This is an opposition letter filed by the U.S. Department of Justice with Judge Paul Engelmayer of the Southern District of New York federal court. The letter opposes a motion by two members of Congress—Representatives Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie—who are seeking to appear as “amici curiae” (friends of the court) in the criminal case against Ghislaine Maxwell. Assistance from Claude AI.
To understand what’s happening here, you need to know that Maxwell’s criminal case concluded long ago. She was convicted in December 2021 on charges related to sex trafficking, sentenced to 20 years in prison in June 2022, and all her appeals were exhausted when the Supreme Court denied her final petition in October 2025. The case is essentially over, with only two narrow issues remaining before Judge Engelmayer: Maxwell’s collateral challenge to her conviction under a procedural mechanism called Section 2255, and disputes about a protective order governing what discovery materials the government can release publicly.
The Parties
The Original Parties are the United States government (represented by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York) and defendant Ghislaine Maxwell.
The Would-Be Participants are Representatives Ro Khanna (Democrat from California) and Thomas Massie (Republican from Kentucky), who co-sponsored the Epstein Files Transparency Act. This statute, passed in November 2025, requires the Department of Justice to release certain documents related to the Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell investigations.
The Legal Issues
The core issue is whether two members of Congress can insert themselves into a closed criminal case to enforce compliance with a transparency statute they authored. This raises several interconnected legal questions:
First, can the Representatives appear as amici curiae? An amicus curiae is Latin for “friend of the court”—someone who isn’t a party to the case but offers the court helpful, neutral information to assist in deciding the issues actually before it. The government argues that Khanna and Massie don’t meet this standard because they’re not offering neutral assistance but rather trying to advance their own political interests and create entirely new issues.
Second, do the Representatives have Article III standing? This is a constitutional requirement that anyone seeking relief from federal courts must satisfy. Standing requires showing a concrete personal injury caused by the defendant that the court can remedy. The government argues the Representatives have suffered no such injury—they’re merely frustrated that DOJ isn’t complying with their statute as quickly as they’d like, which is a “generalized grievance” shared by all citizens rather than a specific harm to them personally.
Third, does the court have authority to oversee DOJ’s compliance with the Epstein Files Transparency Act? The government argues the Act doesn’t give anyone a right to sue to enforce it, and courts can’t create such rights on their own. The only issues properly before Judge Engelmayer relate to the protective order from Maxwell’s criminal case, not broader enforcement of congressional legislation.
The Government’s Arguments
The Justice Department makes several related arguments that build on each other logically:
The Representatives are trying to exceed the proper role of amici curiae. The government explains that amici curiae exist to help courts analyze issues already before them, not to raise new issues or seek new relief. Courts across the country have consistently held that amici cannot make independent motions, cannot take adversarial positions, and cannot seek relief for themselves. Yet Khanna and Massie want to file a motion asking the court to appoint a special master and independent monitor to compel DOJ to produce documents—relief neither actual party has requested and which goes far beyond helping the court decide existing questions.
The Representatives lack the detached, neutral perspective required of amici. The government cites cases holding that courts should deny amicus status to parties with “their own particular interests” in the outcome. Khanna and Massie co-sponsored the Epstein Files Transparency Act and clearly want to vindicate their legislative work by forcing DOJ to comply faster. They’re not disinterested friends of the court but partisan advocates for their own political project.
The Representatives have no standing to raise these issues. Standing requires showing a concrete, particularized injury—not just being unhappy about how government generally operates. The government argues that the Epstein Files Transparency Act, unlike the Freedom of Information Act, doesn’t create any individual right to obtain information. Even if it did, Khanna and Massie haven’t shown that not receiving these documents has actually harmed them personally. Their status as legislators who sponsored the bill doesn’t help them; the Supreme Court has held that individual members of Congress generally can’t sue to enforce institutional interests of the legislature.
