Voice For Liberty

Tag: Economics

  • Myth: Markets don’t work (or are inefficient) when there are negative or positive externalities

    When thinking about the difference between government action and action taken by free people trading voluntarily in markets, we find that many myths abound. Tom G. Palmer has written an important paper that confronts these myths about markets. The seventh myth — Markets Don’t Work (or Are Inefficient) When There Are Negative or Positive Externalities — and Palmer’s refutation is below. The complete series of myths and responses is at Twenty Myths about Markets.

    Palmer is editor of the recent book The Morality of Capitalism. He will be in Overland Park and Wichita in May speaking on the moral case for capitalism. For more information and to register for these events see The Morality of Capitalism.

    Myth: Markets Don’t Work (or Are Inefficient) When There Are Negative or Positive Externalities

    Myth: Markets only work when all of the effects of action are born by those who make the decisions. If people receive benefits without contributing to their production, markets will fail to produce the right amount. Similarly, if people receive “negative benefits,” that is, if they are harmed and those costs are not taken into account in the decision to produce the goods, markets will benefit some at the expense of others, as the benefits of the action go to one set of parties and the costs are borne by another.

    Tom G. Palmer: The mere existence of an externality is no argument for having the state take over some activity or displace private choices. Fashionable clothes and good grooming generate plenty of positive externalities, as others admire those who are well clothed or groomed, but that’s no reason to turn choice of or provision of clothing and grooming over to the state. Gardening, architecture, and many other activities generate positive externalities on others, but people undertake to beautify their gardens and their buildings just the same. In all those cases, the benefits to the producers alone — including the approbation of those on whom the positive externalities are showered — are sufficient to induce them to produce the goods. In other cases, such as the provision of television and radio broadcasts, the public good is “tied” to the provision of other goods, such as advertising for firms; the variety of mechanisms to produce public goods is as great as the ingenuity of the entrepreneurs who produce them.

    More commonly, however, it’s the existence of negative externalities that leads people to question the efficacy or justice of market mechanisms. Pollution is the most commonly cited example. If a producer can produce products profitably because he imposes the costs of production on others who have not consented to be a part of the production process, say, by throwing huge amounts of smoke into the air or chemicals into a river, he will probably do so. Those who breathe the polluted air or drink the toxic water will bear the costs of producing the product, while the producer will get the benefits from the sale of the product. The problem in such cases, however, is not that markets have failed, but that they are absent. Markets rest on property and cannot function when property rights are not defined or enforced. Cases of pollution are precisely cases, not of market failure, but of government failure to define and defend the property rights of others, such as those who breathe polluted air or drink polluted water. When people downwind or downstream have the right to defend their rights, they can assert their rights and stop the polluters from polluting. The producer can install at his own expense equipment or technology to eliminate the pollution (or reduce it to tolerable and non-harmful levels), or offer to pay the people downwind or downstream for the rights to use their resources (perhaps offering them a better place to live), or he must stop producing the product, because he is harming the rights of others who will not accept his offers, showing that the total costs exceed the benefits. It’s property rights that make such calculations possible and that induce people to take into account the effects of their actions on others. And it’s markets, that is, the opportunity to engage in free exchange of rights, that allow all of the various parties to calculate the costs of actions.

    Negative externalities such as air and water pollution are not a sign of market failure, but of government’s failure to define and defend the property rights on which markets rest.

  • Tax costs block progress in Kansas

    If we in Kansas and Wichita wonder why our economic growth is slow and our economic development programs don’t seem to be producing results, there is now data to answer the question why: Our tax costs are high — way too high.

    Recently the Tax Foundation released a report that examines the tax costs on business in the states and in selected cities in each state. The news for Kansas is worse than merely bad, as our state couldn’t have performed much worse: Kansas ranks 47th among the states for tax costs for mature business firms, and 48th for new firms.

    The report is Location Matters: A Comparative Analysis of State Tax Costs on Business.

    The study is unusual in that it looks at the impact of states’ tax burden on mature and new firms. This, according to report authors, “allows us to understand the effects of state tax incentives compared to a state’s core tax system.” In further explanation, the authors write: “The second measure is for the tax burden faced by newly established operations, those that have been in operation less than three years. This represents a state’s competitiveness after we have taken into account the various tax incentive programs it makes available to new investments.”

