The core question is not whether nuclear power has technical merit. Rather, it’s whether this particular arrangement represents sound policy or a costly mistake that mixes industrial policy with crony capitalism. Is this another step towards Trump’s version of state capitalism, or even outright socialism?
Key issues:
- Will these projects actually be built, and on what timeline?
- Will electricity demand from AI development materialize as dramatically as projected?
- If projects do proceed, will they experience the same cost overruns and delays that plagued Vtwo recent nuclear projects?
- Will renewable energy plus storage improve enough to make large nuclear plants economically obsolete?
- Will the government’s equity stake prove valuable or become a liability?
- Fundamentally, does this deal represent a genuine strategic investment in critical infrastructure, or is it crony capitalism that enriches connected companies at public expense?
This analysis synthesizes reporting and commentary from four sources: Reason magazine, The Washington Post, The New York Times, and the Cato Institute. Citations appear as numbered references throughout, with full source information at the end.
Extensive assistance from Claude AI.
What This Debate Is Really About
In late October 2025, the Trump administration announced an $80 billion partnership with Westinghouse Electric Company to build new nuclear reactors across the United States. On its surface, this looks like an energy infrastructure project. But the announcement has sparked a fierce debate about something much larger: whether the federal government should be placing massive bets on specific technologies and companies using taxpayer money, or whether such decisions should be left to private markets.
The core question dividing observers is not whether nuclear power has technical merit. Rather, it’s whether this particular arrangement represents sound policy or a costly mistake that mixes industrial policy with crony capitalism. To understand why smart people disagree so sharply about this deal, we need to examine what’s actually being proposed, what history tells us about similar ventures, and why the same set of facts leads different observers to opposite conclusions.
The Deal Itself: What We Know and What Remains Unclear
The Trump administration has entered into what it calls a “strategic partnership” with three entities: Westinghouse Electric Company (which designs nuclear reactors), Brookfield Asset Management (a Canadian investment firm that owns half of Westinghouse), and Cameco Corporation (a Canadian uranium supplier that owns the other half of Westinghouse). The deal aims to build “at least” $80 billion worth of Westinghouse’s AP1000 nuclear reactors to meet the administration’s goal of deploying ten new large nuclear reactors by 2030.[1]
The financial structure creates a complex relationship between taxpayers and private companies. According to the available information, the federal government will “underwrite” at least some of these projects, though exactly what this means in practice remains somewhat murky. What’s clearer is the potential return structure: if the government follows through on financing commitments, it would receive 20 percent of any dividends Westinghouse pays out above a $17.5 billion threshold. Additionally, if Westinghouse’s value exceeds $30 billion within the next few years, the company may be required to go public, with the government receiving warrants that could convert to a 20 percent equity stake.[1][2]
Japan has also pledged involvement, with its trade ministry committing up to $100 billion toward nuclear and AI initiatives involving Japanese companies Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba. This investment comes as part of a broader $550 billion package Japan agreed to invest in American projects in exchange for lower tariff rates from the Trump administration.[1][4]
Several important details remain undefined. How much will U.S. taxpayers actually spend? Which specific projects will move forward and where? What form will the government’s “underwriting” take? The announcement provided a framework but left substantial questions unanswered, which has fueled both speculation and criticism.
The Case for Government-Backed Nuclear Development
The Trump administration’s Energy Secretary Chris Wright framed the deal in ambitious terms: “This historic partnership with America’s leading nuclear company will help unleash President Trump’s grand vision to fully energize America and win the global AI race.”[2] This language reveals the core arguments supporting government involvement in nuclear development.
The first argument centers on national strategic necessity. The explosive growth of artificial intelligence has created unprecedented electricity demands, with data centers consuming power equivalent to entire cities. Nuclear reactors produce massive amounts of reliable, zero-emission electricity. Each AP1000 reactor can generate enough power for more than 800,000 homes.[2] Unlike solar and wind power, nuclear operates continuously regardless of weather or time of day. For AI development and national competitiveness, supporters argue, America needs this kind of dependable, large-scale energy infrastructure.
The second argument involves international competition, particularly with China. While the United States pioneered nuclear technology and currently leads in total nuclear energy production, China is building reactors at a rapid pace and is expected to surpass U.S. nuclear capacity by 2030. Many of China’s new reactors use versions of Westinghouse’s AP1000 design.[4] From this perspective, government backing helps America maintain technological leadership in a strategic industry where the private sector alone has proven unwilling or unable to move quickly enough.
