaid recipients and state programs.
    Verdict: False – The bill makes major changes to Medicaid (work requirements and funding limits) that are projected to cut millions of people from coverage over time, meaning Medicaid would not be “left alone.”

    Claim: “The bill will kick about 16 million Americans off of health care.”
    Analysis: This claim has been made by some Democratic opponents, who cite estimates of people losing insurance coverage. It overstates the impact. As noted, the nonpartisan CBO’s analysis of the bill projected on the order of 10 to 12 million additional people without health insurance a decade from now compared to current law (12). Some Democrats arrived at a higher figure (\~16 million) by adding in unrelated assumptions, such as the scheduled expiration of certain Affordable Care Act subsidies in 2025, which is a separate issue not directly caused by this bill’s provisions (12). Therefore, saying the bill “kicks 16 million off health care” exaggerates the effect by counting people who might lose insurance for reasons outside the bill. The best estimate for coverage losses directly attributable to the bill’s Medicaid and ACA changes is around 11 million by 2034. That is still a very large number, but it is lower than 16 million.
    Verdict: False – The true projected coverage loss due to the bill is on the order of 11 million people, not 16 million; the higher figure cited by some includes additional factors beyond the scope of this legislation.

    Claim: “Work requirements for benefits only target able-bodied adults who won’t work, just like the successful welfare reforms of the 1990s.”
    Analysis: The bill’s supporters contend that requiring Medicaid and food aid recipients to work or volunteer is a reasonable, non-controversial step that echoes the 1996 welfare reform. It’s true the bill would mandate work activities (at least 80 hours a month of work, job training, or volunteering) for certain adults on Medicaid and food stamps, with exemptions for pregnant women, people with disabilities, and parents of young children. However, experts caution that many people who meet the requirements could still lose benefits due to bureaucratic hurdles. In past trials of Medicaid work requirements (for example, in Arkansas in 2018), thousands of individuals who were working or otherwise exempt nonetheless lost coverage because they failed to navigate the complex reporting rules in time. In fact, most non-elderly adult Medicaid enrollees are already working or caregiving, and only a small minority (around 8%) are not working without an exemption. Those who aren’t working often face barriers like illness, lack of job access, or undiagnosed disabilities. The “able-bodied adults” affected are a diverse group, and not all are simply choosing not to work. The new paperwork and verification processes are likely to strip coverage from some eligible people inadvertently. Thus, while the policy is intended to encourage employment, it could also lead to many working poor losing healthcare through red tape.
    Verdict: Opinion – This is a value judgment rather than a factual claim. The policy indeed targets able-bodied adults without dependents, but whether it is reasonable or similar to past welfare reforms is a matter of perspective. Historically, work requirements in welfare reduced enrollment but also left many vulnerable individuals without support. It is expected the Medicaid work rules here would significantly reduce Medicaid rolls, which supporters see as a cost-saving success and opponents see as harmful.

    Final Summary of Claims and Verdicts:

    1. “No tax on Social Security benefits.”Misleading
    2. “68% tax increase without the bill.”False
    3. “Family of four’s take-home pay will rise by $10,000+.”Misleading
    4. “Bill will reduce cost of living (energy claim).”False
    5. “Bill cuts deficit by $1.4T / adds $4T to debt.”Misleading (both claims)
    6. “10 million illegal immigrants entered under Biden.”False
    7. “Illegal immigrants caused higher housing costs, lower wages, more crime.”False
    8. “600,000 criminal aliens at large (and few agents to deport them).”True
    9. “Medicaid is left untouched by the bill.”False
    10. “16 million will lose health coverage under the bill.”False

