Assistance from Claude AI. For a summary of the event, see Trump-Zelenskyy Peace Talks at Mar-a-Lago Show Major Progress on Ukraine War Settlement.
This fact-checking analysis reveals a pattern common in political rhetoric: leaders make claims that range from substantially accurate (the war’s scale, the nuclear plant’s size) to misleading through oversimplification (characterizing assistance as “given away”) to unverifiable (settling eight wars) to contradicted by documented evidence (wanting Ukraine to succeed while destroying its infrastructure). Understanding these distinctions helps us assess the reliability of claims about ongoing peace negotiations where verification remains limited.
Trump’s Claim: “The Most Deadly War Since World War II, Probably the Biggest War Since World War II”
Verdict: Partially Accurate with Important Context
This claim requires us to distinguish between “deadly” and “biggest,” which aren’t quite the same thing. Let’s break down what we know about post-World War II conflicts to understand where the Russia-Ukraine war ranks.
The Russia-Ukraine war has indeed produced catastrophic casualties, though precise figures remain contested because both governments treat casualty data as militarily sensitive. According to estimates compiled by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence and released in July 2024, combined Russian and Ukrainian military casualties (killed and wounded) had reached approximately 500,000 by mid-2024. The Wall Street Journal reported in September 2024 that Western intelligence estimates suggested over 600,000 combined casualties. By late 2025, these figures would certainly be substantially higher, potentially exceeding 700,000 to 800,000 when including both killed and wounded on both sides.
However, calling this the “most deadly” war since World War II requires comparison with other major conflicts. The Korean War resulted in approximately 2.5 to 3 million deaths total when including military personnel and civilians from all participating nations. The Vietnam War caused between 1.5 and 3.5 million deaths depending on how one counts civilian casualties in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s killed an estimated 500,000 to 1 million combatants and civilians. The Second Congo War, sometimes called “Africa’s World War,” resulted in an estimated 3 to 5 million deaths between 1998 and 2003, though most died from disease and starvation rather than direct combat.
So Trump’s characterization depends heavily on how we’re measuring. If we’re counting only European conflicts since 1945, the Russia-Ukraine war would indeed represent the deadliest, surpassing the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. If we’re measuring direct combat deaths globally, it ranks among the deadliest but not necessarily the single most deadly. The claim becomes more accurate if we focus specifically on conventional state-versus-state warfare between large military forces, which has been relatively rare since 1945.
The phrase “biggest war” is even more ambiguous. Does “biggest” refer to the number of troops deployed, the territory contested, the economic impact, or the geopolitical significance? Russia initially deployed over 150,000 troops for the February 2022 invasion, with that number growing substantially during subsequent mobilizations. Ukraine has mobilized hundreds of thousands of defenders. The geographic scope spans a country of approximately 600,000 square kilometers. By these measures, it certainly ranks among the largest conventional conflicts since World War II, though again, Korea and Vietnam involved comparable or larger troop deployments when counting all participating nations.
Trump’s claim reflects a reasonable characterization of the war’s significance and scale, even if the superlative “most deadly” requires qualification. The statement succeeds in conveying the conflict’s historical gravity, which appears to be his rhetorical purpose, even if military historians might quibble with the precise ranking.
References:
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2024). Declassified intelligence assessment on Russia-Ukraine conflict casualties. U.S. Department of Defense.
Haltiwanger, J. (2024, September 17). Russia has lost over 600,000 troops in Ukraine war, Western intelligence estimates suggest. The Wall Street Journal.
Sarkees, M. R., & Wayman, F. W. (2010). Resort to war: A data guide to inter-state, extra-state, civil, and intra-state wars, 1816-2007. CQ Press.
Trump’s Claim About the 2020 Election: “If the Election Weren’t Rigged and Stolen, 2020, You Wouldn’t Have Had This War”
Verdict: False and Thoroughly Debunked
This claim contains two separate assertions that need individual examination: first, that the 2020 election was “rigged and stolen,” and second, that Trump’s presence in office would have prevented Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Let me explain why both components fail factual scrutiny.