No statute authorizes a lawsuit to enforce the Act. The government emphasizes a fundamental principle: federal courts can only provide remedies where Congress has created a “cause of action”—a legal right to sue. The Epstein Files Transparency Act simply requires DOJ to produce documents but doesn’t say anyone can sue if DOJ doesn’t comply. Courts have consistently refused to create enforcement mechanisms that Congress didn’t include in a statute.
The protective order doesn’t support broader oversight. Judge Engelmayer asked whether his supervision of the protective order gives him authority to oversee DOJ’s Act compliance. The government explains that the protective order only restricts what DOJ may disclose (to protect victim privacy), it doesn’t mandate any particular disclosures. The court modified the protective order to allow DOJ to comply with the Act while still protecting victims, but that doesn’t transform the judge into a general overseer of statutory compliance.
Evaluation of the Arguments
The government’s arguments about amicus status are very strong. The case law is clear and consistent that amici cannot raise new issues, make independent motions, or take adversarial positions. What Khanna and Massie propose—filing a motion to appoint a special master to compel DOJ compliance—is textbook adversarial litigation activity. Courts routinely deny amicus status in these circumstances, and the government cites numerous examples. This argument will almost certainly prevail.
The standing argument is similarly robust. Supreme Court precedent is quite strict about requiring concrete, particularized injuries for Article III standing. The government correctly identifies that Khanna and Massie are asserting a “generalized grievance” about government compliance with law—exactly what the Supreme Court has said is insufficient for standing. The Representatives haven’t identified any way that DOJ’s alleged non-compliance has specifically harmed them as opposed to the public generally. The government also effectively deploys the principle from Raines v. Byrd that individual legislators can’t sue to vindicate institutional legislative interests.
The lack of a cause of action is determinative. Even if Khanna and Massie somehow had standing, they’ve pointed to no statute authorizing a lawsuit to enforce the Epstein Files Transparency Act. The government is correct that Congress must explicitly or implicitly create private rights of action, and courts have become increasingly reluctant to infer them where Congress remained silent. The Act simply requires DOJ production without creating any enforcement mechanism—a choice Congress presumably made deliberately.
The protective order argument successfully cabins the court’s role. By emphasizing that the protective order only restricts (rather than mandates) disclosures and only addresses victim privacy concerns, the government effectively shows that Judge Engelmayer’s ongoing supervision of that order doesn’t extend to general oversight of statutory compliance. This prevents Khanna and Massie from bootstrapping their way into court jurisdiction by piggybacking on an existing case.
Weaknesses and Potential Counterarguments
Despite the strength of the government’s position, there are some potential vulnerabilities:
The Representatives might argue the court has inherent authority to ensure compliance with law. While the government correctly states that the protective order doesn’t mandate disclosure, Khanna and Massie could contend that once the court modified the protective order specifically to facilitate Act compliance, the court assumed some ongoing responsibility to ensure that facilitation wasn’t futile. This argument is weak but not frivolous.
There’s a tension in the government’s position about the Act. The government says the Act was never “an issue in this criminal case” because it was passed after Maxwell’s conviction became final, yet the government itself sought modification of the protective order specifically to comply with the Act. This creates at least a superficial inconsistency—if the Act is irrelevant to the case, why was the protective order modified to facilitate Act compliance?
The Representatives might claim a unique legislative injury. While Raines v. Byrd generally bars individual legislators from suing to vindicate institutional interests, they might argue that DOJ’s alleged non-compliance specifically undermines their legislative work and authority in a concrete way. This argument faces steep odds given Supreme Court precedent, but it’s not entirely foreclosed.
Public interest considerations could play a role. While not a legal argument per se, Khanna and Massie could appeal to the judge’s sense that public transparency in the Epstein matter is important and that DOJ may be dragging its feet. However, this policy argument doesn’t overcome the legal barriers to their participation.
Evidence and Precedent
The government relies heavily on procedural precedents establishing the limited role of amici curiae. Cases like Russell v. Board of Plumbing Examiners establish that amici cannot raise new issues, make independent motions, or assume adversarial positions. The government effectively shows this is black-letter law across multiple circuits.