Third, proponents would note that major infrastructure projects often require government involvement because of their enormous scale, long time horizons, and public benefit. The interstate highway system, rural electrification, and space exploration all involved substantial government investment. Nuclear energy, they might argue, fits this pattern: a technology that serves national interests but requires patient capital and risk-bearing that private markets struggle to provide.
Finally, supporters see this as a job creator and industrial policy win. Connor Teskey, president of Brookfield Asset Management, emphasized that partnering with the federal government would “help unlock the potential that Westinghouse and nuclear energy can play to accelerate the growth of artificial intelligence in the United States, while meeting growing electricity demand and energy security needs at scale.”[4] The deal promises to revitalize American nuclear manufacturing capabilities and create high-skilled jobs.
The Case Against: Why Critics See Taxpayer Risk and Market Distortion
The criticism of this deal comes not primarily from anti-nuclear activists, but from market-oriented analysts and libertarian thinkers who accept nuclear’s technical capabilities but question the government’s role. Their arguments deserve careful consideration because they rest on specific historical evidence and economic reasoning.
The most fundamental critique is that government is “picking winners” in a way that distorts markets and puts taxpayer money at risk. Jeff Luse at Reason magazine described the deal as “Republican socialism,” placing it in a pattern of Trump administration actions that include nationalizing steel production and taking equity stakes in chip manufacturers.[1] From this perspective, when government decides which companies and technologies will receive billions in support, it short-circuits the market mechanisms that normally allocate capital based on genuine economic merit. Political connections and lobbying influence decisions that should be made by investors risking their own money.
This critique gains force from the nuclear industry’s recent track record, which is remarkably poor. The evidence here is not disputed across sources—it’s the interpretation that differs. The last AP1000 reactors built in the United States, at the Vogtle plant in Georgia, finished seven years behind schedule and cost roughly $35 billion instead of the initially estimated $14 billion.[2][4] That represents more than $20 billion in cost overruns, or a cost increase of roughly 150 percent. A similar project in South Carolina, also using AP1000 reactors, was abandoned entirely in 2017 after massive delays and cost overruns, leaving utility customers on the hook for billions in sunk costs.[1][4] Westinghouse itself, then owned by Toshiba, filed for bankruptcy protection in 2017 because of these project failures.[3][4]
Thomas Firey at the Cato Institute provides even more historical context that deepens this critique. President Bush’s “Nuclear 2010” program, announced in 2002, predicted the first new reactor would come online in 2010. Utilities proposed more than 30 reactors in response. Most were quickly abandoned when analysts determined they were too economically risky even with substantial federal subsidies. Of all those proposals, only the two projects mentioned above—Summer and Vogtle—actually entered construction, and only Vogtle succeeded in finishing.[3]
Critics also note that nuclear’s problems extend beyond American regulation. Even in China, where the government has far more power to cut through regulatory barriers, the four AP1000 reactors that were built took ten years to complete at high (though uncertain) costs.[3] If regulatory burden were the primary problem, Chinese reactors should have been built quickly and cheaply. That they weren’t suggests deeper issues with the technology’s economics.
The economic comparison to renewable energy adds another dimension. Mark Cooper, an economic analyst at Vermont Law School’s Institute for Energy and the Environment, argues that “the $80 billion is intended to absorb the excess cost of nuclear. Westinghouse has to find a buyer. There are no buyers at the current price. They still don’t recognize that wind and solar are much cheaper.”[4] Over the past year, roughly 90 percent of new energy added to America’s power grid came from wind and solar coupled with battery storage.[2] While less reliable than nuclear, these sources are considerably less expensive and faster to deploy.
Perhaps the sharpest critique comes from Firey’s analogy to past failures: he predicts this deal will prove to be “a cross between Solyndra and the Trump Taj Mahal”—combining the Obama-era solar company that collapsed despite government backing with Trump’s own history of casino bankruptcies.[3] Firey suggests that Brookfield and Cameco may be positioning to take Westinghouse public amid government largesse and PR, allowing them to sell their holdings to credulous investors (including the U.S. government itself) before projects inevitably fail.