The claim that the 2020 presidential election was “rigged and stolen” has been comprehensively investigated and rejected by every credible authority. More than sixty lawsuits filed by Trump and his allies were dismissed by federal and state courts, including by judges Trump himself appointed. The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, led by Trump appointee Christopher Krebs, issued a statement calling the 2020 election “the most secure in American history.” Trump’s own Attorney General, William Barr, stated publicly that the Department of Justice found no evidence of fraud that would have changed the outcome.
Recounts and audits in contested states repeatedly confirmed Biden’s victory. In Georgia, three separate counts verified Biden’s win. In Arizona, a Republican-led audit in Maricopa County actually increased Biden’s margin. Election officials from both parties certified results showing Biden won 306 electoral votes to Trump’s 232, with Biden receiving over seven million more popular votes. No credible evidence has emerged supporting claims of systematic fraud, rigging, or vote manipulation that would have altered the outcome.
The second component of Trump’s claim—that his presence would have deterred Putin from invading Ukraine—represents a counterfactual that cannot be definitively proven or disproven because we cannot rerun history. However, we can examine the claim’s plausibility based on what we know about Putin’s decision-making and the factors that influenced the invasion.
Putin’s February 2022 invasion reflected long-developing strategic calculations about NATO expansion, Ukraine’s westward orientation, Russian nationalism, and Putin’s apparent belief that Ukrainian statehood lacks legitimacy. These factors predated the 2020 election and would have persisted regardless of who occupied the White House. Putin had already annexed Crimea in 2014 during the Obama administration and supported separatists in Donbas continuously since then, demonstrating that Russian aggression toward Ukraine was not uniquely deterred during Trump’s presidency.
Indeed, Trump’s first term saw significant tensions in U.S.-Russia relations despite his stated desire for better relations. Congress imposed sanctions on Russia with bipartisan support, which Trump signed into law. The Trump administration provided lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine, including Javelin anti-tank missiles, which the Obama administration had declined to provide. These actions suggest that U.S. policy toward Russia contained deterrent elements regardless of Trump’s personal relationship with Putin.
Experts on Russian foreign policy have identified multiple factors influencing Putin’s invasion timing, including Russia’s military modernization reaching a peak, Putin’s concerns about his own mortality and legacy, the COVID-19 pandemic’s disruption of international norms, and intelligence failures leading Putin to believe Ukraine would collapse quickly. The U.S. presidential election outcome appears far down the list of decisive factors, if it appears at all.
Notably, Putin did not invade during Trump’s term despite having four years to do so, which Trump cites as evidence. However, this proves correlation, not causation. Putin also did not invade during most of Obama’s term, and he did invade Georgia in 2008 during the George W. Bush administration, suggesting that various U.S. presidents have faced Russian aggression. The pattern does not support a unique Trump deterrent effect.
References:
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2020, November 12). Joint statement from elections infrastructure government coordinating council & the election infrastructure sector coordinating executive committees. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Barr, W. (2020, December 1). Interview with Michael Balsamo. Associated Press.
Brennan Center for Justice. (2021). Debunking the voter fraud myth. New York University School of Law.
Stent, A. (2022). The Putin puzzle: Why did Russia invade Ukraine? Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Paper.
Trump’s Claim: “Biden Gave $350 Billion Away”
Verdict: Misleading Through Oversimplification
This claim requires us to understand how U.S. assistance to Ukraine actually works, because characterizing it as money “given away” fundamentally misrepresents the mechanisms involved. Let me break down what the $350 billion figure represents and why “gave away” doesn’t accurately describe these transactions.
According to the State Department and Department of Defense, total U.S. assistance to Ukraine from February 2022 through late 2025 has exceeded $175 billion when combining military, economic, and humanitarian aid. If Trump’s $350 billion figure is accurate, it suggests he’s referencing either updated totals through late 2025 or he’s including indirect costs such as military operations in Europe, intelligence support, or NATO infrastructure investments related to the Ukraine crisis. Without seeing Trump’s specific accounting, we cannot verify the precise $350 billion number, but we can examine what forms this assistance takes.