    The report also looks at the tax costs for specific types of business firms. For Kansas, some individual results are better than overall, but still not good. For a mature corporate headquarters, Kansas ranks 30th. For locating a new corporate headquarters — one that would benefit from tax incentive programs — Kansas ranked 42nd. For a mature research and development facility, 46th; while new is ranked 49th. For a mature retail store, 38th, while new is ranked 45th.

    There are more categories. Kansas ranks well in none.

    The report also looked at two cities in each state, a major city and a mid-size city. For Kansas, the two cities are Wichita and Topeka.

    Among the 50 cities chosen, Wichita ranks 30th for a mature corporate headquarters, but 42nd for a new corporate headquarters.

    For a mature research and development facility, Wichita ranks 46th, and 49th for a new facility.

    For a mature and new retail store, Wichita ranks 38th and 45th, respectively.

    For a mature and new call center, Wichita ranks 43rd and 47th, respectively.

    In its summary for Kansas, the authors note the fecklessness of Kansas economic development incentives: “Kansas offers among the most generous property tax abatements and investment tax credits across most firm types, yet these incentives seem to have little impact on the state’s rankings for new operations.”

    Kansas tax cost compared to neighbors. Click here for a larger version.

    It’s also useful to compare Kansas to our neighbors. The comparison is not favorable for Kansas.

    More evidence of failure

    Recently the Greater Wichita Economic Development Coalition issued its annual report on its economic development activities for the year. This report shows us that power of government to influence economic development is weak. In its recent press release, the organization claimed to have created 1,509 jobs in Sedgwick County during 2011. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the labor force in Sedgwick County in 2011 was 253,940 persons. So the jobs created by GWEDC’s actions amounted to 0.59 percent of the labor force. This is a very small fraction, and other economic events are likely to overwhelm these efforts.

    In his 2012 State of the City address, Wichita Mayor Carl Brewer took credit for creating a similar percentage of jobs in Wichita.

    The report by the Tax Foundation helps us understand why the economic development efforts of GWEDC, Sedgwick County, and Wichita are not working well: Our tax costs are too high.

    While economic development incentives can help reduce the cost of taxes for selected firms, incentives don’t help the many firms that don’t receive them. In fact, the cost of these incentives is harmful to other firms. The Tax Foundation report points to this harm: “While many state officials view tax incentives as a necessary tool in their state’s ability to be competitive, others are beginning to question the cost-benefit of incentives and whether they are fair to mature firms that are paying full freight. Indeed, there is growing animosity among many business owners and executives to the generous tax incentives enjoyed by some of their direct competitors.”

    But there is one incentive that can be offered to all firms: Reduce tax costs for everyone. The policy of reducing tax costs for the selected few is not working. This “active investor” approach to economic development is what has led companies in Wichita and Kansas escaping hundreds of millions in taxes — taxes that others have to pay. That has a harmful effect on other business, both existing and those that wish to form.

    Professor Art Hall of the Center for Applied Economics at the Kansas University School of Business is critical of this approach to economic development. In his paper Embracing Dynamism: The Next Phase in Kansas Economic Development Policy, Hall quotes Alan Peters and Peter Fisher: “The most fundamental problem is that many public officials appear to believe that they can influence the course of their state and local economies through incentives and subsidies to a degree far beyond anything supported by even the most optimistic evidence. We need to begin by lowering expectations about their ability to micro-manage economic growth and making the case for a more sensible view of the role of government — providing foundations for growth through sound fiscal practices, quality public infrastructure, and good education systems — and then letting the economy take care of itself.”

    In the same paper, Hall writes this regarding “benchmarking” — the bidding wars for large employers that Wichita and Kansas has been pursuing and which Wichita’s Brewer wants to step up: “Kansas can break out of the benchmarking race by developing a strategy built on embracing dynamism. Such a strategy, far from losing opportunity, can distinguish itself by building unique capabilities that create a different mix of value that can enhance the probability of long-term economic success through enhanced opportunity. Embracing dynamism can change how Kansas plays the game.”