    Endnotes:
    (1) FactCheck.org (July 2025), “Unraveling the Big Beautiful Bill Spin.” Trump’s claim of “no tax on Social Security” is overstated; the bill expands tax exemptions for benefits but does not eliminate them entirely. Millions of seniors would still pay tax on Social Security under the bill’s provisions, though fewer than before (FactCheck.org) .
    (2) FactCheck.org (July 2025), “Unraveling the Big Beautiful Bill Spin.” Trump warned of a “68% tax increase” if the bill failed, but the Joint Committee on Taxation calculated a much smaller impact (around 10.7% on average). The 68% figure is unfounded (FactCheck.org).
    (3) FactCheck.org (July 2025), “Unraveling the Big Beautiful Bill Spin.” In early estimates, the White House Council of Economic Advisers predicted a take-home pay boost between \~$7,600 and $13,300 for a family of four under the bill, later revised to $7,600–$10,900 in the Senate version. Trump and allies cited only the top end of these ranges (FactCheck.org).
    (4) FactCheck.org (July 2025), “Unraveling the Big Beautiful Bill Spin.” The Council’s projections assumed over 4% annual GDP growth. The nonpartisan CRFB labeled these “fantasy growth assumptions,” noting independent analyses expect only 0.1%–1.3% growth – far less than what would be needed to yield a $10k increase in take-home pay (FactCheck.org).
    (5) FactCheck.org (July 2025), citing independent energy analyses. The White House claimed the bill would lower living costs through energy provisions, but experts (e.g. at universities and research groups) found that repealing clean energy incentives could raise household energy costs. Thus, the “reduce cost of living” claim is not supported by evidence (FactCheck.org).
    (6) FactCheck.org (July 2025), “Unraveling the Big Beautiful Bill Spin.” The CBO reported the Senate bill would increase the national debt by about $3.3 trillion over 10 years. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimated an even larger debt increase (
    $3.9 trillion) if the bill passes. Republicans discount the cost of extending 2017 tax cuts to claim deficit reduction, while Democrats cite the full $3–4+ trillion addition (FactCheck.org).
    (7) PolitiFact (Sept. 18, 2024), “Donald Trump ad makes False claims about Kamala Harris, immigration, Social Security.” PolitiFact notes that “10 million” refers to border encounters since Biden took office, not unique individuals. Millions of those encounters led to expulsion or removal, and one person can account for multiple encounters. Roughly 3.8 million people were released into the U.S. (as of mid-2024) to await hearings, and an estimated 1.6 million “got-aways” evaded capture in FY 2021–23. There are not 10 million new undocumented residents (PolitiFact).
    (8) Brookings Institution (Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, “What Immigration Means for U.S. Employment and Wages,” May 4, 2012). A survey of economic research found immigrants “do not tend to cause sizeable decreases in wages or employment” of native-born workers. In some cases, immigration even slightly raises average wages and lowers prices. Immigrant and U.S.-born workers often complement, rather than substitute for, each other (Brookings.edu).
    (9) Econofact (Feb. 2023), “Immigrant Deportations: Trends and Impacts.” Summarizes research showing immigrants have lower crime rates than U.S.-born citizens. Increased deportations have not been linked to reductions in crime; a substantial body of literature finds no evidence that immigration drives up crime, and in fact immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than native-born individuals (Econofact.org).
    (10) U.S. ICE data reported by Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-TX) – Press Release (Sept. 27, 2024). ICE Deputy Director provided data that as of July 2024, there were 662,566 illegal immigrants on ICE’s docket with criminal histories (convictions or charges). This confirms the “hundreds of thousands of criminal aliens” figure cited by GOP lawmakers (gonzales.house.gov press release).
    (11) FactCheck.org (July 2025), “Unraveling the Big Beautiful Bill Spin.” CBO’s analysis of the House-passed bill projected about 7.8 million people would lose Medicaid coverage by 2034 due to the bill’s work requirements and other eligibility changes. This contradicts claims that Medicaid is untouched (FactCheck.org).
    (12) FactCheck.org (July 2025), “Unraveling the Big Beautiful Bill Spin.” For the Senate version, CBO estimated 11.8 million more Americans would be uninsured by 2034 because of the bill (combined Medicaid and ACA marketplace effects). FactCheck.org also explains that Democrats’ higher figure (e.g. 16 million) mistakenly included additional coverage losses from expiring separate ACA provisions, overstating the bill’s direct impact (FactCheck.org).