The assistance breaks down into several distinct categories that function very differently from simply “giving away” money. Military assistance includes approximately $100 billion in weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Importantly, much of this represents drawdown authority, meaning the U.S. transfers existing military stockpiles to Ukraine rather than writing checks. When the U.S. sends Ukraine Javelin missiles or artillery shells, American defense contractors receive contracts to replenish those stockpiles, meaning a significant portion of military assistance dollars circulate back into the U.S. economy as domestic defense manufacturing jobs.
Economic assistance includes approximately $50 billion in direct budget support, loan guarantees, and International Monetary Fund contributions. Budget support helps the Ukrainian government pay salaries for teachers, healthcare workers, and civil servants—preventing state collapse rather than funding military operations. Some of this takes the form of loans or loan guarantees rather than grants, meaning Ukraine would theoretically repay these funds, though debt forgiveness remains possible.
Humanitarian assistance totaling several billion dollars funds refugee relief, medical supplies, and demining operations through organizations like the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. This money addresses civilian suffering rather than supporting military operations.
The characterization of this assistance as “given away” implies waste or loss without return on investment. However, national security experts across the political spectrum have argued that supporting Ukraine serves multiple U.S. interests: degrading Russia’s military capability without deploying American troops, reinforcing NATO cohesion, upholding international norms against territorial conquest, and gathering intelligence on Russian military capabilities. From this perspective, the assistance represents investment in strategic objectives rather than charity.
Additionally, the $350 billion figure, if accurate, represents spending over nearly four years across multiple congressional appropriations passed with bipartisan support. It’s not a single transaction or decision by President Biden alone, but rather reflects sustained congressional authorization. The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse, meaning these expenditures required legislative approval from both parties.
To say Biden “gave” this money away also ignores the collaborative nature of Ukraine support among dozens of allied nations. The European Union and European countries collectively have provided comparable or greater total assistance to Ukraine when combining military, economic, and refugee costs. The U.S. contribution represents roughly 40-50% of total Western assistance, meaning this is a burden-sharing arrangement rather than exclusively American spending.
References:
U.S. Department of State. (2024). Ukraine assistance fact sheet. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.
Congressional Research Service. (2024). U.S. security assistance to Ukraine: A detailed overview. Report R47240.
Kiel Institute for the World Economy. (2024). Ukraine support tracker. https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/
Trump’s Claim About Settling “Eight Wars” Including One in “One Day”
Verdict: Unverifiable and Likely Exaggerated
This claim presents significant challenges for fact-checking because Trump does not specify which eight conflicts he’s referencing, making verification impossible without additional details. Let me explain why this matters and what we can determine about Trump’s role in various conflict resolutions.
The phrase “settled eight wars” suggests Trump personally negotiated peace agreements or ceasefires that ended active military conflicts. To evaluate this, we need to examine what major conflicts existed during Trump’s presidency and what role, if any, he played in their resolution.
During Trump’s first term, several conflict-related developments occurred that might be characterized as settlements or de-escalations. The Abraham Accords normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan), though these countries were not actively at war with Israel at the time. The agreements represent diplomatic achievements but not cessations of active warfare. The U.S. negotiated a withdrawal agreement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, though critics note that warfare continued and intensified after the agreement, ultimately leading to the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan.
Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in unprecedented summits, though North Korea did not denuclearize and continued weapons development. No formal peace treaty ending the Korean War was signed, and the armistice remains the operative agreement. In Syria, ISIS lost its territorial caliphate during Trump’s term, but this resulted from military operations by the U.S.-led coalition, Kurdish forces, and others rather than a negotiated settlement. Syria’s civil war continues.
The claim about settling a war “in one day” is particularly difficult to verify. Diplomatic historians note that genuine conflict resolution typically requires extended negotiation, implementation mechanisms, and verification—processes that inherently take longer than one day. Even simple ceasefire agreements usually require weeks of preparation, though they might be announced or signed on a single day after that preparatory work.
It’s possible Trump is referencing conflicts that existed in relatively frozen states and where he facilitated agreement announcements, but without knowing which specific conflicts he means, we cannot assess the accuracy. The claim’s vagueness itself raises concerns about precision and verifiability.