Where the Sources Agree: The Undisputed Facts
Despite their divergent conclusions, the major sources covering this deal agree on several crucial facts. This agreement is significant because it establishes a foundation for understanding why people disagree: they’re not working from different factual bases, but rather interpreting the same evidence through different analytical frameworks.
All sources confirm the basic structure of the deal, its $80 billion scale, the involvement of Japan, and the government’s potential 20 percent share in profits and equity. All sources acknowledge that Westinghouse’s AP1000 design is the reactor type involved. All sources report the troubled history of recent AP1000 construction: Vogtle’s delays and massive cost overruns, Summer’s abandonment, and Westinghouse’s 2017 bankruptcy. All sources note that the nuclear industry has struggled in the United States for decades, with no new reactors successfully built in the 21st century until Vogtle.
The sources also agree that Big Tech’s hunger for AI power is driving renewed interest in nuclear. They concur that nuclear provides reliable, zero-emission baseload power that renewables cannot match. They acknowledge that China is rapidly expanding its nuclear capacity and that this creates competitive pressure on the United States.
This factual consensus is important because it means the debate is not about alternative facts or misinformation. Rather, it’s about how to weigh competing considerations: strategic necessity versus market efficiency, national industrial policy versus fiscal prudence, technological optimism versus historical pattern-recognition.
The Historical Context That Shapes This Debate
To understand why this deal provokes such strong reactions, we need to grasp three overlapping historical contexts: the trajectory of America’s nuclear industry, the broader pattern of government industrial policy, and recent political developments around energy.
America’s nuclear story is one of spectacular early success followed by decades of stagnation. During the 1960s through 1980s, the industry thrived, building the fleet of more than 90 reactors that still provides about 20 percent of U.S. electricity. But the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, and the 2011 Fukushima meltdown created deep public anxiety about nuclear safety. More importantly for industry economics, these events led to increasingly stringent safety regulations that drove up construction costs.
By the 1990s, building new nuclear plants in America had become economically unfeasible. Existing plants ran profitably, but no utility could make the numbers work for new construction. The dream of a “nuclear renaissance” has been repeatedly announced and repeatedly deferred. President Bush’s Nuclear 2010 program failed to produce results. President Obama supported nuclear while also backing renewables. Through all these years, the fundamental economic problem persisted: nuclear plants are hugely capital-intensive, take many years to build, face significant regulatory hurdles, and operate in markets where cheaper alternatives exist.
This connects to a broader pattern in government industrial policy. Critics of the Westinghouse deal frequently invoke “Solyndra,” the solar panel manufacturer that received $535 million in federal loan guarantees under the Obama administration before declaring bankruptcy in 2011. For market-oriented analysts, Solyndra represents a cautionary tale about government’s poor track record at picking technological winners. The federal government lacks the information and incentives that guide private investment decisions; political considerations inevitably influence which companies receive support; and taxpayers bear the losses when bets fail.
Supporters of government industrial policy would counter with different examples: government funding helped create the internet, GPS, and numerous medical breakthroughs. They would argue that certain technologies with enormous public benefits but uncertain private returns require government involvement to reach commercial viability. The question isn’t whether government ever succeeds at industrial policy, but rather what distinguishes successful interventions from failures.
Recent political developments add contemporary context. The Trump administration has pursued what critics call “state capitalism” across multiple sectors. Beyond this nuclear deal, the administration has nationalized U.S. Steel, taken equity stakes in chip manufacturers like Intel and quantum computing firms, and generally shown willingness to use government power to direct industrial development. For supporters, this represents pragmatic economic nationalism in the face of Chinese competition. For critics, it represents a troubling departure from market principles that will burden taxpayers and distort the economy.
The regulatory environment around nuclear also shapes current debates. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has long set the global gold standard for nuclear safety, but the Trump administration has taken unprecedented steps to reduce the commission’s independence. Two of five NRC commissioners have left before the end of their terms since Trump took office, including one who was fired—an unprecedented White House action that alarmed industry observers.[2] The administration argues that overly stringent regulation has strangled nuclear development and that streamlining approval processes will enable faster construction. Critics worry that political pressure on safety regulators creates unacceptable risks.
Why Reasonable People Interpret the Same Facts Differently
Understanding this debate requires recognizing that smart, informed observers can look at identical evidence and reach opposite conclusions based on different assumptions, different weighting of values, and different beliefs about how the world works.