    In making his argument, Hall cites research on the futility of chasing large employers as an economic development strategy: “Large-employer businesses have no measurable net economic effect on local economies when properly measured. To quote from the most comprehensive study: ‘The primary finding is that the location of a large firm has no measurable net economic effect on local economies when the entire dynamic of location effects is taken into account. Thus, the siting of large firms that are the target of aggressive recruitment efforts fails to create positive private sector gains and likely does not generate significant public revenue gains either.’”

    There is also substantial research that is it young firms — distinguished from small business in general — that are the engine of economic growth for the future. We can’t detect which of the young firms will blossom into major success — or even small-scale successes. The only way to nurture them is through economic policies that all companies can benefit from. Reducing tax rates is an example of such a policy. Abating taxes for specific companies through programs like IRBs is an example of precisely the wrong policy.

    We need to move away from economic development based on this active investor approach. We need to advocate for policies — at Wichita City Hall, at the Sedgwick County Commission, and at the Kansas Statehouse — that lead to sustainable economic development. We need political leaders who have the wisdom to realize this, and the courage to act appropriately. Which is to say, to not act in most circumstances, except to reduce the cost of government for everyone.

  • Myth: Markets cannot possibly produce public (collective) goods

    When thinking about the difference between government action and action taken by free people trading voluntarily in markets, we find that many myths abound. Tom G. Palmer has written an important paper that confronts these myths about markets. The sixth myth — Markets Cannot Possibly Produce Public (Collective) Goods — and Palmer’s refutation is below. The complete series of myths and responses is at Twenty Myths about Markets.

    Palmer is editor of the recent book The Morality of Capitalism. He will be in Overland Park and Wichita in May speaking on the moral case for capitalism. For more information and to register for these events see The Morality of Capitalism.

    Myth: Markets Cannot Possibly Produce Public (Collective) Goods

    Myth: If I eat an apple, you can’t; consumption of an apple is purely rivalrous. If I show a movie and don’t want other people to see it, I have to spend money to build walls to keep out non-payers. Some goods, those for which consumption is non-rival and exclusion is costly, cannot be produced on markets, as everyone has an incentive to wait for others to produce them. If you produce a unit, I can just consume it, so I have no incentive to produce it. The same goes for you. The publicness of such goods requires state provision, as the only means to provide them. Such goods include not only defense and provision of a legal system, but also education, transportation, health care, and many other such goods. Markets can never be relied on to produce such goods, because non-payers would free-ride off of those who pay, and since everyone would want to be a free-rider, nobody would pay. Thus, only government can produce such goods.

    Tom G. Palmer: The public goods justification for the state is one of the most commonly misapplied of economic arguments. Whether goods are rivalrous in consumption or not is often not an inherent feature of the good, but a feature of the size of the consuming group: a swimming pool may be non-rivalrous for two people, but quite rivalrous for two hundred people. And costs of exclusion are applicable to all goods, public or private: if I want to keep you from eating my apples, I may have to take some action to protect them, such as building a fence. Many goods that are non-rivalrous in consumption, such as a professional football game (if you see it, it doesn’t mean that I can’t see it, too), are produced only because entrepreneurs invest in means to exclude non-payers.

    Besides not being an inherent feature of the goods per se, the alleged publicness of many goods is a feature of the political decision to make the goods available on a nonexclusive and even non-priced basis. If the state produces “freeways,” it’s hard to see how private enterprise could produce “freeways,” that is, zero-priced transportation, that could compete. But notice that the “freeway” isn’t really free, since it’s financed through taxes (which have a particularly harsh form of exclusion from enjoyment, known as jail), and also that the lack of pricing is the primary reason for inefficient use patterns, such as traffic jams, which reflect a lack of any mechanism to allocate scarce resources (space in traffic) to their most highly valued uses. Indeed, the trend around the world has been toward pricing of roads, which deeply undercuts the public goods argument for state provision of roads.

    Many goods that are allegedly impossible to provide on markets have been, or are at present, provided through market mechanisms — from lighthouses to education to policing to transportation, which suggests that the common invocation of alleged publicness is unjustified, or at least overstated.