On standing, the government cites foundational Supreme Court cases like Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez establishing the requirement for concrete, particularized injuries. The citation to Raines v. Byrd on legislative standing is particularly powerful because it’s directly on point and has never been overruled.
The cause of action arguments rely on cases like Ziglar v. Abbasi and Alexander v. Sandoval establishing that courts cannot create private rights of action where Congress has not done so. This is well-settled law that the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed.
The government provides less direct evidence about DOJ’s actual progress in complying with the Act, instead noting that it “has conducted, and continues to conduct” a review process and “expects to update the Court again shortly.” This is somewhat thin—more concrete evidence of substantial progress might strengthen the government’s position that judicial oversight is unnecessary.
Predicted Outcome
The government will almost certainly prevail. The legal barriers to Khanna and Massie’s participation are substantial and supported by clear precedent. The motion for leave to appear as amici curiae will likely be denied on multiple independent grounds:
The Representatives are attempting to use amicus status for improper purposes—not to assist the court with pending issues but to create new issues and seek adversarial relief. This alone justifies denial under well-established case law.
Even if the court somehow allowed them to file an amicus brief, they lack standing to raise claims about Act compliance because they haven’t suffered any concrete, particularized injury. Their generalized interest in government following the law doesn’t satisfy Article III.
Even if they had standing, the Act provides no cause of action for judicial enforcement, and the court cannot create one. The protective order supervision doesn’t extend to general statutory oversight.
The most likely outcome is that Judge Engelmayer will issue an order denying the Representatives’ motion for leave to appear as amici curiae, probably relying on multiple grounds to ensure the decision is bulletproof on appeal.
Next Steps for the Parties
For the Government: If the motion is denied (as expected), DOJ will continue its review process under the Epstein Files Transparency Act and provide periodic updates to the court about its compliance with the modified protective order. The government will proceed with its opposition to Maxwell’s Section 2255 collateral challenge through normal briefing.
For Maxwell: This fight doesn’t directly affect her. Her legal team will continue pursuing her Section 2255 motion challenging her conviction and sentence. The transparency issues are largely separate from her personal legal interests, though she may have some privacy concerns about disclosure of case materials.
For Representatives Khanna and Massie: If their motion is denied, they have limited options. They cannot appeal because they’re not parties to the case. They could potentially seek relief in a different forum—perhaps filing an original action in federal court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel DOJ compliance with the Act, though that would face similar standing and cause-of-action problems. More realistically, they would need to pursue political remedies like congressional oversight hearings, appropriations riders, or amendments to the Act creating an explicit enforcement mechanism.
Broader Implications
This dispute raises important questions about the separation of powers and the proper relationship between the legislative and judicial branches. When Congress passes a law requiring executive action but doesn’t create an enforcement mechanism, can frustrated legislators run to the courts? The answer appears to be no—Congress must include enforcement provisions in legislation if it wants judicial oversight, or use its own political tools like oversight hearings and funding restrictions.
The case also implicates access to information in high-profile cases involving powerful individuals. The Epstein Files Transparency Act reflects congressional and public frustration with perceived secrecy around the Epstein scandal. However, the legal system distinguishes between the political legitimacy of that concern and the legal authority to force disclosure through judicial intervention. Courts aren’t roving ombudsmen for government transparency—they decide cases and controversies between proper parties.
There’s also a subtle question about victim privacy versus public accountability. The government emphasizes that its review process protects victim privacy while complying with the Act, suggesting tension between these values. The protective order modification attempts to balance these interests, but that balance may not satisfy those seeking maximum transparency.
Finally, this illustrates the limits of amicus participation in the federal courts. While amici curiae can provide valuable perspectives in appropriate cases, courts are rightly protective of their role to prevent litigation by proxy. If every interested party could participate as an amicus and make independent motions, the two-party adversarial system would collapse into multi-party chaos.
The government’s opposition is well-crafted, thoroughly researched, and highly likely to succeed in keeping Khanna and Massie out of this closed criminal case.