  • Trump’s Tariffs Make Absolutely No Sense

    (Unlocked gift link included)

    One-sentence summary: Jason Furman argues that Donald Trump’s proposed “reciprocal tariffs” are based on flawed economic reasoning and would damage the U.S. economy, worsen global trade relations, and ultimately empower China.

    In this opinion piece, economist Jason Furman critiques former President Donald Trump’s expected announcement of “reciprocal tariffs,” a policy aimed at matching other countries’ tariff levels on U.S. goods. Furman argues that the rationale behind this policy is deeply flawed, starting with the misconception that trade deficits are inherently bad and stem from foreign trade barriers. He illustrates this point by likening trade to everyday exchanges, emphasizing that buying more from a partner than one sells is not inherently problematic.

    Furman explains that imports benefit American consumers through variety, quality, and affordability, and help domestic companies stay competitive by lowering input costs. He dispels the idea that tariffs influence trade deficits, citing that these imbalances are largely determined by national saving and investment rates. Because the U.S. invests more than it saves, it attracts foreign capital, which in turn drives up imports and creates a trade deficit – a sign of economic strength, not weakness.

    Reciprocal tariffs, Furman argues, would reduce both imports and exports, hurt economic growth, and risk inflation and job loss. Even without retaliatory measures from other countries, tariffs would make foreign goods more expensive and reduce foreign demand for American goods by strengthening the dollar. Furman warns that Trump’s approach is not limited to equalizing trade barriers but selectively targets products with higher foreign tariffs, ignoring areas where U.S. tariffs are already higher.

    He also critiques Trump’s claims that foreign VATs discriminate against U.S. exports, clarifying that these taxes apply equally to domestic and imported goods in those countries. Furman notes that demanding changes to VAT systems would require countries to alter foundational aspects of their tax codes – a highly unrealistic goal.

    The real economic costs are substantial: Trump’s first-term tariff hikes averaged a 1.5-point increase, while 2025 actions have already added another six points, with more expected. These could reduce GDP growth by 0.5 percentage point, raise inflation, and cost households roughly $1,000. Lower-income Americans will feel the burden most, even as potential tax cuts benefit wealthier households. The stock market has already lost $3 trillion since February due to tariff-related uncertainty.

    Furman concludes by warning of geopolitical consequences. As the U.S. retreats from global trade, China stands to benefit by deepening its ties with other countries. This shift in trade alliances could pave the way for a broader realignment of global political power, increasingly centered around China.

    Furman, Jason. “Opinion | Trump’s Tariffs Make Absolutely No Sense.” The New York Times, 31 Mar. 2025, www.nytimes.com/2025/03/31/opinion/trump-tariffs-economy.html.

    Unlocked gift link:
    https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/31/opinion/trump-tariffs-economy.html?unlocked_article_code=1.8E4.oaZr.ZUB2kW7HA-uk&smid=url-share

    Key takeaways:

    • Trump’s proposed reciprocal tariffs are based on a misunderstanding of trade deficits and global economics.
    • Trade deficits are more influenced by investment and saving behaviors than by tariffs.
    • Imports benefit consumers and support U.S. businesses by providing cheaper inputs and greater product variety.
    • Tariffs will likely lead to less trade, higher prices, slower growth, and economic uncertainty.
    • Lower-income households will bear more of the costs, while benefits will skew toward wealthier individuals.
    • Trump’s approach selectively targets high-tariff goods while ignoring where U.S. tariffs are higher.
    • Foreign VATs are not discriminatory; changing them is implausible.
    • The policy could diminish the U.S.’s global economic role and strengthen China’s influence.

    Most important quotations:

    • “Every step in this chain of reasoning is wrong.”
    • “Imports are good, not bad.”
    • “There is generally no correlation between a country’s tariff levels and its overall trade balance.”
    • “Even if other countries don’t retaliate… the situation is still bad.”
    • “The enormous increase in business uncertainty that tariffs have engendered means anything could happen.”
    • “Lower-income families will pay a higher fraction of their income in tariffs.”
    • “Give these countries a choice between economic relations with the United States and with China, they would probably choose the latter in a heartbeat.”