    A common form of the argument that certain goods are allegedly only producible through state action is that there are “externalities” that are not contracted for through the price mechanism. Thus, widespread education generates public benefits beyond the benefits to the persons who are educated, allegedly justifying state provision and financing through general tax revenues. But despite the benefits to others, which may be great or small, the benefits to the persons educated are so great for them that they induce sufficient investment in education. Public benefits don’t always generate the defection of free-riders. In fact, as a wealth of research is demonstrating today, when states monopolize education they often fail to produce it for the poorest of the poor, who nonetheless perceive the benefits to them of education and invest substantial percentages of their meager incomes to educate their children. Whatever externalities may be generated by their children’s education does not stop them from paying their own money to procure education for their children.

    Finally, it should be remembered that virtually every argument alleging the impossibility of efficient production of public goods through the market applies at least equally strongly– and in many cases much more strongly –to the likelihood that the state will produce public goods. The existence and operation of a just and law-governed state is itself a public good, that is, the consumption of its benefits is non-rivalrous (at least among the citizenry) and it would be costly to exclude non-contributors to its maintenance (such as informed voters) from the enjoyment of its benefits. The incentives for politicians and voters to produce just and efficient government are not very impressive, certainly when placed next to the incentives that entrepreneurs and consumers have to procure public goods through cooperation in the marketplace. That does not mean that the state should never have any role in producing public goods, but it should make citizens less willing to cede to the state additional responsibilities forproviding goods and services. In fact, the more responsibilities are given to the state, the less likely it is to be able to produce those public goods, such as defense of the rights of its citizens from aggression, at which it might enjoy special advantages.

  • Myth: Markets only work when an infinite number of people with perfect information trade undifferentiated commodities

    When thinking about the difference between government action and action taken by free people trading voluntarily in markets, we find that many myths abound. Tom G. Palmer has written an important paper that confronts these myths about markets. The fifth myth — Markets Only Work When an Infinite Number of People With Perfect Information Trade Undifferentiated Commodities — and Palmer’s refutation is below. The complete series of myths and responses is at Twenty Myths about Markets.

    Palmer is editor of the recent book The Morality of Capitalism. He will be in Overland Park and Wichita in May speaking on the moral case for capitalism. For more information and to register for these events see The Morality of Capitalism.

    Myth: Markets Only Work When an Infinite Number of People With Perfect Information Trade Undifferentiated Commodities

    Myth: Market efficiency, in which output is maximized and profits are minimized, requires that no one is a price setter, that is, that no buyer or seller, by entering or exiting the market, will affect the price. In a perfectly competitive market, no individual buyer or seller can have any impact on prices. Products are all homogenous and information about products and prices is costless. But real markets are not perfectly competitive, which is why government is required to step in and correct things.

    Tom G. Palmer: Abstract models of economic interaction can be useful, but when normatively loaded terms such as “perfect” are added to theoretical abstractions, a great deal of harm can be done. If a certain condition of the market is define as “perfect” competition, then anything else is “imperfect” and needs to be improved, presumably by some agency outside of the market. In fact, “perfect” competition is simply a mental model, from which we can deduce certain interesting facts, such as the role of profits in directing resources (when they’re higher than average, competitors will shift resources to increase supply, undercut prices, and reduce profits) and the role of uncertainty in determining the demand to hold cash (since if information were costless, everyone would invest all their money and arrange it to be cashed out just at the moment that they needed to make investments, from which we can conclude that the existence of cash is a feature of a lack of information). “Perfect” competition is no guide to how to improve markets; it’s a poorly chosen term for a mental model of market processes that abstracts from real world conditions of competition.

    For the state to be the agency that would move markets to such “perfection,” we would expect that it, too, would be the product of “perfect” democratic policies, in which infinite numbers of voters and candidates have no individual impact on policies, all policies are homogenous, and information about the costs and benefits of policies is costless. That is manifestly never the case.

    The scientific method of choosing among policy options requires that choices be made from among actually available options. Both political choice and market choice are “imperfect” in all the ways specified above, so choice should be made on the basis of a comparison of real — not “perfect”– market processes and political processes. Real markets generate a plethora of ways of providing information and generating mutually beneficial cooperation among market participants. Markets provide the framework for people to discover information, including forms of cooperation.

