Wichita targeted economic development should end


Is the City of Wichita able to choose which companies are worthy of taxpayer assistance for the purposes of economic development?

This week and next, the Wichita City Council will attempt to do this several times. It starts tomorrow with a theater owner’s request to avoid paying millions in property taxes. A food processing company is asking for similar treatment.

Several downtown buildings are receiving special assessment financing for improvements. An ordinance allowing a downtown hotel to keep its guest tax collections for its own exclusive benefit will be voted on.

The city will also decide whether to implement community improvement districts. These districts let a business add up to two cents on the dollar of sales tax, and keep that extra revenue for its own benefit. (One wonders why the business doesn’t simply increase its prices by two percent.)

That’s all in one day’s work.

The question Wichitans need to ask is simply this: Do these targeted economic development incentives work? The answer is, almost always, no.

In 2008 the Kansas Legislative Division of Post Audit looked at the use of economic development incentives in Kansas, examining some $1.3 billion in spending over five years. In examining the literature, the auditors found: “Most studies of traditional economic development incentives suggest these incentives don’t have a significant impact on economic growth.”

It also found: “The majority of research concludes there is a lack of demonstrated impact from the typical types of economic development assistance, and that incentives aren’t cost-effective.” The audit can be read at Economic Development: Determining the Amounts the State Has Spent on Economic Development Programs and the Economic Impacts on Kansas Counties.

Recently Alan Cobb wrote of the harm that targeted incentives cause, using Detroit as an example: “While state and local government poured incentives into the Big Three’s trough, the marginal costs of doing business for everyone else crept up.”

Wichita is taking the same path. Instead of competing in the market, businesses look to city hall for special treatment. When applicants ask government for special treatment at the expense of others, the economic term for that activity is rent seeking.

The term rent, or more precisely, economic rent is somewhat unfortunate, as the common usage of the term — paying someone money for the use of an asset for a period of time — contains no sinister connotation. But economic rent does carry baggage.

So what is rent seeking? Wikipedia defines it like this: “In economics, rent seeking occurs when an individual, organization or firm seeks to earn income by capturing economic rent through manipulation or exploitation of the economic environment, rather than by earning profits through economic transactions and the production of added wealth.”

This explanation doesn’t do full justice to the term, because it doesn’t mention the role that government and politics usually play. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics adds this: “The idea is simple but powerful. People are said to seek rents when they try to obtain benefits for themselves through the political arena. They typically do so by getting a subsidy for a good they produce or for being in a particular class of people, by getting a tariff on a good they produce, or by getting a special regulation that hampers their competitors.”

It’s thought that Wichita needs to dish out economic development subsidies so that we can attract new companies to our town, or, as is often the case, retain existing companies. So we grant special tax treatment — usually through industrial revenue bonds, but also in other ways such as tax increment financing — to these companies. Or sometimes we may dispense with these cumbersome processes and simply give companies money or make loans that don’t need to be repaid.

These benefits — representing economic rent and rent seeking behavior — are great for the lucky companies that received them. But what about considering the city or region as a whole? In that case, something different emerges. Here’s an excerpt from “Rent Seeking and Economic Growth: Evidence From the States,” Harold J. Brumm, Cato Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1999):

The present study finds the growth rate of real gross state product (GSP) per capita to be negatively correlated with the initial level of real GSP per capita, the burden of state tax structure, and — most notably — the level of rent-seeking activity in the state. On the basis of the estimates obtained for the standardized coefficients of the explanatory variables in the growth rate equation, the conclusion reached here is that rent-seeking activity has a relatively large negative effect on the rate of state economic growth. An implication of this finding is that a state government which promulgates policies that foster sustained artificial rent seeking does so at considerable expense to its economic growth.

In simple terms, rent seeking activity harms economic growth.

This study also states: “The private returns of rent seekers come from the redistribution of wealth, not from wealth creation. The tax that rent seeking imposes on the productive sector reduces the output growth rate by reducing the incentives of entrepreneurs to produce and innovate.”

This study looked at state governments and their activities, but there’s reason to suspect that the findings apply to cities and counties, too.

So should we simply give up and not grant preferential tax treatment and other subsidies to companies to induce them to locate in Wichita? No. Instead, as I’ve outlined in Wichita universal tax exemption could propel growth, we should offer preferential tax treatment to all new investment in Wichita.

A broad policy like this, where everyone benefits, eliminates the harmful effects of rent seeking. All companies can benefit, not only those that fit into certain categories or make special pleadings to politicians or bureaucrats. All companies can plan with certainty on receiving the benefit — there won’t be the risk whether the city council and bureaucrats will approve the benefit.

This is the type of policy we should follow to increase economic growth in Wichita.


3 responses to “Wichita targeted economic development should end”

  1. Wichitator

    How much is the city spending to subsidize the politically favored businesses in this community? Why don’t these subsidies get reported in the eagle and on the 10 o’clock news?

    Let’s connect the dots between donors and subsidies. I don’t care if the subsidies is a TIF, CID, IRB, NRA (Neighborhood Reinvestment Act), or some other alphabet soup.

  2. […] Wichita targeted economic development should end, Wichita Warren Theater IRB a TIF district in […]

  3. […] findings apply to the issuance of industrial revenue bonds, as the city issued last week and issues […]

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