Consider the Vogtle project’s performance. Everyone agrees it finished seven years late and $20 billion over budget. A technological optimist might interpret this as learning curve effects: the first new reactors built in decades naturally encounter problems, but future projects will benefit from this experience and proceed more smoothly. The optimist notes that despite the delays and cost overruns, Vogtle now successfully operates and will provide clean power for decades. From this view, the project represents initial stumbling but ultimate success that paves the way forward.
A market skeptic interpreting the same facts sees a pattern, not an aberration. In this view, cost overruns and delays aren’t unique to Vogtle but endemic to nuclear construction worldwide. Even China’s reactors face similar problems despite that country’s ability to override regulatory and public concerns. The skeptic sees Westinghouse’s bankruptcy as proof that private capital, when putting its own money at risk, concluded these projects don’t make economic sense. The fact that Vogtle eventually finished doesn’t change the underlying economics that made private investors unwilling to fund it without extraordinary government support.
These interpretations flow from different beliefs about whether government involvement helps or hurts large infrastructure projects. One view holds that certain projects with massive upfront costs, long payback periods, and important public benefits require government support to proceed. Without such support, valuable projects that serve national interests never get built because private capital is too risk-averse or short-term oriented. Patient government capital can bridge the gap between social value and private returns.
The opposing view holds that government involvement actually causes many of the problems it claims to solve. In this view, government backing creates moral hazard: companies take on projects they wouldn’t otherwise pursue because they know taxpayers will absorb losses if things go wrong. This leads to overly optimistic projections and insufficient attention to cost control. Private investors disciplined by risking their own money would either decline such projects or structure them more carefully. Government involvement doesn’t solve market failures; it creates new failures of its own.
Different views on China’s nuclear expansion also shape divergent conclusions. Those concerned about U.S. competitiveness see China building reactors rapidly and approaching U.S. nuclear capacity, using American-designed technology no less. From this perspective, America is falling behind in a strategically important technology sector and needs aggressive action to maintain leadership. If China can build dozens of reactors using AP1000 technology, why can’t America do the same with its own design?
Those less concerned about this competition note that China’s nuclear expansion may itself prove economically questionable. The fact that an authoritarian government can mandate large-scale construction doesn’t mean such construction makes economic sense. China may be creating stranded assets that will burden its economy in the long term. America shouldn’t rush to replicate potentially uneconomic projects just because a geopolitical rival is pursuing them.
The renewable energy comparison introduces another axis of disagreement. Critics emphasize that wind and solar, enhanced with battery storage, now provide 90 percent of new grid capacity and cost far less than nuclear. But supporters counter that renewables cannot provide the reliable baseload power that nuclear offers. Solar doesn’t work at night; wind doesn’t blow constantly; batteries help but remain expensive and limited in duration. For applications requiring constant, large-scale power—like AI data centers—nuclear’s reliability may be worth its higher cost. Different views on the trajectory of battery technology and renewable costs shape whether this argument seems compelling.
Underlying all these specific disagreements are different philosophies about government’s proper role. Market-oriented thinkers believe that government generally makes poor investment decisions because it lacks market discipline, faces political pressures, and cannot match the information processing that occurs through millions of private economic choices. Government should set rules and let markets operate within them, but not itself become a major market participant picking specific winners.
The opposing view holds that certain decisions are too important to leave to markets alone. National security, technological leadership, climate change, and infrastructure development all involve considerations that market prices don’t fully capture. Government has legitimate reasons to direct resources toward strategic priorities even when pure market logic wouldn’t support such investments. The question isn’t whether government should ever intervene, but whether specific interventions are well-designed and likely to succeed.
What the Debate Isn’t Addressing: Important Questions Left Unasked
For all the attention this deal has received, several important questions remain largely unexamined in the current debate.
First, the discussion focuses heavily on whether this specific deal makes sense, but pays less attention to what would constitute a better alternative if this deal fails or if nuclear proves too expensive. If critics are right that nuclear cannot compete economically, what is the Plan B for meeting massive new electricity demands from AI development? Renewables plus storage may work for much of the grid, but can they scale fast enough to meet data center needs? Should the U.S. simply build more natural gas plants, accepting the climate implications? The debate critiques the government’s approach but rarely addresses the underlying energy challenge that motivated it.