    Advertising, credit bureaus, reputation, commodity exchanges, stock exchanges, certification boards, and many other institutions arise within markets to serve the goal of facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation. Rather than discarding markets because they aren’t perfect, we should look for more ways to use the market to improve the imperfect state of human welfare.

    Finally, competition is better understood, not as a state of the market, but as a process of rivalrous behavior. When entrepreneurs are free to enter the market to compete with others and customers are free to choose from among producers, the rivalry among producers for the custom of customers leads to behavior favorable to those customers.

  • Myth: Markets depend on perfect information, requiring government regulation to make information available

    When thinking about the difference between government action and action taken by free people trading freely in markets, we find that many myths abound. Tom G. Palmer has written an important paper that confronts these myths about markets. The fourth myth — Markets Depend on Perfect Information, Requiring Government Regulation to Make Information Available — and Palmer’s refutation is below. The complete series of myths and responses is at Twenty Myths about Markets.

    Palmer is editor of the recent book The Morality of Capitalism. He will be in Overland Park and Wichita in May speaking on the moral case for capitalism. For more information and to register for these events see The Morality of Capitalism.

    Myth: Markets Depend on Perfect Information, Requiring Government Regulation to Make Information Available

    Myth: For markets to be efficient, all market participants have to be fully informed of the costs of their actions. If some have more information than others, such asymmetries will lead to inefficient and unjust outcomes. Government has to intervene to provide the information that markets lack and to create outcomes that are both efficient and just.

    Tom G. Palmer: Information, like every other thing we want, is always costly, that is, we have to give something up to get more of it. Information is itself a product that is exchanged on markets; for examples, we buy books that contain information because we value the information in the book more than we value what we give up for it. Markets do not require for their operation perfect information, any more than democracies do. The assumption that information is costly to market participants but costless to political participants is unrealistic in extremely destructive ways. Neither politicians nor voters have perfect information. Significantly, politicians and voters have less incentive to acquire the right amount of information than do market participants, because they aren’t spending their own money. For example, when spending money from the public purse, politicians don’t have the incentive to be as careful or to acquire as much information aspeople do when they are spending their own money.

    A common argument for state intervention rests on the informational asymmetries between consumers and providers of specialized services. Doctors are almost always more knowledgeable about medical matters than are patients, for example; that’s why we go to doctors, rather than just curing ourselves. Because of that, it is alleged that consumers have no way of knowing which doctors are more competent, or whether they are getting the right treatment, or whether they are paying too much. Licensing by the state may then be proposed as the answer; by issuing a license, it is sometimes said, people are assured that the doctor will be qualified, competent, and upright. The evidence from studies of licensure, of medicine and of other professions, however, shows quite the opposite. Whereas markets tend to generate gradations of certification, licensing is binary; you are licensed, or you are not. Moreover, it’s common in licensed professions that the license is revoked if the licensed professional engages in “unprofessional conduct,” which is usually defined as including advertising! But advertising is one of the means that markets have evolved to provide information– about the availability of products and services, about relative qualities, and about prices. Licensure is not the solution to cases of informational asymmetry; it is the cause.

  • Regulation for the sake of business

    There are many examples of how the conventional wisdom regarding regulation is wrong, That wisdom being Republicans and conservatives are in bed with government, seeking to unshackle business from the burden of government regulation. Democrats and liberals, on the other hand, are busily crafting regulations to protect the middle class from the evils of big business. As it turns out, both Democrats and Republicans love creating regulations, and big business loves these regulations. Business often uses government regulation as way to harm its competitors or gain advantage for itself, which is contrary to the principles of free markets and capitalism.

    Holman W. Jenkins., Jr. explains how regulation works in the real world: “When some hear the word “regulation,” they imagine government rushing to the defense of consumers. In the real world, government serves up regulation to those who ask for it, which usually means organized interests seeking to block a competitive threat. This insight, by the way, originated with the left, with historians who went back and reconstructed how railroads in the U.S. concocted federal regulation to protect themselves from price competition. We should also notice that an astonishingly large part of the world has experienced an astonishing degree of stagnation for an astonishingly long time for exactly such reasons.” (Let’s Restart the Green Revolution, Wall Street Journal.)