    Word count of generated summary: 798
    Word count of supplied input: 1,651

    Model version used: gpt-4-turbo
    Custom GPT name: Summarizer 2

  • Trump’s Tariffs Have Sown Uncertainty. That Might Be the Point.

    One-sentence summary: President Trump’s tariffs and economic policies have created uncertainty in markets and business investments, which appears to be an intentional strategy to strengthen his negotiating leverage rather than a flaw in his approach.

    President Trump’s aggressive use of tariffs against Canada, Mexico, and China, along with plans for additional “reciprocal” tariffs on imports worldwide, has caused significant economic uncertainty. The administration’s messaging around these policies has been inconsistent, citing reasons ranging from addressing unfair trade practices to tackling the national debt. This unpredictability has dampened business investment, shaken consumer confidence, and led to market volatility, while also making it difficult for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates.

    Rather than clarifying his strategy, Trump and his advisers have embraced uncertainty as a key aspect of their economic approach. White House economic adviser Kevin Hassett acknowledged the instability but framed it as a necessary step leading up to the April 2 tariff enactments. Trump himself dismissed concerns from the business community, arguing that his policies are necessary to counteract past global trade imbalances.

    The impact of this uncertainty is already evident. The ratings firm Fitch has warned that Trump’s trade war will slow U.S. economic growth, raise consumer prices, and disrupt business investment. Economist Brian Coulton noted that tariff increases would lower real wages and raise corporate costs. Analysts argue that Trump sees tariffs primarily as a bargaining tool for broader policy negotiations, which makes his approach unpredictable. This has led to financial market volatility and economic concerns.

    Some policymakers hope that after April 1, businesses and investors will have more clarity, but market experts remain skeptical. Unlike in his first term, Trump’s current economic team seems less inclined to moderate his aggressive instincts. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has not ruled out the possibility of a recession but defends the tariffs as a way to revive critical U.S. industries. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has gone further, stating that Trump’s economic policies are vital for America, even if they push the country into a recession.

    Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers warned that even if Trump eventually scales back his tariffs, the damage has already been done by creating uncertainty that hampers economic activity. The ongoing instability is slowing corporate deals and investment, reinforcing concerns that the administration’s erratic approach to trade policy is negatively affecting the economy.

    Rappeport, Alan. “Trump’s Tariffs Have Sown Uncertainty. That Might Be the Point.” The New York Times, 19 Mar. 2025, www.nytimes.com/2025/03/19/business/trump-tariffs-economy.html.

    Key takeaways:

    • Trump’s tariffs have caused market instability, reduced business investment, and increased economic uncertainty.
    • The administration’s inconsistent messaging suggests that unpredictability is an intentional part of Trump’s trade strategy.
    • The Federal Reserve may delay rate cuts due to economic uncertainty caused by tariffs.
    • Economists warn that tariffs will slow economic growth, raise prices, and reduce wages.
    • Trump’s economic team appears more willing to accept recession risks than in his first term.
    • Financial markets remain volatile as investors fear long-term economic consequences.
    • Even if tariffs are reversed, the uncertainty they have created has already hurt the economy.

    Important quotations:

    • “Absolutely, between now and April 2, there’ll be some uncertainty.” – Kevin Hassett
    • “For years, the globalists… have been ripping off the United States. They have been taking money away… and all we’re doing is getting some of it back.” – Donald Trump
    • “Tariff hikes will result in higher U.S. consumer prices, reduce real wages and increase companies’ costs, and the surge in policy uncertainty will take a toll on business investment.” – Brian Coulton
    • “These are profoundly problematic steps even if reversed… They generate immense uncertainty which overhangs the economy.” – Lawrence H. Summers

    Word count of summary: 451
    Word count of supplied input: 1036

    Model version: GPT-4-turbo
    Custom GPT: Summarizer 2