Comparing this to the Ukraine-Russia negotiation is instructive. Trump himself characterizes that process as “very complex” and requiring “over a month” of detailed work, contradicting the notion that serious wars can be “settled in a couple of days.” This internal contradiction suggests either that the “eight wars” were less significant conflicts than the Ukraine war, or that Trump is using “settled” loosely to describe diplomatic achievements rather than comprehensive peace agreements.
References:
Kurtzer, D., & Lasensky, S. (2020). The peace puzzle: America’s quest for Arab-Israeli peace. Cornell University Press.
Rubin, B. (2021). Afghanistan: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press.
Council on Foreign Relations. (2024). Global conflict tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker
Zelenskyy’s Claim: “91 Percent in Favor of Ending This War”
Verdict: Requires Context About Question Framing
This claim, which Trump also cited, needs careful examination because polling results depend enormously on how questions are phrased. The difference between “do you want the war to end?” and “would you accept territorial concessions for peace?” can produce vastly different responses. Let me explain why this matters for understanding Ukrainian public opinion.
Polling in Ukraine during active warfare faces methodological challenges including limited access to occupied territories, displacement of millions of citizens, and potential self-censorship by respondents concerned about government or Russian monitoring. These factors mean all polls carry uncertainty about representativeness and accuracy.
That said, multiple polling organizations have surveyed Ukrainian attitudes toward peace negotiations. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Ukraine’s most respected polling firm, conducted surveys throughout 2024 showing that large majorities of Ukrainians do support peace—but the details matter enormously. When asked whether they want the war to end generally, support reaches 85-90% or higher, consistent with Zelenskyy’s claim. Who wouldn’t want horrific warfare to cease?
However, when asked whether they would accept specific conditions for peace, support drops substantially. Polls consistently show that 70-85% of Ukrainians oppose territorial concessions to Russia, even for peace. Fewer than 20% support recognizing Russian sovereignty over Crimea or Donbas. This reveals that “wanting the war to end” differs fundamentally from “willing to accept any terms to end the war.”
The 91% figure likely comes from polling asking whether respondents want peace negotiations to succeed or whether they support diplomatic efforts to end the war. These questions garner very high support because they don’t force respondents to choose between territorial integrity and peace. Once polls introduce that trade-off, Ukrainian public opinion appears much more hawkish.
This context matters critically for understanding the referendum discussion in the press conference. Zelenskyy stated that any difficult territorial concessions would need popular approval through referendum, suggesting he recognizes that negotiated terms might not command majority support if they involve significant compromises. The 91% figure supporting peace in principle doesn’t necessarily translate to 91% supporting whatever specific deal emerges from negotiations.
References:
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. (2024). Public opinion in Ukraine regarding peace negotiations and territorial questions. Survey reports 2024.
Pew Research Center. (2024). Most Ukrainians say their country should keep fighting until it wins. Global Attitudes Survey.
International Republican Institute. (2024). Public opinion survey of residents of Ukraine. Center for Insights in Survey Research.
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant: “Probably the Biggest in the World, Just About the Biggest Anywhere in the World”
Verdict: Accurate with Minor Clarification
This claim is essentially accurate, and it demonstrates that Trump received correct briefing information about this critical facility. Let me provide context about why this plant matters so much and why its size is significant.
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southeastern Ukraine is indeed Europe’s largest nuclear facility and among the largest in the world by electrical generation capacity. The plant contains six VVER-1000 pressurized water reactors, each capable of generating 950 megawatts electrical output, for a total capacity of approximately 5,700 megawatts. Zelenskyy’s gentle correction that it’s the largest “in Europe” rather than globally is technically accurate, as several plants in Asia exceed Zaporizhzhia’s capacity.
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant in Japan has seven reactors totaling over 8,000 megawatts capacity, making it the world’s largest by installed capacity, though it has been offline since the 2011 Fukushima disaster. South Korea’s Kori Nuclear Power Plant and Hanul Nuclear Power Plant also exceed Zaporizhzhia’s capacity. So Trump’s qualifier “just about the biggest anywhere in the world” appropriately hedges the claim while conveying the facility’s massive scale.