    Another example of a big business using regulation as a competitive weapon comes from 2005 when Walmart came out in favor of raising the national minimum wage. Providing an example of how regulation is pitched as needed for the common good, Walmart’s CEO said that he was concerned for the plight of working families, and that he thought the minimum wage level of $5.15 per hour was too low. If Walmart — a company the political left loves to hate as much as any other — can be in favor of increased regulation of the workplace, can regulation be a good thing? Had Walmart discovered the joys of big government?

    The answer is yes. Walmart discovered a way of using government regulation as a competitive weapon. This is often the motivation for business support of regulation. In the case of Walmart, it was already paying its employees well over the current minimum wage. At the time, some sources thought that the minimum wage could be raised as much as 50 percent and not cause Walmart any additional cost — its employees already made that much.

    But its competitors didn’t pay wages that high. If the minimum wage rose very much, these competitors to Walmart would be forced to increase their wages. Their costs would rise. Their ability to compete with Walmart would be harmed.

    In short, Walmart supported government regulation as a way to impose higher costs on its competitors. It found a way to compete outside the marketplace. It abandoned principles of free markets and capitalism, and provided a lesson as to the difference between capitalism and business. And it did it while appearing noble.

    Many, particularly liberals and progresives, make no distinction between business and capitalism. But we need to learn to recognize the difference if we are to have a thriving economy based on free-wheeling, competitive markets that foster innovation, or continue our decline into unproductive crony capitalism.

    In the following excerpt from his book The Big Ripoff: How Big Business and Big Government Steal Your Money, author Timothy P. Carney explains that big business is able to use regulation as a blunt and powerful tool against competitors, and also as a way to improve its image, just like Walmart asking for a higher minimum wage.

    How does regulation help big business?

    Excerpt from The Big Ripoff: How Big Business and Big Government Steal Your Money, by Timothy P. Carney

    If regulation is costly, why would big business favor it? Precisely because it is costly.

    Regulation adds to the basic cost of doing business, thus heightening barriers to entry and reducing the number of competitors. Thinning out the competition allows surviving firms to charge higher prices to customers and demand lower prices from suppliers. Overall regulation adds to overhead and is a net boon to those who can afford it — big business.

    Put another way, regulation can stultify the market. If you’re already at the top, stultification is better than the robust dynamism of the free market. And according to Nobel Laureate economist Milton Friedman:

    The great virtue of free enterprise is that it forces existing businesses to meet the test of the market continuously, to produce products that meet consumer demands at lowest cost, or else be driven from the market. It is a profit-and-loss system. Naturally, existing businesses prefer to keep out competitors in other ways. That is why the business community, despite its rhetoric, has so often been a major enemy of truly free enterprise.

    There is an additional systemic reason why regulation will help big business. Congress passes the laws that order new regulations, and executive branch agencies actually construct the regulations. The politicians and government lawyers who write these rules rarely do so without input. Often the rule makers ask for advice and information from labor unions, consumer groups, environmental groups, and industry itself. Among industry the stakeholders (beltway parlance to describe affected parties) who have the most input are those who can hire the most effective and most connective lobbyists. You can guess this isn’t Mom and Pop.

    As a result, the details of the regulation are often carefully crafted to benefit, or at least not hurt, big business. If something does not hurt you, or hurts you a little while seriously hindering your competition, it is a boon, on balance.

    Another reason big business often cries “regulate me!” is the goodwill factor. If a politician or bureaucrat wants to play a role in some industry, and some executive says, “get lost,” he runs the risk of offending this powerful person. That’s bad diplomacy. Bureaucrats, by their nature, do not like to be told to mind their own business. Supporting the idea of regulation but lobbying for particular details is usually better politics.

  • In Kansas, tax reform is about job creation

    As explained in the new edition of Rich States, Poor States: ALEC-Laffer State Economic Competitiveness Index, tax policy is vitally important to a state’s economic competitiveness. Unfortunately, Kansas does not perform well against other states.