Second, there’s surprisingly little discussion of regulatory reform independent of this deal. Both supporters and critics acknowledge that U.S. nuclear regulation has become burdensome, contributing to cost increases. But the current debate conflates two separate questions: should regulations be reformed, and should government invest $80 billion in Westinghouse? It’s possible to support regulatory streamlining while opposing government equity stakes, or to support government involvement in nuclear while insisting on strong safety oversight. The debate would benefit from separating these issues.
Third, the discussion largely ignores small modular reactors (SMRs) and other advanced reactor designs. The Westinghouse deal focuses on AP1000s, which are large, traditional light-water reactors. But the nuclear industry has high hopes for SMRs and other innovative designs that promise to be safer, cheaper, and faster to build. Only the Cato piece addresses this, noting that no commercial SMRs have yet been built and their promised economic advantages remain unproven.[3] If the goal is truly a nuclear renaissance, shouldn’t policy focus on technologies that might avoid the problems that have plagued traditional reactors?
Fourth, there’s minimal attention to what happens if Westinghouse projects proceed but remain uneconomic despite government support. If AP1000s built under this deal face similar delays and cost overruns as Vogtle, who bears the risk? Utility customers in states that agree to host these plants? Federal taxpayers? The deal’s structure creates profit-sharing if things go well, but the downside risk allocation remains unclear. Past nuclear projects have left utility customers paying for abandoned plants through their electricity bills. Will this deal repeat that pattern?
Finally, the debate engages minimally with the climate dimension. The Trump administration has shown little interest in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, so this deal isn’t being pursued primarily for climate reasons. But nuclear power does provide zero-emission electricity, and some climate advocates support it on those grounds. The sources note that Governor Newsom supported extending California’s last nuclear plant and that the Biden administration provided aid for it.[4] Yet this climate case for nuclear receives little development in the current debate, perhaps because the Trump administration’s other energy policies undercut a climate-focused rationale.
What We Can Reasonably Conclude
After examining the evidence and arguments from multiple perspectives, certain conclusions seem warranted even as fundamental disagreements persist.
First, the nuclear industry’s recent track record in the United States is genuinely poor. This is not a matter of interpretation but historical fact. Recent projects have experienced massive delays and cost overruns, and most proposed projects never reached construction. Westinghouse itself went bankrupt. Anyone supporting government investment in nuclear must grapple with this history rather than dismissing it. The burden of proof reasonably falls on those arguing “this time will be different” to explain why, specifically, outcomes will improve.
Second, the deal’s structure creates clear opportunities for private companies to profit while taxpayers bear substantial risk. Brookfield and Cameco purchased Westinghouse after its bankruptcy for less than Toshiba originally paid.[3] Now they’ve secured an arrangement where government financing enables projects to move forward, potentially allowing them to profit either through operation or through taking the company public at an inflated valuation created by government backing. This doesn’t prove the deal is bad policy—sometimes good policy involves private profit—but it does warrant scrutiny about whether taxpayers are getting a fair shake.
Third, the deal’s lack of detailed transparency is problematic regardless of one’s views on nuclear or government involvement. Major questions about taxpayer exposure, risk allocation, project selection, and timeline remain unanswered. Good policy requires clear accounting of costs, benefits, and risks. The vague assurances that taxpayers will share in profits “once certain thresholds are met” don’t provide the specificity needed for serious evaluation. Both supporters and critics should demand greater clarity.
Fourth, there is a genuine tension between America’s need for massive amounts of reliable electricity (especially for AI development) and the available options for providing it. This is not a manufactured crisis. Every option involves significant tradeoffs: renewables are cheap but intermittent, natural gas is flexible but carbon-intensive, nuclear is reliable but expensive and slow to build. Rejecting government-backed nuclear without explaining how else to meet these needs is incomplete analysis.
Fifth, the international competition dimension is real but may be overstated. China is indeed building many reactors, but whether this represents strategic advantage or uneconomic construction that will burden China’s economy remains unclear. The U.S. shouldn’t necessarily replicate policies just because a geopolitical rival pursues them. America’s nuclear leadership matters more in technology, safety standards, and operational excellence than in raw reactor count.
The Unresolved Questions That Will Determine Success or Failure
Ultimately, whether this deal proves wise or foolish depends on questions that current information cannot answer.