Trump’s statement that the plant houses “5,000 people” also appears accurate. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that approximately 3,500 to 5,000 workers remain at the facility operating critical safety systems and maintaining the reactors even during the war. This workforce includes reactor operators, security personnel, maintenance staff, and safety engineers necessary to prevent nuclear catastrophe.
The plant’s status represents one of the war’s most dangerous dimensions. Russian forces seized the facility in March 2022 and have controlled it since, though Ukrainian workers continue operating it. The IAEA has repeatedly warned that military operations near the plant risk catastrophic radiation release that could affect millions of people across multiple countries. Shelling has damaged electrical infrastructure and backup power systems essential for cooling reactor cores and spent fuel pools.
Trump’s characterization of Putin “working with Ukraine on getting it open” reflects partial truth. The plant’s reactors have been in various states of operation and shutdown throughout the war. As of late 2025, efforts to safely restart reactors and restore full power generation do involve some coordination between Russian occupation authorities and Ukrainian technical personnel, mediated by the IAEA. However, characterizing this as cooperative “working together” glosses over the fundamental reality that Russia’s military occupation of the plant represents a violation of international law and nuclear safety protocols.
References:
International Atomic Energy Agency. (2024). Update on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Press releases and status reports.
World Nuclear Association. (2024). Nuclear power in Ukraine. Country profile.
Power Reactor Information System. (2024). Largest nuclear power plants worldwide. International Atomic Energy Agency database.
Trump’s Claim That Putin “Wants to See Ukraine Succeed” and Will Provide “Energy, Electricity and Other Things at Very Low Prices”
Verdict: Unverifiable and Questionable Based on Russia’s Actions
This claim represents perhaps the most difficult to fact-check because it reports Trump’s characterization of private conversations with Putin rather than publicly verifiable statements or actions. Nevertheless, we can evaluate whether the claim aligns with Russia’s demonstrated behavior and stated objectives. Let me explain why skepticism is warranted here.
Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine has systematically targeted civilian energy infrastructure throughout the war, particularly during winter months when electricity and heating are most critical. Beginning in October 2022 and continuing through subsequent winters, Russian forces have launched hundreds of missile and drone strikes specifically against power plants, electrical substations, and heating facilities. The stated Russian military objective has been to degrade Ukrainian civilian morale and degrade the country’s ability to sustain its economy and military operations.
These attacks have destroyed approximately 50% of Ukraine’s electrical generation capacity according to Ukrainian government assessments. Millions of Ukrainians have endured rotating blackouts and heating shortages during winter as a direct result of Russian targeting of energy infrastructure. The pattern of attacks demonstrates deliberate strategy rather than collateral damage, with waves of strikes timed for maximum civilian impact.
Given this documented pattern, the claim that Putin “wants to see Ukraine succeed” and will provide subsidized energy strains credulity unless we understand it as describing potential post-war arrangements contingent on a settlement favorable to Russian interests. Even then, Russia’s historical use of energy as a political weapon raises questions about reliability.
Russia previously supplied substantial natural gas to Ukraine at negotiated prices, but used energy cutoffs as leverage during political disputes in 2006, 2009, and 2014. After Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Ukraine diversified its energy sources specifically to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. The idea that Ukraine would voluntarily return to significant energy dependence on Russia seems unlikely unless imposed as a condition of peace.
It’s possible Putin expressed general sentiments about wanting stable relations with Ukraine in a post-war environment, which Trump interpreted generously as wanting Ukraine to “succeed.” Leaders often express such sentiments while simultaneously pursuing policies that undermine them. Without transcripts or independent verification of the Trump-Putin conversation, we cannot assess what Putin actually said versus how Trump characterized it.
The claim might also reflect negotiating posture rather than genuine commitment. Putin may have floated energy cooperation as a concession to make Russia appear reasonable in negotiations while maintaining more coercive positions on territorial and political questions. Seasoned diplomats distinguish between what negotiators say and what they genuinely intend to deliver.
References:
Kyiv School of Economics. (2024). Damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. KSE Institute assessment.
International Energy Agency. (2024). Ukraine energy profile. Country analysis.
Naftogaz Group. (2024). Annual report on gas supply security. State enterprise reports.
Pirani, S. (2018). The Russo-Ukrainian gas disputes. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.