    Two groups working to create a more competitive economic environment in Kansas are Americans for Prosperity, Kansas and Kansas Policy Institute. Their video commercial from earlier this year that explains the urgent situation in Kansas is below.

  • Rich States, Poor States 2012 edition released

    This month American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) released the fifth edition of Rich States, Poor States: ALEC-Laffer State Economic Competitiveness Index. As in the past, Kansas performs in the middle of the pack in one measure, below average in another, with little or no progress achieved in making Kansas competitive with other states.

    The report’s authors are Arthur B. Laffer, Stephen Moore, and Jonathan Williams. Besides the ranking of the states, the Rich States, Poor States report always contains useful information about economic and tax policy. This year a chapter is titled “10 Golden Rules of Effective Taxation,” starting with “When you tax something more you get less of it, and when you tax something less you get more of it.”

    Another important rule or observation is “An increase in tax rates will not lead to a dollar-for-dollar increase in tax revenues, and a reduction in tax rates that encourages production will lead to less than a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax revenues.” People seek to avoid paying taxes, and as tax rates rise, they will employ various methods to accomplish this. Some will simply stop earning more income. That’s why predictions of increased revenue after tax rate increase are rarely fulfilled. Similarly, when tax rates are reduced, the incentive to avoid taxes is reduced. Additionally, the business decision process is focused on achieving productive economic goals instead of tax avoidance.

    Rule five is the famous Laffer Curve: “If tax rates become too high, they may lead to a reduction in tax receipts. The relationship between tax rates and tax receipts has been described by the Laffer Curve.”

    Rule seven explains the strategy behind Kansas Governor Sam Brownback’s goal of reducing and eliminating the Kansas income tax: “Raising tax rates on one source of revenue may reduce the tax revenue from other sources, while reducing the tax rate on one activity may raise the taxes raised from other activities.” If business taxes rise, we expect less business, therefore fewer employees with jobs contributing taxes. The converse — if business taxes fall, we expect more business activity — means more employees paying the other taxes that Kansas relies on: sales and property taxes.

    In the second chapter — Paving the Path to Prosperity — the authors discuss migration data made available by the Internal Revenue Service. Despite the fact that some states have gorgeous weather and in some states the weather is terrible, that’s not why people move around: “Census data consistently shows that people choose where to live, engage in commerce, and invest based on economic competitiveness.” California and Hawaii are losing many people to states where the economic climate is better. While we in Kansas can’t control the weather, we can control our state’s economic policies: “State elected officials obviously have little control over their states’ 10-day forecasts, but they do control their states’ tax climates. We know tax policy is not the only reason people are motivated to live, invest, or grow a business in a state, but it plays a significant
    role. State lawmakers should keep this in mind as they shape public policy.”

    The impact of state employee pension plans is also important, write the authors. Kansas is in especially poor condition in the area, and emerging legislation offers some relief for Kansas taxpayers, but not much.

    In the chapter “Policies for Growth” the authors address an issue very relevant to Kansas. It is said by many that we need an income tax in Kansas because we aren’t blessed with natural resources like, say, Texas, which receives huge income from the oil industry. First, the author’s note that having an income tax is still harmful: “But while the existence of oil, gas, and other natural resources clearly makes things easier for a state’s government, they do not negate the impact of a state’s income tax.”

    In Texas, by the way, three percent of the state’s budget comes from severance taxes. (In Kansas it is 1.1 percent.) While this revenue is helpful to Texas, it isn’t anywhere near the magnitude of benefit that the Kansas government spending lobby would have you believe.

    If we need more evidence of the harmful effects of income taxes, the authors present results from the 11 states that have introduced an income tax over the past 50 years. The results? “What we find astonishing is how the size of the economy in each one of these states has declined as a share of the total U.S. economy compared with a time just prior to when each state introduced its income tax. Some of the declines are quite large.”

    While there is a link between income tax rates and state economic performance, the authors did not find the same link regarding sales tax rates. It has a neutral effect, they write, and is a preferred method for generating revenue for the states. Sales tax receipts are also less volatile than income tax revenues.