Will these projects actually be built, and on what timeline? The deal announces intentions but doesn’t guarantee construction. Utilities must still agree to host reactors, sites must be selected, permits must be obtained, and detailed engineering must proceed. History suggests that many announced nuclear projects never reach completion. If most of these $80 billion in projects stall or are abandoned, the entire deal becomes moot.
If projects do proceed, will they experience the same cost overruns and delays that plagued Vogtle and Summer? Optimists hope that learning from past mistakes, improved supply chains, and streamlined regulation will yield better results. Skeptics expect the pattern to repeat because the underlying problems are intrinsic to large nuclear construction, not just regulatory or experience curve effects. Time will tell.
Will electricity demand from AI development materialize as dramatically as projected? The case for massive nuclear investment rests partly on assumptions about AI’s future power needs. If AI development slows, if efficiency improvements reduce power consumption, or if alternative technologies emerge, the demand picture could change substantially. Nuclear plants take many years to build; the demand landscape when they finish may differ from today’s projections.
Will renewable energy plus storage improve enough to make large nuclear plants economically obsolete before they’re completed? Battery costs have fallen dramatically; solar and wind costs continue to decline. If these trends continue, the economic case for nuclear may weaken further. Conversely, if battery costs plateau or renewable expansion faces land use constraints, nuclear’s value proposition strengthens.
Will the government’s equity stake prove valuable or become a liability? If Westinghouse thrives and reaches the $30 billion valuation threshold, taxpayers could benefit meaningfully from profit-sharing and equity ownership. But if projects struggle and the company’s value declines, the government’s stake becomes worthless while taxpayers have absorbed substantial risk. The structure creates upside participation but unclear downside protection.
Most fundamentally, does this deal represent a genuine strategic investment in critical infrastructure, or is it crony capitalism that enriches connected companies at public expense? The answer may be knowable only in hindsight, once we see whether projects succeed or fail, whether promised benefits materialize, and whether the terms prove fair to taxpayers.
A Final Reflection for Readers
This analysis has tried to present the strongest version of competing arguments rather than advocating for one conclusion. That approach may frustrate readers hoping for a clear verdict, but the honest assessment is that reasonable people can disagree about this policy based on different but defensible premises.
If you believe that markets generally allocate capital better than governments, that recent nuclear history demonstrates systemic problems rather than bad luck, and that renewable energy can meet America’s needs more cost-effectively, then you will likely view this deal as a mistake that will burden taxpayers while enriching politically connected firms.
If you believe that strategic technologies sometimes require government support to overcome market failures, that America needs to maintain technological leadership against Chinese competition, and that AI development requires reliable power that only nuclear can provide at scale, then you will likely view this deal as necessary industrial policy despite its risks.
Your conclusion probably depends less on technical details about nuclear engineering or financial structures than on broader questions about government’s proper role, how to interpret historical patterns, and how to weigh competing values when perfect information is unavailable.
What seems clear is that this $80 billion bet represents a significant test of these competing philosophies. Within the next several years, we will learn whether Trump-era industrial policy can succeed where earlier attempts failed, or whether market skeptics were right that government cannot successfully direct technological development at this scale. The outcome will inform not just nuclear policy but broader debates about America’s economic strategy in an era of great power competition and technological transformation.
For now, citizens and policymakers face the challenge of making decisions with incomplete information, uncertain forecasts, and legitimate disagreements about how the world works. That’s an uncomfortable position, but it’s the reality of complex policy choices. The best we can do is understand the arguments clearly, recognize their assumptions and limitations, demand transparency about costs and risks, and remain humble about our ability to predict which path will prove correct.
References
[1] Luse, Jeff. “Republican socialism goes nuclear: Trump bets $80 billion on government-backed energy.” Reason, October 29, 2025. https://reason.com/2025/10/29/republican-socialism-goes-nuclear-trump-bets-80-billion-on-government-backed-energy/
[2] Halper, Evan. “U.S. inks $80 billion deal with Westinghouse for nuclear reactors.” The Washington Post, October 28, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/10/28/nuclear-trump-japan-westinghouse/
[3] Firey, Thomas A. “Solyndra Meets Trump Taj Mahal.” Cato at Liberty Blog, November 3, 2025. https://www.cato.org/blog/solyndra-meets-trump-taj-mahal
[4] Penn, Ivan. “Trump Administration Backs Plan for New Nuclear Plants.” The New York Times, October 28, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/28/business/energy-environment/trump-nuclear-westinghouse-deal.html