    Kansas among the states

    Rich States, Poor States evaluates state economies two ways. The “Economic Outlook Ranking” is a forecast looking forward. It is based on factors that are under control of the states. The “Economic Performance Ranking” is a backward-looking rating that measures state performance, again using variables under control of each state.

    For Economic Performance Ranking, Kansas is ranked 39 among the states, near the bottom in terms of positive performance. In the 2010 edition, Kansas was ranked 40th, and in 2010, 34th. Kansas is not making progress in this ranking of state performance.

    In the forward-looking Economic Outlook Ranking, Kansas ranks 26th. Again, Kansas is not making progress, compared to other states. In annual rankings since 2008 Kansas has been ranked 29, 24, 25, 27, and now 26.

    In this ranking, Kansas performs well for having no inheritance or estate tax, having a good state liability system, a state minimum wage that is not higher than the federal minimum wage, having low workers’ compensation costs, and being a right-to-work state.

    Areas in which Kansas performs poorly include personal income tax progressivity, sales tax burden, recently legislated tax changes, debt service, and number of tax expenditure limits (Kansas has none).

    A problem in Kansas is the number of government employees. The measure “public employees per 10,000 population” is 708.2, which ranks Kansas 48th among the states. Only Alaska and Wyoming have more government employees per capita.

    The complete Rich States, Poor States report is available for purchase or free download at Rich States, Poor States: ALEC-Laffer State Economic Competitiveness Index. An oped in the Wall Street Journal by authors Laffer and Moore is at A 50-State Tax Lesson for the President: Over the past decade, states without an income levy have seen much higher growth than the national average. Which state will be next to abolish theirs?.

  • Myth: Reliance on markets leads to monopoly

    When thinking about the difference between government action and action taken by free people trading freely in markets, many myths abound. Tom G. Palmer has written an important paper that confronts these myths about markets. The third myth — Reliance on Markets Leads to Monopoly — and Palmer’s refutation is below. The complete series of myths and responses is at Twenty Myths about Markets.

    Palmer is editor of the recent book The Morality of Capitalism. He will be in Overland Park and Wichita in May speaking on the moral case for capitalism. For more information and to register for these events see The Morality of Capitalism.

    Myth: Reliance on markets leads to monopoly

    Myth: Without government intervention, reliance on free markets would lead to a few big firms selling everything. Markets naturally create monopolies, as marginal producers are squeezed out by firms that seek nothing but their own profits, whereas governments are motivated to seek the public interest and will act to restrain monopolies.

    Tom G. Palmer: Governments can — and all too often do — give monopolies to favored individuals or groups; that is, they prohibit others from entering the market and competing for the custom of customers. That’s what a monopoly means. The monopoly may be granted to a government agency itself (as in the monopolized postal services in many countries) or it may be granted to a favored firm, family, or person.

    Do free markets promote monopolization? There’s little or no good reason to think so and many reasons to think not. Free markets rest on the freedom of persons to enter the market, to exit the market, and to buy from or sell to whomever they please. If firms in markets with freedom of entry make above average profits, those profits attract rivals to compete those profits away. Some of the literature of economics offers descriptions of hypothetical situations in which certain market conditions could lead to persistent “rents,” that is, income in excess of opportunity cost, defined as what the resources could earn in other uses. But concrete examples are extremely hard to find, other than relatively uninteresting cases such as ownership of unique resources (for example, a painting by Rembrandt). In contrast, the historical record is simply full of examples of governments granting special privileges to their supporters.

    Freedom to enter the market and freedom to choose from whom to buy promote consumer interests by eroding those temporary rents that the first to offer a good or service may enjoy. In contrast, endowing governments with power to determine who may or may not provide goods and services creates the monopolies — the actual, historically observed monopolies — that are harmful to consumers and that restrain the productive forces of mankind on which human betterment rests. If markets routinely led to monopolies, we would not expect to see so many people going to government to grant them monopolies at the expense of their less powerful competitors and customers. They could get their monopolies through the market, instead.

    It’s always worth remembering that government itself seeks to exercise a monopoly; it’s a classic defining characteristic of a government that it exercises a monopoly on the exercise of force in a given geographic area. Why should we expect such a monopoly to be more friendly to competition than the market itself, which is defined by the freedom to compete?